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France’s Organisme de Défense et de Gestion: A Model
for Farmer Collective Action through Standard
Development and Brand Management
Christopher J. Bardenhagen*, Philip H. Howard** & MarieOdile Nozières-Petit***
Abstract****
Quality-based food production, often with a regional
dimension, can provide farmers with new, value-added markets. It
can also provide consumers with access to place-based high-quality
products, and may benefit local economies through increased
commerce. French Organismes de Défense et de Gestion (ODGs)
illustrate a mode of quality-based agri-food business organization.
ODGs focus on the development of production standards, as well as
management of the intellectual property related to those standards.
This mode, which is commonly used in Europe, has not often been
used in the United States, despite its potential for regional food
system development. The ODG mode may provide certain
advantages, such as the ability to assemble farmers and value chain
actors in a collective food product branding effort, while also
remaining in compliance with anti-trust laws —an ODG does not
actually buy or sell the products it certifies. Here we describe French
ODGs, their legal requirements, and their institutional supports and
development processes. We compare relevant French corporate law
to that of the United States, using Michigan as an example, and
describe how the ODG mode can be organized using existing state
statutes, provided steps are taken to ensure compliance with anti-trust
laws. We discuss how certain French institutional supports can be
*

Christopher J Bardenhagen, PhD, Esq., is a Michigan attorney and recently
completed a doctorate at the Department of Community Sustainability at Michigan
State University. His dissertation research focused on the legal aspects of “quality
group” agri-food organizations in France.
** Philip H. Howard, PhD is an Associate Professor in the Department of
Community Sustainability at Michigan State University. His areas of research
include industry consolidation in the food system and the role of ecolabels in
providing information to consumers.
*** Marie-Odile Nozières-Petit, PhD is a researcher at the National Institute for
Research in Agriculture, Food, and the Environment (INRAE) and UMR
Mediterranean and Tropical Livestock Systems (SELMET) in Montpellier, France.
She studies the changes occurring in livestock systems, their resilience, and their
organization and product markets.
**** Note: The aspects of this study involving human participants were reviewed and
approved by the Michigan State University Human Research Protection Program,
Exempt Category 2: MSU Study ID: STUDY00001089.
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replicated by adding specific provisions to organizational
documents, and how others can be replicated by utilizing private
institutional structures, such as a nonprofit umbrella brand. Finally,
we discuss the circumstances for which the ODG mode could fit
well, and conversely describe specific situations where an ODG may
be less ideal. The ODG model has significant potential for branding
of value-added farm and food products, but as with any mode of
organization or business entity, it is not a panacea.

I. Introduction
Quality-based food production may bring a number of
benefits to farmers and consumers alike. Farmers may develop
alternatives to commodity markets by focusing on qualities that
consumers are increasingly seeking out at a wide variety of levels.1
One type of quality arises from using particular plant or genetic
varieties that have a specific flavor.2 Another type relates to products
grown or raised in particular ways, such as pastured poultry or grassfed beef, which speak to growing consumer interests in animal
welfare, omega-3 nutritional profiles, and environmental concerns.3
Depending on the product, these may be marketed at the
local, regional, or global level, with information about the product
often communicated through food labeling.4 There are many placeSee generally Aimé L. Aumaître, Quality and Safety of Animal Products, 59
LIVESTOCK PROD. SCI. 113, 113-24 (1999); Catherine Mariojouls, Introduction to
Quality: Quality Concepts, Quality Perception by Producers, Clients and
Consumers; Quality Signs (Geographic Origin, Ecolabelling, etc.); Translation of
Quality Concepts into Products, Procedures and Services, 51 CAHIERS OPTIONS
MÉDITERRANÉENNES 15, 15-22 (2000); Bertil Sylvander et al., Establishing a
Quality Convention, Certifying and Promoting the Quality of Animal Products:
The Case of Beef, in LIVESTOCK FARMING SYSTEMS: PRODUCT QUALITY BASED ON
LOCAL RESOURCES LEADING TO IMPROVED SUSTAINABILITY 61, 61 (2006).
2 See, e.g., François Casabianca & Claude Beranger, Le Lien au terroir des
viandes: Une construction originale [The Link to the Meat Terroir: An Original
Construction], in UNE HISTOIRE DES VINS ET DES PRODUITS D’AOC : L’INAO DE
1935 À NOS JOURS 147 (2015) (Fr.) (discussing localized production and genetic
factors leading to quality differences).
3 See, e.g., Kevin Romig, Impetus for Grass–Fed Beef Production in the Beef Belt,
103 GEOGRAPHICAL REV., 112, 112-20 (2013); Philip H. Howard & Patricia Allen,
Beyond Organic and Fair Trade? An Analysis of Ecolabel Preferences in the
United States, 75 RURAL SOCIO. 244, 244-69 (2010); Imen Oueslati et al., Virgin
Olive Oil (VOO) Production in Tunisia: The Commercial Potential of the Major
Olive Varieties from the Arid Tataouine Zone, 112 FOOD CHEMISTRY 733, 733-41
(2009).
4 See generally Jean-Christophe Bureau & Egizio Valceschini, European FoodLabeling Policy: Successes and Limitations, 34 J. FOOD DISTRIB. RSCH., Nov.
2003, at 70, 70-76; Danielle Ufer et al., Information and Consumer Demand for
Milk Attributes: Are Redundant Labels an Effective Marketing Strategy?, APPLIED
ECON. PERSP. POL’Y, 1, 1-2 (2021).
1
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based foods that have a particular quality due to the localization of
their production, marked by the use of local genetic material and/or
traditional know-how. Geographical Indications (GIs), for example,
establish an association and connection between the quality of the
products and a region, such as with Champagne wine, Idaho
Potatoes, and Roquefort Cheese.5 The production for each of these
quality types usually arises from local-based efforts (at different
scales: micro regional, regional or national), in contrast to
commodities which may be aggregated from many points around the
world. Quality-based food production may increase choice and
availability of healthy food options for consumers.6 It may also
provide farmers with a larger share of the food dollar, either through
shorter supply chains or value-added premiums,7 thereby
contributing to the agricultural economy (rural and urban) through
food business development.8
In Europe, farmers have developed multitudes of products
that incorporate production standards with the intellectual property
associated with quality signs. While not exclusive to Europe, quality
signs have been promoted at the European Union (EU) level for
decades as a strategy for rural development and one means of
cultivating and protecting the agricultural sector.9 Groups of farmers
can use quality signs as a method for creating added value and
increased sales through developing reputation. Quality signs can be

5

Luke Owen et al., Place-Based Pathways to Sustainability: Exploring Alignment
between Geographical Indications and the Concept of Agroecology Territories in
Wales,. SUSTAINABILITY (June 15, 2020), https://www.mdpi.com/20711050/12/12/4890/htm. See also M. Julien Frayssignes, L'ancrage territorial d'une
filière fromagère d'AOC. L'exemple du système Roquefort [The Territorial
Anchoring of an AOC Cheese Sector: The Example of the Roquefort System],. 264
ÉCONOMIE RURALE 89, 90 (2001) (evaluating the relationship of Roquefort cheese
production to its territory over time).
6 See Micaela Fischer et al., Food Hubs: Definitions, 10 Expectations, and
Realities. J. HUNGER & ENV’T NUTRITION 92, 93-94 (2015).
7 See, e.g., Marko Nousiainen et al., Are Alternative Food Systems Socially
Sustainable? A Case Study from Finland, 33 J. SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. 566, 581-82
(2009).
8 See Henk Renting et al., Understanding Alternative Food Networks: Exploring
the Role of Short Food Supply Chains in Rural Development, 35 ENV’T & PLAN. A:
ECON. & SPACE 393, 392-95 (2003).
9 Council Regulation 2081/92, art. 2, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1, 2-3 (EC) (repealed by
Council Regulation 510/2006, O.J. (L 93) 12, 12-13 (EC), and further repealed by
Regulation 1151/2012 O.J. (L 343) 1, 1-2 (EU)).
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an effective means of protecting against dilution of quality or cooptation by the larger industry.10
A variety of types or modes of organization are used to
develop quality-based food production at the regional level in the
United States. These include farmers markets, community supported
agriculture arrangements, food hubs, cooperatives and other social
entrepreneurship-focused business entities, standard business
entities, and other governance modes such as state or federal
marketing orders. Due to the many complexities to local and regional
food system development, it is important for legal practitioners and
other business advisors to identify the best mode to fit a particular
effort that will match the specific needs of farmers and other actors
involved.
Particular methods of business organization are often shared
by practitioners across states or countries through research and
networking. For example, the Limited Liability Company (LLC)
form was created by legislation in Wyoming in 197711 and provides
multiple benefits over traditional corporations, such as pass-through
taxation and a high degree of organizational flexibility. LLC
legislation was later adopted by the other states, and now LLCs are
one of the most frequently used forms used to start a business,12 due
to their value for small business development. Although the specifics
of using a particular method or mode of organization will vary from
one legal system to another, the underlying purposes can usually be
translated to other contexts. France has adopted a similar form called
the Société à responsibilité limité (SARL).13 New forms and methods
of organization in many cases require enabling legislation to be
passed, such as with the LLC. However, some new forms and
10

See Lawrence Busch, Is Resistance Futile? How Global Agri-Food Attempts to
Co-opt the Alternatives, in RESISTANCE TO THE NEOLIBERAL AGRI-FOOD REGIME: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 21, 21-22 (Alessandro Bonnano & S. A. Wolf eds., 2018).
11 Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§17-15107(a)(viii)-(ix), 17-15-113, 17-15-122 (Westlaw through 2021 General Session of
Wyoming Legis.) (repealed 2010). See also Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited
Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS LAW. 375, 383 (1992).
12 For example, in Michigan during January 2021, 12,148 new LLCs were created
versus 1,080 new corporate entities. FY 2020/2021 New Corporation and Limited
Liability Company Monthly Totals, MICH. DEP’T OF LICENSING & REGUL. AFFS.,
HTTPS://WWW.MICHIGAN.GOV/LARA/0,4601,7-154-89334_61343_35413-544867-,00.HTML (last visited Sept. 23, 2021). Total number of Michigan domestic LLCs
in good standing as of October 1, 2020 is 623,400, versus 159,799 for-profit
corporations. Total Business Entities as of October 2020, MICH. DEP’T OF
LICENSING & REGUL. AFFS., (Oct. 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7154-89334_61343_35413-114907--,00.html.
13 See Code de Commerce [C. com.] [Commercial Code] arts. L. 223-1–223-43, R.
223-1–223-36 (Fr.).
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methods of organization can be utilized in a specific jurisdiction
using its existing laws.14
EU regulations require applicants seeking to use a quality
sign to be a “group” made up of “mainly producers.”15 This group
must develop production rules called “specifications,” oversee
production controls, and manage the defense of the sign.16 However,
these groups do not actually commercialize the products—their
members do. Countries within the EU can have additional
requirements for these collective management organizations.
France is the birthplace of quality signs from both an
intellectual property and an institutional programming perspective.17
Legislation to protect place-based quality products dates back to
1919,18 and several quality sign programs have been created since
then. The first official quality sign created in France was the famous
appellation d’origine contrôlée (AOC), which provided intellectual
property protection and brand labeling for products having a
connection to terroir, loosely translated as a “taste of the earth” or
the “taste of place” that a product was grown and produced.19
Another quality sign program France developed is the Label Rouge.
Started in 1965,20 Label Rouge is well-known by French
consumers.21 The Label Rouge is held as a certification mark by the
For examples, worker cooperatives can often be organized using a state’s
general cooperative statutes or even using other entities, depending on the state;
and benefit corporations can be created on an ad-hoc basis in Michigan due to the
specifics of Michigan corporate law. However, legislation creating a statutory
basis for a new form provides structure and legal clarity for practitioners and
regulators, which can lower the costs of organization for businesses.
15 Regulation No. 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
Nov. 2012 on Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 2012
O.J. (L. 343) 8.
16 Id. at 9-12.
17 Scholarly articles describing GIs frequently provide introduction to French legal
history; for examples, see articles cited infra in notes 18, 19, and 24.
18 For a comprehensive legal history of French, European, and international
intellectual property related to place-based quality food products, see Lilian V.
Faulhaber, Cured Meat and Idaho Potatoes: A Comparative Analysis of European
and American Protection and Enforcement of Geographic Indications of
Foodstuffs, 11 COLUMBIA. J. EUR. L. 623 (2005).
19 See Elizabeth Barham, Translating Terroir: The Global Challenge of French
AOC Labeling, 19 J. RURAL STUD. 127, 131 (2003).
20 See generally Randall E. Westgren, Delivering Food Safety, Food Quality, and
Sustainable Production Practices: The Label Rouge Poultry System in France, 81
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1107, 1107-1111 (1999) (describing the origins and
characteristics of the Label Rouge program).
21 See Daniel Hassan & Sylvette Monier‐Dilhan, National Brands and Store
Brands: Competition Through Public Quality Labels, 22 AGRIBUSINESS, 21, 21-30
(2006).
14
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French Ministry of Agriculture, and permission to use it is granted to
applicants that can prove that their product is considered to be of
higher quality than the standard version of a product in consumer
taste tests and organoleptic lab testing.22 Label Rouge products are
marketed almost exclusively domestically, with many products
found only in certain French régions. The Label Rouge program is
unique to France and has not been replicated by other countries, but
it has been the subject of study by researchers in other countries.23
The French AOC program became the model for the EU’s
Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and the Protected
Geographical Indication (PGI) programs created in 1992.24 The PGI
program requires a link between a product and the place it originates,
whereas qualification for the PDO program requires that all steps of
production, including processing and further transformation such as
cheese ripening, occur in the designated region.25
Each of the abovementioned official quality sign programs
serve as “umbrella” brands, and an institutional structure for
development and approval of products is provided by governments
both at the member state and the EU level. However, the quality
products themselves are managed within the private sector, by the
groups of farmers and other agricultural businesses involved in
production. Hence, in addition to the official quality sign logos, these
products are marketed under specific private brands.
Often referred to as quality groups, collective organizations
are used to manage quality sign projects. These quality groups must
comply with certain program regulations, which have experienced
22

See id. at 22; Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L641-1 (Fr.); Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime
Fisheries Code] art. R641-9 (Fr.).
23 See, e.g., Westgren, supra note 19, at 1110; Myra Clarisse Ferrer & Glenn C. W.
Ames, Food Quality Certification: Is the Label Rouge Program Applicable to the
U.S.?, 43 J. FOOD DISTRIB. RSCH., 114, 114-115 (2012).
24 24 Regulation 1151/2012 of the European Parliament of the Council of 21 Nov.
2012 on quality schemes for agriculture products and foodstuffs, 2012 O.J. (L 343)
1, 1-4. Council Regulation (EEC) 2081/92 of July 14, 1992 on the protection of
geographical indications and designations of origin agricultural products and
foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1, 1-8 (repealed by Council Regulation (EC)
510/2006, and further repealed by Regulation (EU) 1151/2012). See also Delphine
Marie-Vivien et al., Are French Geographical Indications Losing Their Soul?
Analyzing Recent Developments in the Governance of the Link to the Origin in
France, 98 WORLD DEV. 25, 25-27 (2017).
25 Quality Schemes Explained, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/foodfarming-fisheries/food-safety-and-quality/certification/quality-labels/qualityschemes-explained_en (last visited Sept. 19, 2021). The European Commission
has a webpage dedicated to explaining these “quality schemes” available in
multiple languages. Id.
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changes over the years. Prior to the passing of European Standard
EN 45011 in 1998, quality groups could perform product controls
internally, certifying their own members to be able to use the quality
sign logo.26 However, EN 45011 required quality groups to use
independent organizations for certifying their members’ products.27
In France, this meant that groups managing Label Rouge and PGI
signs had to begin to work with third party control organizations
quickly, whereas the holders of the AOC/PDO sign were able to
continue to be overseen by a special department of the French
Ministry of Agriculture until 2006, after which each of the signs were
required to use control organizations for certification.28
A French ordinance passed in 2006 restructured the Institut
National de l’Origine et de la Qualité (INAO), making it the main
institutional support for each of the quality signs in France.29 Groups
seeking quality signs were then required to organize their collective
management body as an Organisme de Défense et de Gestion (ODG)
and to apply for use of a quality sign through the INAO.30
For reasons described in this paper, French ODGs represent
perhaps the most legally advanced, institutionally supported version
of collective management body used for the quality sign mode of
agri-food organization. Our comparative research addresses the
question of whether this mode can be readily replicated in the United
States, and furthermore, what additional mechanisms are needed to
meet the standards of the French ODG.

26

Christopher J. Bardenhagen, Qualitative Research Data Set Based on 42 SemiStructured Interviews (compiled January 2021) (unpublished data set) (on file with
author, available upon reasonable request). Interview data was coded and separated
into 5 thematic areas for analysis (summary 1, control mechanisms; summary 2,
defense, marketing supports, and other subsidies; summary 3, institutional support,
development, and oversight; summary 4, law and program regulations; summary 5,
missions and purposes of ODG.
27 Int’l Org. for Standardization, General Requirements for Bodies Operating
Product Certification Systems, Guide 65/1996 (April 16, 1998) (replaced more
recently by Guide 17065/2012).
28 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, summaries 1 and 4. See also Marie-Vivien et al.,
supra note 24, at 27.
29 Marie-Vivien et al., supra note 24, at 27. Loi 2006-1537 du 7 décembre 2006
relative au secteur de l’énergie [Law 2006-1547 of December 7, 2006 Relating to
the Energy Sector] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] Dec. 8, 2006, p. 180.
30 Loi 2006-1537 du 7 décembre 2006 relative au secteur de l’énergie [Law 20061547 of December 7, 2006 Relating to the Energy Sector] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] Dec. 8, 2006, p.
180. Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-17 (Fr.).
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In order to understand and consider the ODG mode and its
applications, this paper will proceed in three further sections. Chapter
II will describe the characteristics of ODGs—their function and
purpose, unique legal requirements, and the institutional support they
receive for development and oversight. Chapter III will compare the
method of organizing an ODG under French corporate law with that
of the United States to develop and manage a set of production
standards—more specifically, organizing an ODG in Michigan.31 For
this chapter, three levels of organization building will be considered:
a) meeting base minimum purposes and requirements b)
incorporation of certain aspects and benefits of the French model and
c) replication of a variety of institutional supports. Chapter IV will
explore the “organizational fit” for ODGs in the U.S.––under which
circumstances would the ODG mode be appropriate, and in which
situations would it not be a good fit?
A mixed methods approach was used for this research. Legal
research of French codified law, statutes, and regulation was
conducted. Among the resources used were statutory code books,
online code via Legifrance,32 European Commission information,33
programmatic informational documents, and INAO directives and
guides. Our description of ODGs structure and functioning is also
strongly informed by the perspectives gained from extensive
interviews conducted in France in 2018 and 2019 with farmers,
managers and value chain operators from 12 ODGs, government
staff and INAO outreach agents, consultants, and researchers (42
total interviews).34 We also reviewed the organizational documents
(statutes) from the 12 ODGs researched (note: the term “operators,”
which will be further defined below, refers to farmers and any other
value chain actors such as processors and packers whose actions are
implicated by any of the production rules of the quality sign).
II. Description of Organismes de Défense et de Gestion
Qualification as an ODG is a necessary step for collective
management organizations to utilize French quality signs programs,
and there are statutory requirements imposed on ODG structures. As
such, ODGs have many of the characteristics of a business entity (or
31

Michigan was chosen as the first author is a Michigan attorney and member of
the State Bar of Michigan.
32 See generally Codes, LÉGIFRANCE,
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/liste/code?etatTexte=VIGUEUR&etatTexte=VIGU
EUR_DIFF (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
33 See generally EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
34 The aspects of this study involving human participants were reviewed and
approved by the Michigan State University Human Research Protection Program,
Exempt Category 2: MSU Study ID: STUDY00001089.
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quasi-entity). Here we provide information regarding the basic
functions and purposes of ODGs, their legal requirements,
development process and oversight.
A. Functions, Purposes, and Missions
As France’s chosen form for a collective management body,
the main function of ODGs is to develop and manage a quality sign
product or products.35 France’s very specific outlines for the
functioning of ODGs relate to the basic purposes of its quality sign
programs: rural development and farm viability (especially in remote
and rugged areas), enable equitable sharing of the profits within the
supply side of the value chain,36 and farm competitiveness in the
national and international marketplace.37 There are varying
requirements for each of the programs, but at the heart of each is the
purpose of providing consumers information about the quality of
products.38 As such, ODGs create production standards and promote
their brand, however, ODGs do not produce or sell the products
themselves—it is their farmer, cooperative, or processor members
who actually commercialize the products.39
The definition of quality also varies for each of the programs.
Quality for the Label Rouge program effectively means a better
sensory experience based on taste tests, whereas quality for the
AOP/PDO program is based on the “taste of place” or terroir, and
quality for the PGI program relates to the fact of being raised or
processed traditionally in a particular place.40 As stated by an INAO
35

See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L–642-22(Fr.). See also Bardenhagen, supra note 26, summaries 4 & 5.
36 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L–640-1 (Fr.). As one development researcher/practitioner stated, quality sign
organization is intended to be “…a type of bottom-up labelisation … that is
original because it is rooted in local elements, … it is up to the local group of
stakeholders to define the contents of the code of practice [specifications] …” See
Interview by French research group with anonymous researcher performed under
promise of confidentiality (April 2, 2019).
37 A national strategy of increased farmer adoption of or inclusion in quality sign
projects is being promoted under the current administration. There are some who
have concerns, however, that such a policy could lead to a watering down of
quality.
38 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L640-1(Fr.); Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L641-1− 641-13 (Fr.) (defining the details of the “signes d’identification
de la qualité et de l’origin,” the Label Rouge program’s focus on “qualité
supérieure,” and the AOC/PDO and PGI programs’ focus is on qualities that are
specifically connected to a place).
39 Bardenhagen, supra note 26.
40 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L–641-11(Fr.). See also Regulation 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of
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agent (translated from French), “It has to be a product that is
genuinely specific. You need to be careful: it doesn’t necessarily
have to be a quality product in the sense… how can I put this? It must
satisfy certain organoleptic specificities, but it’s not a product that
will please everyone.”41 While each quality sign product might not
be preferred by all consumers, one of the main public purposes
behind the programs is to efficiently transmit knowledge about these
high-information cost goods.42 For farmers and other operators of
ODGs, this leads to increased product reputation, which further
translates into new markets, increased sales, and/or higher prices.43
The statutory missions for ODGs are clearly defined in the
French Rural Code.44 These include development of the product
specifications, putting in place a control and inspection plan, and
defending and promoting the name of the product as intellectual
property45 (each of these are visited in more detail below). Also
included are requirements to communicate with the INAO for
oversight purposes, such as to transmit a current list of operators and
provide relevant budget information at INAO’s request.46 The
missions outlined in the Rural Code were normally included in the
ODG’s organizational documents.

the Council of Nov. 21, 2012 on the Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products
and Foodstuffs 2012 O.J. (L 343) 1; Barham, supra note 19.
41 Interview with anonymous regional agent performed under promise of
confidentiality, Institut National de l’orgine et de la qualité (Jan. 18, 2019).
42 See generally, Riccarda Moser et. al., Consumer Preferences for Fruit and
Vegetables with Credence-Based Attributes: A Review 14 INT’L FOOD &
AGRIBUSINESS MGMT REV. 121, 122, 126 (2011) (describing experiential goods as
those that can’t fully be evaluated before purchase, and credence products as those
that require trust in information provided, because consumers can’t fully determine
the nature of the good before or after the purchase (e.g., the attribute of
origin)); See also Interview with anonymous member of the Board of Directors
performed under promise of confidentiality, French ODG (Mar. 15, 2019)
(“There’s a real demand from society as a whole for us to explain how we work,”
(translated from French)).
43 As one small farm-market-oriented vegetable farmer described, “… it’s just the
same as being organically certified, you don’t have to justify yourself.” – Interview
with anonymous farmer member performed under promise of confidentiality,
French Organismes de Defense et de Gestion (June 17, 2019).
44 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-22(Fr.).
45 Id.
46Id. See also Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L642-23−642-25.
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i. Development of Production Specifications
Creating and managing product specifications form the core
of the ODG’s functions.47 Referred to as “cahier des charges” in
French, the “specifications” are the body of agreed upon production
rules for a particular product, describing all the steps needed for the
manufacture of the product, from the origin of the raw materials to
the packaging.48 The specifications become the intellectual property
of the ODG, and essentially are what are promoted, defended, and
controlled by the control plan.49 To meet its obligation, an ODG will
provide a space for communication and negotiation between the
farmers and other value chain operators. The more the product is
processed, the more downstream operators will be involved in the
process of developing the specifications.50 For the cases we studied,
many times the baseline of the specifications was simply the methods
that farmers were already using for production, as the main idea is to
include the practices and genetics that result in the typical product.
However, for AOP/PDOs and PGIs, delineation of the geographical
area is also part of the specification-building process, using criteria
which that might include micro-climates within a territory,
geological aspects, and cultural dimensions.51 While simple in
concept, the specifications can become quite complex, and ultimately
include requirements for sizing, shape conformation, packaging,
storage box sizes, and even sucrose (brix) levels.52

47

Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-22. See also Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 5.
48 Westgren, supra note 20, at 1108; see examples of cahier des charges for
different products by using the product search function, INSTITUT NATIONAL DE
L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, https://www.inao.gouv.fr (last visited Oct. 31,
2021).
49 Because the specifications form the rules of production that are advertised to
and/or largely accessible by consumers, they are the basis of branding and
reputational development.
50 Christopher J. Bardenhagen, Data Set Comprised of 12 Organizational Statutes,
Numerous cahiers des charges and Control Plan (2018-2019) (on file with author).
Information obtained upon condition of confidentiality.
51 Id. See also Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L641-6 (Fr.); Council Regulation 1151/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 343) 1-2, 8-9
(EU); Bardenhagen, supra note 26.
52 Bardenhagen, supra note 50. Our qualitative research indicates that ODGs are
increasingly adding specifications related to sustainability and environment, in
order to boost reputation with consumers. However, some practitioners advise to
keep the specifications focused on the production methods and situations that make
the product unique.
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ii. Control Mechanisms
Once the specifications are drafted, the control plan (“plan
de contrôle”) can be created.53 The control plan is based on the
important points of the specifications. It is the basis of verification
that a product is actually produced in line with the rules—enabling a
consumer to trust that a product is what the label says it is. The types
of items controlled for vary by product type and the particulars of the
specifications. They can include checking the documentation of
harvest dates, confirmation of appropriate storage and drying
facilities, and visual inspection of plant and animal variety, such as
the breed of cattle used for milk production for cheese products.54
Other control points include amount of pasture per animal and the
density of trees per acre to stay within agreed-upon limits.55
There are several levels of control: self-control by the
operators, consisting of checks and form filling; internal control by
the ODG, which conducts control checks on operators and audits
operators’ self-control forms; and external control by a third-party
control organization (CO), which conducts control checks of
operators in the field, and audits the ODGs’ control regularly (two to
four times a year).56 This inclusion of an independent third-party
controller to help draft the control plan and provide inspection
services is required by the Rural Code.57 The CO will perform both
planned and surprise visits along the value chain in order to help
ensure compliance with the specification.
The INAO mandates a minimum amount of external control,
the level of which can vary by sector.58 However, the remainder of
controls can be split between the ODG and the CO in a manner that
fits a group’s particular circumstances.59 A greater amount of internal
control will minimize external control needs; this enables those
ODGs that have the capacity and resources to manage a larger part
of the control, while allowing other ODGs to delegate certain tasks
53

Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-2 (Fr.). An overview of the principle or most notable control points will also
be listed in the specifications documents (cahier des charges). Id.
54 Bardenhagen, supra note 26; Bardenhagen, supra note 50.
55 Bardenhagen, supra note 26; Bardenhagen, supra note 50.
56 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 1.
57 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-27−L642-35 (Fr.). Additionally, the CO must be approved and overseen by
INAO per Code Rural L642-34 and R642-41, and all third party-certification
organizations in France are overseen and approved by the Comité Français
d’Accréditation (COFRAC). Id. L642-34, R642-41.
58 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 1.
59 Id.
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to the third-party CO. The ODG’s proposed split of control duties
must be approved by the INAO.60 As an example, one ODG controls
30% of its operators each year, with the CO inspecting 10%. The
ODG and CO coordinate to make sure they control different
operators in a particular year, and that each operator is inspected
relatively frequently.
The control plan also outlines what will be done in the case
of non-conformity. There are three levels of non-conformity: minor,
major, and severe (“grave”).61 Each has different consequences for a
particular control point that must be answered by the operator in a
different length of time (24 hours for severe, 1 week for major,
etc.).62 For example, harvesting the crop before specified dates might
be a minor charge where a warning is given, whereas utilizing an
unauthorized variety would be a severe issue that, if repeated, could
lead to suspension of the use of the ODG’s brand for the farmer.
Normally, ODG managers and the CO will work to help an operator
come back into compliance with the specifications.63 Sanctions can
include excluding the operator from use of the ODG’s branding label,
but this is rare and nearly always the result of inaction on the
operator’s part.64
The costs of third-party certification are usually covered by
the ODG, but charged to operators via annual fees (“cotisations”) in
order to spread the costs evenly over time, though in some groups the
individual operators pay the CO directly when they are controlled.65
iii. Defense of Intellectual Property and Brand Management
As the name implies, one of the main purposes for the ODG
as a collective management organization is to defend the quality sign
against fraud and usurpation.66 Fraudulent use of the sign can occur
at two levels—the local/regional level and the larger national or
international commerce level. Locally, fraud tends to happen in the
form of individual farmers who are not part of the ODG marketing
their products using the quality sign name brand or logo, often at
farmer’s markets, local shops, or at roadside stands. Most ODGs that
60

Id.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at Summary 1.
64 Id; Bardenhagen, supra note 50. Note that the control organizations do not
inspect for food safety compliance; it is only for the specification points. However,
COs are obliged to report serious food safety issues if they see them.
65 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 1; Bardenhagen supra note 50.
66 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-22 (Fr.); Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 5.
61
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we interviewed have these issues with some frequency,67 and
managers will talk to the farmer or send a cease-and-desist letter.
Usually such action is sufficient, but if not, ODGs can get the INAO
involved, or even file an action at the local court.
At the extra-regional or foreign level, the positive reputation
that an ODG develops can lead outside businesses to infringe on the
name. When this occurs, ODGs can work with INAO and the French
consumer fraud authority, DGCCRF,68 which can provide assistance
and legal support.69 Most ODGs do not get involved with litigation
frequently, but when it does occur INAO provides substantial
support, including sharing the costs of legal services.70
ODGs carry out a variety of promotional activities for the
quality sign, with some being more involved with marketing and
promotion efforts than others. ODGs promote their quality sign
brand in a general way, rather than particular products of their
individual members.71 Managers often attend regional food fairs and
salons where they can educate people about their production
practices and hand out promotional materials. Some ODGs are
involved with agri-tourism, setting up farm visit days with maps of
farmer stops on a trail or around a region, as well as supermarket
promotions, usually within the relevant farming region.72 However,
some of the larger volume ODGs have initiated media campaigns,
67

Ideally, all the farmers in a particular region will eventually begin to produce
under the specifications and become official members of the ODG, especially with
the regionally-oriented AOP/PDO and PGI programs. This 100% saturation can
happen as an ODG develops its reputation, gains sales, and adds producers over
time.
68 Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Repression
des Frauds, https://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf (last visited Sept. 20, 2021).
69 See Id.; INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ (INAO),
https://www.inao.gouv.fr (last visited Sept. 20, 2021). The INAO has authority to
take action/litigate based on France’s intellectual property code (Code de la
Propriété Intellectuelle) whereas the DGCCRF takes action based on the consumer
code (Code de la Consommation). See Code de la propriété intellectuelle
[Intellectual Property Code] art. L711-1−L731-4 (Fr.); Code de la consommation
[Consumer Code] art. L511-1−L541-3 (Fr.).
70 As stated by an INAO agent (translated from French): “If we observe that
someone is doing this, we can… not necessarily take them to court straight away,
it generally starts with official letters, but it can end up in court if there’s no other
way of finding a solution. In that case, we have lawyers who support the ODG.
And the cost – because lawyers aren’t free! – is shared between the ODG and the
INAO.” – Interview with anonymous regional agent performed under promise of
confidentiality, Institut National de L’orgine et de la Qualité (Jan. 18, 2019).
71 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summaries 2 and 4. ODGs do not buy, sell, or
otherwise commercialize quality sign products themselves; more on this in the
“Legal Requirements” section below.
72 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 2.
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such as advertisements in the Paris Metro.73 ODGs often receive
subsidies from the EU or regional French authorities in order to
promote their products, sometimes in collaboration with businesses
that do the direct marketing of the products.74
B. Legal Requirements
The definition and main legal requirements for quality sign
programs and ODGs are outlined in Book Six, Title IV of the French
Rural code.75 However, multiple areas of the law apply to ODG
functioning, in particular French corporate and nonprofit law, and the
French Intellectual Property code related to trademarks and
geographical indications.76 This subsection B will focus on the
specific laws and regulations that help to shape and define ODGs.77
i. Entity Considerations and Membership Definitions
A very important aspect of ODGs is that they must not have
a commercial purpose, meaning that they do not buy, sell, or
themselves produce the goods they manage.78 Because of this, only
certain forms of business entities are permitted for organizing an
ODG,79 namely, “syndicates”80 (farmer’s unions), or associations
73

Id.
Id.
75 See generally Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L640-1−L644-15, R641-1− D646-37 (Fr.) (“La valorization des
produits agricoles, forestiers ou alimentaires et des produits de la mer.”).
76 Trademark laws are similar in France and the U.S., but geographical indications
have a separate legal regime in France, found in the CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ
INTELLECTUELLE [INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE] art. L721-1−L722-17, R7211−R. 722-7.
77 Many of the main requirements for ODGs are spelled out in Chapter II, Section
III of Title IV (Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code] art. L642-17−L. 642-26, R642-33−R642-36), titled Les organismes de
défense et de gestion [Defense and Management Organizations].
78 Bardenhagen, supra note 26. This admonition against commercial purpose,
while not found in French codes or accessible regulations, is detailed in the
INAO’s guidance publication for ODGs. INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE
LA QUALITÉ, GUIDE DU DEMANDEUR POUR LA
RECONNAISSANCE EN QUALITÉ DE DÉFENSE ET DE GESTATION [APPLICANT’S GUIDE
FOR RECOGNITION AS A DEFENSE AND MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION] 16 (2017). It
was also mentioned and emphasized by multiple INAO agents and other
interviewees officially connected to the INAO. For this reason, it is either a de
facto regulation, or, we hypothesize, a per se regulation codified in an INAO
Circulaire, which are not publicly accessible.
79 See id.
80 Syndicates are organized under the French labor code. Code du travail [C. trav.]
[Labor Code] art. L2131-1−L2131-6. Code du travail art. R2131-1 requires a
syndicate to file their statutes at the local Mayor’s office.
74
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organized under the Loi du 1er juillet 1901,81 the main nonprofit law
used in France.82 For-profit corporations and cooperatives are
prohibited from use due to their commercial nature, though certain
“interprofessions” organized prior to 2007 can be approved to act as
ODGs, provided they split their ODG missions and finances from
their other activities.83 While a baseline business entity must be used
to organize an ODG, we posit that the ODG form can be considered
as a “quasi”-business entity due to the statutory and regulatory
requirements that apply to the form. ODGs can manage more than
one quality product,84 for example a poultry ODG might manage
different quality signs for the chicken, duck, and eggs that its farmers
raise.
The flexible, if complicated, French legal platform for ODGs
gives all the relevant value chain actors implicated by the production
rules the power to get involved. ODGs can involve farmers, packers,
processors, slaughterhouses, and potentially other upstream and
downstream actors, collectively defined as “operators.” The Rural
Code, in seeking to ensure that all relevant producers have a voice in
decision-making about the production rules, define an operator as
“… each person that actually participates in the activities of
production, transformation, processing, or packing planned for in the
production specifications …”85 In other words, any actor who is
involved in a production step outlined by the production rules is an
operator and has certain rights and obligations under the Rural Code.
Operators are deemed to be members of the ODG as a matter
of law,86 but membership in the underlying entity – the association
or syndicate – can be further defined in their organizational
81

This association law is an important standalone law that has not been
incorporated into one of the French statutory codebooks but is instead regulated by
the law of contracts. Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’assocation [Law
of July 1, 1901 relating to the Association Contract] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 2, 1901, p.
1. Associations must file their statutes at the local Prefecture, found at the head of
the department (akin to a county seat in the United States; there are 101
departments in France). Id. Statutes are publicly available by request, but not
online.
82 However, ODGs are not charitable organizations.
83 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-19 (Fr.).
84 Id. art. L642-17.
85 Id. art. L642-3. Similar to Michigan state law, “persons” can include
corporations and other legal entities under French law. See e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 450.2108 (Westlaw through P.A. 2021, No. 81, of the 2021 Reg. Sess.,
101st Legis.).
86 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-21 (Fr.).
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documents, following laws applicable to that entity.87 Operators can
be represented by delegates, provided there is some democratic
mechanism for selection of delegates and that the operators are kept
informed about ODG matters.88 In some ODGs, for example,
cooperatives are the main members, but this is acceptable because
the farmer operators are involved in the democratic processes at the
cooperative level.89 However, ODGs must provide a means for
individual operators to become part of the ODG, for example farmers
that are not members of a member cooperative.90
ii. Financing
Regarding financing, an ODG is free to determine how to
calculate a fee structure for the funding of its activities.91 Sometimes
these fees (cotisations) will be flat, but they are often calculated on a
per-unit basis. The decision to set fee levels must be decided on
annually by the General Assembly, which is the whole body of the
members, and the details of this vote must be provided to the INAO.92
This provides the operators a direct vote on the fees as a matter of
law, ensuring a small board of directors cannot control the financial
decisions affecting all the operators. Operators are obligated to
provide the information necessary to calculate their fees to the
ODG,93 though in some situations not all operators in an ODG are
necessarily liable to pay the fees, for example where a cooperative
pays on a farmer’s behalf.
iii. Organizational Documents and Structural Requirements
The basic fee structure, details on membership, and missions
are all set forth in the ODGs “statutes” and “règlement intérieur,”
which are organizational documents similar to corporate articles of
incorporation and bylaws in the United States.94 In order to apply for
87

For example, the groups statutes might require the annual fees to be paid as a
condition or confirmation of membership.
88 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78, at 8.
88 See id.
89 See Bardenhagen, supra note 26; Bardenhagen supra note 50.
90 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITE, supra note 78, at 8.
91 Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-24 (Fr.).
92 Id. See id. art. L642-25.
93 See id. art. L642-24.
94 An organization’s statutes contain many of the operational rules concerning
membership and the board of directors inter alia, that would be contained in
bylaws in the U.S. However, while bylaws in the U.S. are a private document, the
statutes are a semi-public document, accessible by the general public, but only
upon request (not held online like articles of incorporation can be in the U.S.). As
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recognition as an ODG, the group must provide their statutes (and
règlement intérieur if they have one) to the INAO for approval.95
Groups have a high degree of flexibility with how to structure the
ODG, but among other things, INAO checks to see if the relationship
between the operators passes scrutiny regarding three statutory and
regulatory factors:
•
•
•

representativeness of the operators (représentativité des
opérateurs)96
democratic functioning (fonctionnement démocratique)97
balanced representation (représentation équilibrée)98

These factors, detailed below, broadly seek to implement
fairness, which is a concept that is perhaps uniquely operationalized
in various areas of French law including contracts.99 Overall,
deference is given to the group organizing the ODG, but INAO
outreach agents and National Committee members100 check to ensure
that the power relationship between actors is not too out of balance.
Representativeness of the operators. The factor of
representativeness of operators relates to the basic rule that all
operators potentially implicated by the ODG’s product specifications
such, the statutes are somewhat of a cross between articles and bylaws. The
règlement intérieur is a private document, however, which can add more specifics
and rules to the statutes but cannot contradict the statutes on any matters. A
règlement intérieur is optional – many ODGs do not have one. See Guides
Pratiques [Practical Guides], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ,
https://www.inao.gouv.fr/eng/Espace-professionnel-et-outils/Produire-sous-signesde-qualite-comment-faire/Guides-pratiques (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
95 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-33 (Fr.).
96 See id. L642-18; INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, INAODJR-2009-03 RÉV. 1, SUIVI DES CONDITIONS DE RECONNAISSANCE ODG
[MONITORING OF ODG RECOGNITION CONDITIONS] (2011).
97 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 96.
98 Id.
99 See Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1171 (Fr.) (deeming certain sideclauses that create a “significant imbalance” between parties to be “unwritten”
(essentially non-enforceable)); Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art. 1195 (Fr.)
(allowing a judge to revise a contract when unforeseen circumstances make it
onerously costly for a party to perform); Code Civil [C. Civ.] [Civil Code] art.
1221 (Fr.) (allowing specific performance unless it would be extraordinarily costly
to the obliged). Fairness is a concept incorporated into contract law in United
States as well, but the French mechanisms seem to provide stronger safeguards
against greatly disadvantageous outcomes.
100 The Rural Code creates several national committees to provide oversight of
quality sign programs and approve applications for ODG status. See Code rural et
de la pêche maritime [Rural Fisheries and Maritime Code] art. L642-6−L642-11
(Fr.).
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must have a voice.101 To assess this, INAO agents work to determine
how many operators are involved with the ODG relative to the total
number of operators currently working in the production of that
product, as well as the volume of product the group organizing the
ODG produces relative to the whole.102 For example, the organizers
of an ODG for a GI identifying a particular variety of pears should
make sure that at least 80% of the growers of that variety in that
region are represented and involved in the discussions, and similarly
that most of the volume of production is represented. In this way, an
ODG should mirror fairly closely the extant industry, so that the
ODG does not become an exclusive club.103 As intellectual property,
the quality sign becomes a common good among the producers and
operators involved, and therefore an ODG should not be created in
such a way as to allow one or more firms to monopolize it.104 In a
practical sense, this does not mean all operators will participate in
the ODGs production rules from the start. Often the membership
grows once the ODG is more established and the operators involved
experience more benefits, with some PGI and PDO ODGs eventually
adding all the farmers from the region onto its membership list.
Some scholars, however, question the value of
representativeness, noting that this requirement can duplicate
already-existing inequalities or unfair situations between ODG
actors.105 For example, a group of smaller cheese producers might
seek a quality sign for their products that requires the use of certain
artisanal practices, but representativeness enables larger companies
of cheese in their area to enter the ODG and water down the rules. In
101

See, e.g., id. art. L642-18. The rules, regulations, and practice surrounding
ODG development provide multiple layers of assurance that any of the farmers and
other value chain operators involved in production can have a place in the
development of the ODG and the production rules, even if through another
democratic entity such as a cooperative.
102 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78.
103 In the case of GIs, a delineated region is created, and all growers inside that
region are implicated. However, the rules of Label Rouge allow for farmers or
other food producers to create a product that is different from the standard, without
regional constriction and reputational history, and so some Label Rouge ODGs
illustrate exceptions to this rule. For example, several producers of a new, special
variety of wheat could work together, potentially span different regions, provided
they create a collective (ODG) that enables other producers that comply with the
product specifications to join.
104 For further reading related to the concept of common ownership, see Stéphane
Fournier et al., Les indications géographiques au regard de la théorie des
communs [Geographical Indications with Regard to the Theory of Commons],
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES ÉTUDES DU DEVELOPPEMENT 139, 141 (2018).
105 See Delpine Marie-Vivien et al., Controversies Around Geographical
Indications: Are Democracy and Representativeness the Solution?, 121 BRIT. FOOD
J. 2995, 3006 (2019).
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this way, the reputation that may have been built by artisanal
producers over many years can become exploited by processors
working with essentially commodity milk.
Democratic functioning. The factor of democratic
functioning requires there to be democratic processes underlying all
important decisions for the ODG. All operators must be able to have
a voice individually or to elect members through some democratic
mechanism.106 This means that even though farmers are operators in
an ODG, cooperatives can be per se members and vote in the General
Assembly because there is a method for electing the delegates
through the cooperative.
To create a democratic form, ODGs can organize different
classes of operators into colleges or sections.107 This enables the
different classes to have representation on the board of directors
(conseil), which provides flexible structuring that can fit nearly any
value chain situation and number of operators. Some ODGs may
have hundreds of farmers, multiple processors, and a college of
farmers that process on farm, whereas more simple ODGs have only
farmers as members. As such, the ODG model can allow for
significant complexity, as opposed to the cooperative form, which is
normally more limited to one member, one vote, and single levels of
membership, even for different product areas (though capital
contributions can vary). Democratic functioning in an ODG is not
limited to one member, one vote, and structures where the
downstream actors (e.g., processors, slaughterhouses) have as many
board seats as the upstream operators (e.g., farmers) are not
uncommon and are found to be acceptable by INAO.108
Relevant to the concept of democratic functioning, it is up to
the ODG to spell out the process of creating the product
specifications, and the body that is charged with developing it.109
Although the structure must be approved by INAO, which
presumably ensures that the voices of the operators are heard, in
some cases the main process of product rule creation can be
delegated to the board.110 While this surely adds practicality to the
development of the production rules, there is a risk of decisionmaking being skewed towards more concentrated actors, such as

106 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE
107 See id. at 13.
108

L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78.

Bardenhagen, supra note 50.

109 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra
110 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.

note 78, at 12.
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cooperatives and processors, even if those results are ratified at the
General Assembly of operators.
Balanced representation. The factor of balanced
representation relates to the different categories of the operators
along the value chain that are involved.111 While this factor is
ostensibly meant to ensure that farmers have significant voice, this
principle goes both ways, also requiring that there be representation
from the processors, packers, and other downstream operators. This
factor is closely tied to the representativeness and democratic
functioning of an ODG. What is considered to be balanced
representation can vary widely, again with deference usually given
to the ODG. INAO will step in when they determine there is a
significant imbalance or lopsidedness, such as a situation where a
small number of downstream operators hold a clear majority of the
decision-making power.112
C. Institutional Support and Oversight
Two significant areas of support for ODGs are related to
support during the application process, including applications for
changes to existing production rules, and to subsidies that help save
resources for ODGs.
i. Application Process and Continuing Oversight
The INAO is main supporting organization for ODG
development and ongoing changes with production specifications,
with approximately 21 INAO regional offices serving the different
French regions.113 Interested groups will come to these agents for
information and guidance on the process. Three important areas for
which INAO agents provide support and oversight are the
development of the ODG organizational structure, the development
or modification of specifications, and communications with the
INAO National Committee114 that ultimately decides on the ODGs
application.
The organizational structure is of first order importance
because it is the ODG that creates the specifications via a democratic
111See INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA
112 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.

QUALITÉ, supra note 78, at 12.

L’INAO sur le Territoire [INAO on the Territory], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE
L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, https://www.inao.gouv.fr/eng/The-NationalInstitute-of-origin-and-quality-Institut-national-de-l-origine-et-de-la-qualiteINAO/L-INAO-sur-le-territoire (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
114 See Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art.
L642-6–642-11 (Fr.) (establishing the INAO National Committee structure).
113
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process; therefore, it is important to ensure that the appropriate
stakeholders have a voice and a sufficient level of voting power in
the ODG. To accomplish this, when working with a new group INAO
will evaluate whether the appropriate stakeholders are involved in
the process, per the représentativité or representativeness factor
mentioned above. Usually, local agents already have familiarity with
the sector involved, but will also go to the local Chamber of
Agriculture to cross reference information given to them by the ODG
organizers regarding the volume of product and percentage of the
implicated operators they represent.115 To help institute the factors of
fonctionnement démocratique and représentation équilibrée, INAO
agents can provide advice to groups on the internal structure during
the development of their statutes,116 with some agents being more
involved in statute development than others. Groups are encouraged
to connect with existing ODGs to gather experience and examples of
statutes that can help them create their organizational structures.
Industry groups and cooperatives also help with statutes
development in some circumstances. Local INAO agents can send
difficult questions regarding the statutes or internal structure on to
the legal department at the central INAO office in Paris for an
opinion. Overall, INAO agents guide groups in creating a structure
that will pass the scrutiny of the INAO National Committee.
As the production rules or specifications are being written by
the ODG, a Commission of Inquiry is created from members selected
from the INAO National Committee.117 Both this commission and an
ODG’s local INAO agent will provide expertise on items that should
be included (or alternatively, excluded).118 They also will advise
groups to consider the corresponding control measure for any item
that will be included in the specifications, as control measures are
based on important points in the specifications. Both INAO agents
and members of Commission of Inquiry can ask for help from
university or government research units to provide assistance on an
ad hoc basis with writing specifications, such as with drafting a
comprehensive definition of the product.119 Additionally, agents
from control organizations (COs) will advise groups on
115

Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
As mentioned above, the statutes are similar to bylaws in the U.S., setting out
provisions for the governance structure for the organization (e.g., board
membership and voting rules). The statutes document is the main organizational
document for ODGs and many other corporate organizations.
117 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
118 Id.
119 Marie-Odile Nozières-Petit, Comment (June 3, 2021). Dr. Nozières-Petit is a
member on the Label Rouge/PGI National Committee, serving as a personalité
qualifié.
116
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specifications and items to consider for the control plan if they are
able to connect early on with an ODG.120
Where specifications involve defining areas of production,
as with PDOs and PGIs, INAO will provide experts to help delimit
and define the areas, including geographers.121 These definitions will
eventually become part of the specifications.
Once an ODG’s dossier is ready, it is sent to the appropriate
INAO National Committee, which oversees and approves
applications both for new quality signs and for modifications to an
existing quality sign’s specifications.122 The National Committee
structure is an important institutional pillar for the French quality
sign programs, providing a clear decision-making process for
recognition of products and oversight to ODGs.123 The appropriate
committee will look at the ODG’s statutes (and règlement intérieur
if the group has one) to ensure it complies with the Rural Code
requirements for structure.124 The committee will also review and
comment on the specifications or modification of the specifications.
The French fraud and consumer protection agency (DGCCRF) is part
of the committee process and can provide ODGs input on labelling
and other items on behalf of consumers.
The INAO agents and members of the Commission of
Inquiry serve as liaisons for ODGs at the National Committee
meetings.125 After helping a group to prepare their dossier for
committee approval, the local agent and the members of the
Commission of Inquiry will attend the meetings (held in Paris) in
order to explain the ODGs case, acting both as an advocate for the
ODG and as a communication messenger from the National
Committee to the ODG.126
The process of quality sign development can be quite long,
with final approval taking anywhere from two years, to longer than
a decade.127 It can take four or more years to make seemingly simple
modifications of the production rules.128 This is perhaps both a
120

Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 1.
Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
122 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summaries 2 and 3; See Code rural et de la
pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-6 (Fr.)
123 For more about the National Committee structure, including details about the
composition of the subcommittee, see See Code rural et de la pêche maritime
[Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. R642-1–642-12 (Fr.).
124 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
121
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weakness and a strength of the quality sign programs—while
practical amendments related to technological advances require an
onerous process, consumers are essentially provided a higher
guarantee that the level of quality will not be eroded. INAO has a
policy to not approve any change in specifications that will have a
negative impact on the quality of the product, however it is debatable
whether this has been adhered to in certain cases.129
Once approved, local INAO agents will continue to work
with and provide oversight to ODGs. They are invited to the General
Assembly meetings, where they can confirm the voting process for
annual fees required by law.130 ODGs are required to annually submit
to the local INAO agents the minutes of the General Assembly
meetings and a current list of operators.131 Local agents are normally
in frequent communication with ODGs because they regularly seek
to make modifications to the production rules, including sometimes
minor changes, such as storage container size.
ii. Defense and Marketing Support and Other Subsidies
While there is little direct government aid for farmers to
adopt quality label production, ODGs and quality signs are supported
in a numerous ways. Common agricultural subsidies and farm aid
from the EU and France can help farmers to get started with quality
sign production, as with other types of production.132 In some cases
regional authorities help farmers in these systems, for example, to
make equipment purchases relevant to the region’s production.
Regional bodies, such as the Chamber of Agriculture, sometimes
provide office space and other office support for ODGs.133
Cooperatives often offer programs for new farmers, who might be
edged towards quality signs as viable avenues of production.
However, in most cases it seems to be the price premium or

129

For example, in one cheese group, the rules were changed to allow pasteurized
milk to be used to make the cheese, enabling much larger farmers to enter the
ODG and produce large volumes of cheese, but damaging the reputation of the
quality sign and putting downward pressure on quality. See Marie-Vivien et al.,
supra note 105, at 3001-02.
130 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
131 Id. See also Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries
Code], art. L642-25.
132 See Commission Staff Working Document Evaluation of the Impact of the CAP
Measures on the General Objective ‘Viable Food Production,’ SWD (2021) 106
final (May 11, 2021). For example, the EU has subsidized 50% or more of the cost
of tree plantings in certain areas, and for certain varieties – but these are not
limited to quality sign varieties. See Commission Staff Working Document on the 3
Billion Tree Planting Pledge for 2030, SWD (2021) 651 final (July 16, 2021).
133 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 3.
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reputational edge of quality signs that attracts farmers to work with
ODGs in their area.134
One of the most important areas of support at the level of the
ODG is assistance with defense. As mentioned above, ODGs can
write cease and desist letters to people inside and outside their region
based on the intellectual property they have been granted in the form
of a quality sign. However, when that isn’t effective, the ODG can
ask INAO to send a cease-and-desist letter, which is backed up by
threat of litigation—INAO will share the legal costs with groups.135
It would be impossible to quantify the value of having a government
agency backing up an ODG’s intellectual property, but in addition to
staff time and the sharing of lawyer’s fees that occur from time to
time in higher profile cases, many infringers are likely deterred by
INAO’s cease and desist letters at the outset.
Another area where ODGs garner a significant amount of
support is promotion. The EU regularly provides funding that can be
used for building reputation for an ODG’s products.136 The amounts
can represent a significant percentage of an ODG’s marketing budget
and provide money for advertisements, such as for national radio
spots. Regional authorities also provide substantial support to ODGs,
for promotion of the brand, as well as products associated with the
region.137
In closing this section, it should be emphasized that one of
the largest sources of support, which saves substantial ODG
resources, is the INAO itself. This institutional framework provides
groups a starting point and assistance that would normally have to be
undertaken by an entrepreneur, and in an ad-hoc manner, which
would likely be less efficient without tested models and processes to
adopt. Salient to the topic of marketing supports, INAO agents help
with development and oversight using programmatic rules that serve
to keep a high level of quality for the products. The umbrella nature
of the quality sign labels (Label Rouge, PGI, PDO/AOC) creates a
framework that significantly lowers the cost of developing reputation
for a group, because of the existing recognition and credibility of the
label.
134As

stated by one ODG manager (translated from French): “Objectively
speaking, it’s not the subsidies that incite farmers to produce. … What does
encourage them is the added value of having a Label Rouge [product] in relation to
standard production.” – Interview with Anonymous, Business Manager, French
Organisme de Défense et de Gestion (Jan. 29, 2019).
135 Bardenhagen, supra note 26, at summary 2.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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III. Legal Methods of Organization of the ODG Mode in
the United States
The central aspect of this model—the development of
production specifications and the management of resulting
intellectual property—can be accomplished using existing state-level
law. Here we use Michigan as an example state legal system and
statutory regime. However, there are several important aspects of the
French model that would require modifications or special provisions
to be put into the organizational documents. Furthermore, there are
many benefits stemming from the quality sign programs and other
French institutional supports that would require the development of
oversight mechanisms. This paper will visit each of these levels in
turn.
A. Establishing the Core Purpose of Development and
Management of Specifications
Creating an organization that replicated the core purpose of
the ODG model in the United States would be relatively simple.
However, additional steps need to be taken in order to ensure
compliance with anti-trust laws.
In Michigan, the most appropriate entity to use would be a
nonprofit association created under the Nonprofit Corporation Act.138
This act can be used to create a wide range of nonprofit businesses.139
By electing to use a non-stock membership structure, the group can
create an appropriate form based on the circumstances and the value
chain actors involved.140 The organization can be managed on a one
member, one vote basis, which is the default basis provided in the
law,141 or different classes of members can be given different voting
rights.142 This would allow for operators to be organized into
colleges, each of which has a defined level of representation on the
board of directors.

138

Nonprofit Corporation Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.2101-.3192 (Westlaw
through P.A.2021, No. 81, of the 2021 Reg. Sess., 101st Legis.).
139 These include nonprofit cooperatives. See id. § 450.2123(2)(a). However, due
to the commercial nature of the cooperative form, even a nonprofit cooperative
would not be appropriate for the ODG mode, particularly if value chain actors
other than farmers will be involved, due to antitrust concerns. See generally 26
U.S.C.A. § 501; see also 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 291-292.
140 See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.2302 (Westlaw through P.A. 2021, No. 81, of the
2021 Reg. Sess., 101st Legis.1983); see generally id. § 450.2304.
141 Id. § 450.2304(3).
142 Id. § 450.2304(2).
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It is necessary to elaborate the basic purposes for the
organization in the articles of incorporation.143 While this statement
can be somewhat broad (e.g., “ …organized for the purpose of
branding agricultural products”), it may be prudent to narrow to the
main purposes of the ODG mode in order to help clarify the noncommercial nature of the organization: the purpose of the
organization is to create of production standards, develop of
intellectual property and branding, and promote and defend the
brand.144 While non-commercial, an ODG-mode business is not a
charitable organization and therefore would not quality as a 501(c)3
organization for federal income tax purposes.145
A nonprofit association that has value chain actors other than
farmers for members will not be exempt from anti-trust regulations
under the Capper-Volstead act,146 making it important to ensure that
members are not using the organization to engage in any sort of price
setting. Provisions should be included in the articles of incorporation
that prohibit real time price fixing or quantity coordination across
members. The bylaws should also have a provision that explicitly
prohibits discussions regarding prices or efforts to affect quantity at
all meetings of the organization. French ODGs similarly comply with
antitrust laws by not engaging in commercial activities, and by not
allowing members to use ODG meetings and venues to discuss
price.147
In regard to antitrust and competition law, however, it is
sometimes argued that certain production specifications can
ultimately affect quantity—directly or indirectly. A full analysis of
related French and EU anti-trust jurisprudence is outside of the scope
of this article,148 but production rules that provide direct constraints
143

See id. § 450.2202(b).
This suggestion is made both in keeping to the French ODG model and in
providing a safeguard against violation of anti-trust regulations.
145 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3). However, an ODG-mode business organized as a
Michigan nonprofit corporation might qualify as a 501(c)6 trade association. See
id. § 501(c)(6).
146 See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 291-292. An exception lies with organizations managing
federal and state marketing orders, which can include processors in addition to
farmers; they are exempt as a result of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937. See
id. § 608b(a).
147 Bardenhagen, supra note 26.
148 For more on this topic, see Emmanuel Raynaud & Egizio Valceschini, Collectif
ou Collusif? [Collective or Collusive?], 2 Revue Internationale de Droit
Économique 165, 195 (2005); Stéphan Marette & Emmanuel Raynaud,
Applications du Droit de la Concurrence au Secteur Agroalimentaire
[Applications of Competition Law to the Agri-Food Sector], 277 Économie Rurale
2, 3 (2003); Emannuel Raynaud & Egizio Valceschini, Competition Regulation
Against Quality Policy: The «Label Rouge» in the French Poultry Industry, in
144
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on quality, such as limiting the amount of acreage or limitations to
entry of new participants, can sometimes survive scrutiny in France
and the EU. However, such product specifications should be avoided
in the United States until/unless there is clear legislation and/or case
law enabling them to be used, or unless there is an applicable legal
exemption that a group is working under (for example, a federal
marketing order).149 Production rules that are established in order to
develop a particular quality of product, such as geographical origin,
varietal or genetic selection, or grading and uniformity rules, do not
directly limit quantity and should therefore be safe from an anti-trust
perspective.150 Similarly, production rules that focus on conservation
or other sustainable practices should be allowable, given that thirdparty certifications, ecolabels, and food safety rules are widely
adopted across farmers without issue, even if these rules have
(usually limited) indirect consequences on quantity. However, rules
that are ostensibly quality-oriented, but are actually a guise for
limiting quantity should not be used; the ODG mode would not
protect a group or industry from anti-trust actions in such a
situation.151
B. Incorporating Other Benefits Resulting from French law
An organization in the United States seeking to replicate the
multiple aspects of fairness prescribed in French law can do so by
adding specific provisions to their organizational documents. One of
the central tenets of the French quality sign programs is accessibility
to the ODG and the resulting brand.152 All farmers and other actors
that comply with the rules should be able to join the ODG, have some
level of voice in the decision-making, and utilize the brand or quality
TYPICAL AND TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS: RURAL EFFECT AND AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
PROBLEMS 529, 530 (F. Arfini & C. Mora, Eds., 1997).
149 Limitations to acreage have been used as a cause of action in the United States.
See John C. Monica, Jr., Agricultural Antitrust Liability: What About the
“Reasonable Farmer?,” 22 Drake J. Agric. L. 1, 13 (2017) (discussing agricultural
antitrust litigation in the United States).
150 While price leads antitrust discussion, quality is also a metric that is considered
in antitrust actions. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., THE ROLE AND
MEASUREMENT OF QUALITY IN COMPETITION ANALYSIS 1 (2013). The United
State’s brief for the OECD roundtable quotes the U.S. Supreme Court: “The
antitrust laws do not require manufacturers to produce generic goods that
consumers do not know about or want. The manufacturer strives to improve its
product quality or to promote its brand because it believes this conduct will lead to
increased demand despite higher prices . . . ” Id. at 120 (citing Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 897 (2007)).
151 See generally Monica, supra note 94.
152 See discussion supra Section II.B.iii; Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural
and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-18, L642-21 (Fr.); INSTITUT NATIONAL
DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78.
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sign resulting from the work. To accomplish this using a nonprofit
association in the U.S., provisions related to the concept of operators
need to be included. “Operators” can be defined as all persons,
natural and legal, that are involved in any step of product production
that is specifically outlined by the production rules. This means that
a processor that uses a specific process or ingredient outlined in the
production rules would be considered an operator, whereas a
distribution company that simply buys, transports, and sells the
product to retails would not. A bylaw giving operators the right to
have input and voice in the organization should be included, as well
as one providing the right to use the resulting brand if the operator is
in compliance with the specifications.153
Other important fairness aspects of the ODG mode include
representativeness of the operators, democratic functioning, and
balanced representation.154 The first of these, representativeness,
relates to the existing industry for a product. In France, a majority of
the quality signs are related to geographic areas, so that a quality sign
under the PGI or PDO/AOC programs will necessarily implicate the
entire industry in that area.155 This provides significant public policy
justification for the ensuring that the industry is well-represented
during the ODG development process. Other quality products,
including some having Label Rouge status, are not necessarily from
a defined region, but often arose from already existing production
systems. When developing an organization following the ODG mode
in the United States, however, the factor of representativeness may
not be necessary nor desired in many circumstances, such as for the
development of new products, or when a product is intended to be
marketed for its higher quality or special production rules. For
example, a farmer group that wanted to work together to grow a
specific variety of potato such as fingerlings would not need to
involve all of the potato farmers in the state in the development of
their organization. However, for a quality product based on a
geography and its existing reputation, representativeness would be
153

Note that it is not necessarily the case that all operators need to be fee-paying
members in order to enjoy these rights. A provision in French law establishes that
all operators are members, but this may in fact be in opposition to certain EU
public policies as well as impracticable in certain contexts. Code rural et de la
pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-21 (Fr.). See also
Marie-Vivien et al, supra note 105, at 2996.
154 See discussion supra at Section II.B.iii; Code rural et de la pêche maritime
[Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-18 (Fr.); INSTITUT NATIONAL
DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ, supra note 78, at 1.
155
See discussion supra Sections II.B.iii, II.C.i. The structural requirements for
ODGs coupled with the programmatic requirements for the PGI and AOC/PDO
programs result in the potential for inclusion of all operators in the industry in the
delineated region, though participation is voluntary.
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appropriate. Having no overarching institutional structure in the
U.S., these decisions would be made in an ad hoc manner by the
organizers.156
A group can implement the factors of balanced
representation and democratic functioning by creating provisions
related to voting rights and board representation that seek to provide
an appropriate balance of power between the actors involved. The
characteristics of a fair structure will vary based on the circumstances
of the operators and their production. Consideration of the amount of
input by the different categories of actors should be made, for
example, whether most of the work that adds value is done by
farmers, processors, or other relevant actors. Representative equality
can be implemented by providing decision-making weight to the
different categories of actors based on the amounts of production
rules and responsibility that falls on each of them, such as by
allocation of board seats. However, to ascertain this, it is important
for the organizers to create a process for gathering input from all of
the relevant operators involved. Otherwise, operators not sufficiently
included or heard can become disenfranchised, which may lead to
declining quality.
C. Replicating Institutional Supports
Developing a governmental institutional framework similar
to the INAO would likely be extraordinarily costly and politically
infeasible, but many of the strengths of the French institutional
arrangement could feasibly be replicated using private organizations,
and potentially some level of public support. Three main areas of
consideration are development support, quality sign programming,
and defense. Each of these are detailed separately below, although
they also intersect with each other.
i. Development Supports
One of the biggest strengths of the French system is the
existence of INAO agents, who provide some level of assistance
during the development process.157 These agents work with farmers
156

However, if an umbrella brand or oversight program is created to provide
institutional support, representativeness could be instituted as a required factor. See
Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L.
642-6–642-11 (Fr.).
157Interviews conducted with the French international development agency CIRAD
identified this type of expertise as being one of the most desired, potentially
beneficial institutional supports for work in developing countries. See also
Delphine Marie-Vivien & Estelle Biénabe, The Multifaceted Role of the State in
the Protection of Geographical Indications: A Worldwide Review, 98 WORLD DEV.
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in a similar manner as university agricultural extension agents in the
United States, developing expertise in the area of farm business
outreach over their careers. Similarly, there are cooperative
development centers that provide educational outreach, training, and
business development advice in the United States.158 These are often
associated with land grant universities and work in partnership with
university extension agents.
If similar programming around the ODG mode was
developed using these existing land grant resources or via a private
organization, only a handful of agents would be needed to provide
significant outreach, education, and developmental assistance to
groups organizing as ODGs. For example, if a government program
similar to cooperative development programming were to be created,
training could focus with as few staff members as one agent per
business development center, or one extension agent per state.159
Agents with ODG mode expertise could help groups with the
organizational process, ensuring that the right actors are involved and
providing assistance with developing bylaws and production rules.
During the development process, agents could work to ensure the
principles of balanced representation, democratic functioning, and,
where appropriate, representativeness of the extant industry. Agents
could also recommend adoption of the principle that all operators
who comply with the rules are eligible to join the quality sign
organization and use the resulting brand, if that matches the policies
promoted by the agents’ institutions.
ii. Quality Sign Programming
Development of a quality sign program at the state level is
possible in the United States, but funding and other issues may
present significant obstacles that are not feasible to overcome in most
states. However, it is possible that a private organization could be
developed at to create an umbrella brand for groups of producers to
develop products under. While a full assessment of the topic of
1, 1-11 (2017). See Delphine Marie-Vivien & Estelle Biénabe, Institutionalizing
Geographical Indications in Southern Countries: Lessons Learned from Basmati
and Rooibos, 98 WORLD DEV. 58, 58-67 (2017).
158
For examples, the Michigan State University Product Center’s Michigan
Cooperative Development Program; the Mid-America Cooperative Council;
University of Wisconsin’s Center for Cooperatives.
159 On the private side, a relevant example can be found with Cooperative
Development Services, which provides consulting services for food cooperatives
around the United States. They have several experts who travel to conduct
feasibility studies and other food cooperative business development work;
however, these agents have developed a specialized expertise that is indispensable.
See COOP. DEV. SERVS., https://www.cdsus.coop (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
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organizing an umbrella organization is outside the scope of this
study, in this subsection I will visit a few of the key structural aspects
needed to replicate important benefits of the French quality sign
programs.
A quality sign umbrella organization could develop rules to
help shape the ODG-mode organizations and to provide ongoing
oversight. It might be beneficial to create a baseline set of standards,
such as minimum animal welfare and sustainability practices, that
could apply across products.160 The organization could limit the
program to a particular geographical area, such as a region within
Michigan, or a wider foodshed such as the Great Lakes. However,
any umbrella brand organization would need to define what is
different about its products and require groups to define the
specificities of their products. In a practical sense, the success of the
brand might rest on having higher intrinsic levels of quality, in
addition to any other qualities such as geography or being grown with
sustainable practices.
Once the main rules were developed, this umbrella
organization could develop logos and apply for a certification mark
or a collective mark (both marks are types of trademarks) that would
become the basis for a branding program. The organization would
allow ODG-type farmer groups that comply with its rules to use the
resulting logo for branding.
Such an umbrella organization would want to keep its
standards high in order to develop its reputation and establish
credibility. A significant amount of strength and detail of control is
mandated for the French quality sign programs, presumably to ensure
a high level of integrity, and that the signs and products can withstand
scrutiny of policymakers and the consuming public. This justifies the
use of third-party certification organizations. However, the level of
control needed for an umbrella label in the United States could vary.
For some efforts, third-party certification might be prudent to help
provide legitimacy of the brand and program, whereas for others,

160

The Label Rouge program in France has baseline production rules for a variety
of product types, for example, beef, poultry and lamb. Groups seeking the Label
Rouge quality sign must meet these rules at a minimum, and also create their own
specific standards in order to develop a unique product. See generally Label Rouge
[Red Label], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE L’ORIGINE ET DE LA QUALITÉ,
https://www.inao.gouv.fr/eng/Official-signs-identifying-quality-and-origin/LabelRouge-Red-Label (last visited Sept. 18, 2021).
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such as where consumer trust is high, control checks could be carried
out by the umbrella brand itself.161
Developing financial capital for such an umbrella brand
effort would present a substantial challenge. Due to the large amount
of up-front funding that would be needed to help with the
establishment and organization of the ODG-type production groups,
as well as the resources for the promotion and advertising needed to
successfully develop brand recognition in early years, the
participation of an investment fund could be critical to the feasibility
of the effort. The purpose of developing branding for farmers is not
generally charitable (unless it is tied to another charitable purpose
such as helping underserved communities), and for this reason, the
involvement or creation of a community development financial
institution (CDFI) to create a funding pool may be unlikely to be
successful. Standard venture capital groups are unlikely to work
either, because the venture capitalists will likely want some say in
the programmatic rule development in order to allow flexibility to
adjust to the market. However, this desire would be in direct
opposition to the rigidity of standards needed for long-term brand
development needed. Additionally, venture capitalists will likely
demand relatively high rates of returns to their investment.
However, there are alternatives to CDFIs. One possibility is
to utilize a Benefit Corporation, a burgeoning type of socialentrepreneurship entity, to garner investment from socially conscious
individuals and impact investors who are interested in regional food
system development. These investors may be willing to take a lower
rate of return,162 and a Benefit Corporation can be used to ensure that
the original purposes of the corporation (developing regional
branding for farmers) are adhered to, even if it is less profitable than
other ventures. However, the corporation would have to deal with
securities registration and subsequent advertising of investment
opportunities.

161

Participatory guarantee programs can provide an alternative to conventional
third-party certification; see, for examples, Kornelia Kirchner, Overview of
Participatory Guarantee Systems in 2014, in THE WORLD OF ORGANIC
AGRICULTURE: STATISTICS & EMERGING TRENDS 2015 134, 134 (Helga Willer &
Julia Lernoud eds., 2015). Patrick Mundler & Stéphane Bellon, Les Systèmes
Participatifs de Garantie : Une Alternative à la Certification par Organismes
Tiers ? [Participatory Guarantee Systems: An Alternative to Third Party
Certifiation?], 5 POUR 57, 57-65 (2011). Paulo Niederle et al., Social Movements
and Institutional Change in Organic Food Markets: Evidence from Participatory
Guarantee Systems in Brazil and France, 78 J. Rural Stud. 282, 282-291 (2020).
162 See Philip Roundy et al., Finance or Philanthropy? Exploring the Motivations
and Criteria of Impact Investors, 13 SOC. RESP. J. 491, 491-512 (2017).
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If an umbrella organization manages to overcome these
funding and brand development challenges, and eventually gets to
the point where it is running smoothly with numerous member
groups and products, the organization could be used to provide the
expert agents mentioned in the subsection above. Per unit fees have
potential as a sustainable source of funding for those agents and other
operational needs, if the label results in price premiums and increased
sales volumes that make these fees economically feasible to charge
operators. The Label Rouge program, for example, is funded in part
in this manner.163
iii. Defense
ODGs in France enjoy a significant benefit in the form of
government aid for the defense of intellectual property.164 Both the
sending of cease-and-desist letters, and assistance with litigation by
INAO, act as deterrents to domestic and foreign usurpation, and
provide support to ODGs in their defense efforts.
Similar support for intellectual property defense could be
provided to some extent by an umbrella brand organization. An
umbrella organization could centralize defense activities for each of
its groups’ products, writing cease and desist letters, and initiating
the enforcement of US intellectual property laws where necessary.
Template cease and desist letters could be drafted and used for
different circumstances (for one example, local farmer usurpation in
direct markets, in another example infringement of the logo or brand
name by an outside business). If an umbrella organization is
successful financially, per unit fees could be collected from groups
to use for defense of the brand in courts when necessary. Such costs
of litigation and/or mediation could be substantial.
State departments of agriculture (e.g., Michigan Department
of Agriculture and Rural Development) provide another possibility.
A single group or an umbrella organization could negotiate an
arrangement to provide aid with defense efforts. Such a relationship
with a state’s agriculture department could be mutually beneficial,
protecting the reputation of both the quality sign organization and the
state’s agricultural sector, especially if the umbrella organization
uses state or an internal region geography as part of the label. This
would likely require new legislation, which might be more feasible
if it were applicable to other agricultural groups based in the state
(for example, if the Michigan Apple Committee could also request
163

Code rural et de la pêche maritime [Rural and Maritimene Fisheries Code] art.
L642-13 (Fr.).
164
See discussion supra Section II.C.ii.

2021]

A Model for Farmer Collective Action

35

state assistance when their label is being infringed upon). Cease and
desist letters written by the state would be a relatively low-cost
method of meeting these mutual goals,165 and in a best-case scenario,
assistance with funding the costs of litigation by the state could be
provided.
IV. Appropriateness of the ODG Mode for Different
Contexts in the United States
The utility of the ODG mode of organization will vary based
on the particular circumstances of a value chain or producer group.
Here we consider the “fit” of the ODG for various contexts in the
United States, and conversely situations where the ODG mode would
likely not be an appropriate fit.
A. More Ideal Contexts for the ODG Mode
The ODG mode has many strengths as an organizational tool
and may be beneficial for groups to use in the right circumstances.
First, as with any value-added food production effort, it is necessary
to have a strong customer base and market for the group’s products,
whether that is achieved through local proximity, shortness of supply
chain, or access to a wide geography using conventional distribution
channels. Additionally, the group of farmers must be amenable to
cooperation. Below is a list of circumstances where the ODG model
would have a more ideal fit:
i. Where groups of farmers want to work in common on
branding a value-added product.
The branding could be intended to develop reputation for a
specific quality of the product (region, variety, growing process), or
could be used for highlighting sustainable practices, or some
combination of these criteria. Take, for example, market gardener
farmers in Southern Michigan, many of whom grow garlic, and use
non-certified organic practices. Working with the assumption that
many of these farmers have the capacity to grow more garlic, an
ODG-mode organization could be formed to create rules and develop
and manage a brand and logo. Farmers could use this label to signal
quality attributes—the chosen variety, sustainable practices, and
geography—to direct market and other types of purchasers. As
consumer awareness of the label grows through, for example, regular
promotion (e.g., posters or flyers) used by members during farmers
165

After the initial development of a template cease and desist letter form, it may
be fair to estimate about two to four hours of MDARD staff time would be needed,
between communication about the issue with the stakeholder group representative
and writing and sending the letter (for a simple matter.)
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markets across the state, demand for the product could also grow,
provided the high quality of the product is maintained.
ii. Where it would be beneficial to have other value chain
actors besides farmers involved (e.g., upstream or
downstream actors).
A strength of the ODG mode is that a variety of value chain
actors can be organized in a manner that is not in opposition to
antitrust laws. In contrast, cooperatives cannot normally have other
value chain actors involved without violating antitrust laws, due in
large part to their commercial nature.166 One example of a product
that would need downstream operators to be involved is Honeycrisp
variety apples from Northwest Michigan, which are known to have a
higher quality due to their coloration, taste, and other factors. In order
to market a fairly uniform, high quality product, a group of farmers
would need to create sizing, coloration, and sucrose content rules for
apples to be sold under the label. Only a small percentage of regional
farmers’ Honeycrisps would make the grade, and the equipment
facilities needed to do the sorting could run into the tens of millions
of dollars in upfront costs. However, many or most apple farmers
already work with packers that have this equipment, and have the
ability to segregate and store apples for marketing over the year. The
Northwest Michigan growers would want to work closely with one
or more of these packers on production standards and management
of ongoing operations.
iii. Where aggregation is required to meet the needs of large
buyers, such as supermarkets and institutions.
Production standard development is conducive to the
aggregation of farmer’s products, because of the resulting
consistency of quality, and the ability to create the sizing and grading
uniformity rules acceptable to supermarkets.167 The ability to
aggregate numerous farmers’ products should enable the distribution
of larger product volumes and sales in wider geographical areas
(statewide, nationally, internationally). Furthermore, the specific set
of standards that is developed can be protected as intellectual
property for purposes of branding and reputation development. This
circumstance could apply to both the garlic and the Northwest
Michigan Honeycrisp groups mentioned above. The Honeycrisp
166

See John C. Monica, Jr., Agricultural Anti-Trust Liability: What About the
“Reasonable Farmer?” 22 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1, 1-2 (2017).
167 See Getachew Abatekassa & H. Christopher Peterson, Market Access for Local
Food Through the Conventional Food Supply Chain, 14 INT’L FOOD &
AGRIBUSINESS MGMT. REV. 41, 41-60 (2011).
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group likely will require a wider distribution than its growing region
to make the effort feasible, so working with larger retailers in the
Great Lakes region could be an ideal fit. The Southern Michigan
garlic group might find that distribution around the state is feasible
and within their aggregate capacity, given a sufficient price premium
or net return.
iv. Where voluntary organizations are preferable to
mandatory organizations (e.g., marketing orders168).
Whereas marketing orders impose requirements and taxes on
all the farmers in a region that are growing a particular product, the
ODG mode could be used to set up an organization that is voluntary
to join.169 The garlic group mentioned above provides an illustrative
example. The subset of garlic growers that are interested in creating
a value-added product could organize without implicating all garlic
growers in the delineated area, as a marketing order would.
Furthermore, to ensure that the opportunity extends to all growers,
ODGs are designed to have open membership for any new producers
168

State and federal marketing orders in the United States impose fees (and rules
in some circumstances) on all of the farmers in the area that grow the particular
product. These are voted in often by a simple majority of producers, sometimes by
slim margins. State marketing orders have oversight by the states (See e.g.,
Michigan, see the Agricultural Commodities Marketing Act, MCL § 290.651-.674
(Westlaw current through P.A. 2021, No. 81, of the Reg. Sess., 101st Legis.)), and
federal marketing orders are overseen by the US Department of Agriculture, who
authority to approve or disapprove actions by the group or board managing the
marketing order. 7 U.S.C.A. § 601. In relation to marketing orders, ODGs may be
more farmer-centric and have less heavy ongoing political and government
involvement once started (for example, members of the Michigan state agricultural
marketing committees are appointed by the governor.)
Antitrust exemptions are made for marketing orders via the Agricultural
Marketing Act of 1937, and processors are allowed to be involved (for example,
the tart cherry federal marketing order is voted on by growers but creates duties for
processors). 7 U.S.C.A. § 608(b). As such, one strength of marketing orders is that
quantity control measures can legally be taken by the industry in an attempt to
provide consistency of price, and in some cases such as tart cherries, availability of
product inventory to ensure consistent supply to buyers. However, these quantity
control measures require growers to ‘set aside’ or even dump product on the
ground by law; and strong disagreements can occur within the industry.
ODGs are voluntary; while farmers and other operators are required to
comply with the production rules and often to pay annual fees in order to market
their products using the ODGs quality sign/brand name, farmers are free to sell
their products in other markets, including commodities markets. Furthermore
ODGs can have not only processors, but as many other upstream and downstream
value chain actors as is practicable.
169 This applies generally to development in the U.S., and to certain quality sign
ODGs in France. However, while with PGI and PDO/AOC groups membership is
not mandatory, farmers in the region cannot legally use the regional brand
developed without following the specifications and joining the ODG.
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willing to follow the production rules. The result is that the voluntary
aspect of ODGs does not lead to an exclusive closed club.
v. Where fairness and equity between value chain actors is a
need.
Fairness is an integral part of the French ODG model, due to
specific requirements for a balance of power between actors in an
ODG, and to an underlying focus on fairness in contracts under
French law. As detailed in Section II above, these aspects could be
infused into an ODG-mode organization in the United States using
specific provisions in organizational documents and/or, if necessary,
by creating oversight mechanisms (although these oversight
mechanisms might have a significant cost). Take, for example, a
product such as a type of cheese organized by Michigan milk
producers, which is produced for larger-scale distribution in the
Great Lakes region. Processors and/or transformers would need to
be involved to process the milk, create, shape, and ripen the cheese,
and then package it for distribution. Given that processors are often
very concentrated in the dairy industry, farmers could use an ODG
to both involve the downstream actors, and protect their decisionmaking voice and power within the organization.
B. Less Ideal Contexts for the ODG Mode
As with any mode or entity, the ODG mode would not be an
ideal fit with every circumstance, and does not promise to be a
panacea. Below are a few circumstances where the ODG mode
should clearly be avoided:
1. The ODG mode would not work well for marketing a large
number of individual products, because it would be difficult to create
production standards for each product. An example would be a
multiple-farm CSA collaboration for grouping numerous market
garden products, whether through seasonal subscription or through a
common online ordering system—instead, a cooperative or LLC
would likely be better fit. However, a strong umbrella brand for
market garden products could facilitate the creation of production
standards for a large number of products over time.
2. The ODG mode would not be a good fit for the
conventional version of commodity products such as corn, soybeans,
or oranges. The ODG mode is mainly applicable to value-added
products, because the production rules are intended to provide
something different or additional in comparison to the commodity
version of the product, such as varietal or regional qualities.
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3. The ODG mode would not be a good fit for products that
have a large variability in size, appearance, or variety, if the intent is
to aggregate for larger-scope wholesale markets, such as
supermarkets. This is because supermarkets normally require a
significant amount of uniformity.170 For example, if a group of
farmers wants to work together to market a certain variety of peach,
but there is great variability between size and color of peaches from
each of the different farmers, an ODG mode would be less
appropriate.
V. Conclusion
French ODGs provide one model for regionally-based food
product organization. Geographical indications have been
comprehensively studied as an intellectual property umbrella that
farmers can gather under, boasting well-known products from France
and around the world.171 However, less is known about the nature of
the collective management organizations underlying those products.
This research investigated the legal underpinnings as well as
institutional supports that affect the structure of these collectively
managed entities in France. France’s statutory and regulatory
regimes for ODGs have unique attributes and strengths, including a
focus on fairness and balance in structure, and an ability to include
not only farmers, but also packers, processors, cheese ripeners, and
other value chain actors.172 Each of the relevant actors for a particular
product can potentially be involved in determining the product rules
that will apply to them.
Many of the strengths found in the French context can indeed
be translated to the context of the United States. Some aspects of
ODGs are relatively simple to replicate, given the relatively similar
state background institutions, legal systems,173 and property rights
enforcement (rule of law). Other aspects of ODGs are more difficult
170

Jennifer Jo Thompson & Julia Gaskin, An Extension Specialist's Reflections
from the Field: Discovering Ag of the Middle in the Shift from Direct Sale to
Wholesale Vegetable Production, 40 CULTURE, AGRIC., FOOD & ENV’T, 124, 124,
127 (2018).
171 See, e.g., Barham, supra note 19, at 127-30; Ulrike Grote, Environmental
Labeling, Protected Geographical Indications and the Interests of Developing
Countries, 10 ETSEY CENTRE J. INT’L L. & TRADE Pol’y 94, 96100 (2009); William Van Caenegem et al., Pride and Profit: Geographical
Indications as Regional Development Tools in Australia, 16 J. ECON. & SOC. POL’Y
1, 1, 7-10 (2014).
172 See discussion supra Section II.B.iii; Code R rural et de la pêche maritime
[Rural and Maritime Fisheries Code] art. L642-3, L642-21.
173 While France has a civil law system as opposed to the common law system
used in the United States, contract, corporate, and commercial law are quite similar
in each country.
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to replicate due to their connection with unique institutions in France
and the EU that are dedicated to quality sign products. Replicating
these would therefore require the creation of oversight bodies for
particular aspects, and development and funding of outreach experts
for others. However, the benefits of these efforts could potentially
outweigh the costs, if enough participation and volume were
achieved.
A promising area of future research would be to investigate
to what extent and how the strengths of ODGs could be replicated in
other contexts that have weaker, or significantly different,
government institutional support. In particular, it may be valuable to
determine if the aspects of balanced representation and democratic
functioning can effectively be replicated in order to provide farmer
groups with more negotiating power vis-à-vis concentrated value
chain actors such as processors.

I Want You to Panic:
Leveraging the Rhetoric of Fear and Rage for the Future
of Food
Iselin Gambert*
Abstract
“Humanity Is About to Kill 1 Million Species in a GlobeSpanning Murder-Suicide. Only 11 Years Left to Prevent
Irreversible Damage from Climate Change.”
Doomsday headlines like these are terrifying. But are they
enough to make us act? The causes of the current climate crisis are
many, but the science is clear that the meat and dairy industry
shoulders much of the blame. Given the role the animal agriculture
industry plays in perpetuating the climate crisis, combined with the
harms the industry imposes on the animals and workers within it,
politicians and governments—given their degree of power and
influence—should ostensibly be leaders in setting policies that might
set humanity on a course-correction. Instead, we see fear prompting
politicians and governments to action—action designed to slow
progress and thwart change.
This article explores the role that emotion—specifically fear
and rage—play in shaping the legal, political, and cultural discourse
around the future of food, and offers a strategy to leverage those
emotions to help people more effectively confront the impact that
their dietary choices have on the environment, farm animal welfare
and exploitation, and factory farm workers. Part One provides an
overview of the current climate crisis. It also unpacks the role that
animal-derived meat plays in perpetuating cultural norms around
traditional masculinity, which the American Psychological
Association has identified as harmful and which has been identified
as a driving force behind climate skepticism. Part Two explores three
examples of governments—state, national, and international—using
fear as a primary motivating force to wage linguistic and semantic
battles over the meaning of “meat” and “milk.” This section unpacks
legislative efforts in Missouri, Arkansas, and other states to pass socalled “Real Meat Laws” that seek to prohibit the commercial speech
of producers of plant-based and cultivated meat. It explores similar
efforts in the U.S. Congress to prohibit plant milk from using the
word “milk” on its labels in a thinly-veiled fear-driven attempt to
protect the dairy industry. And it explores the European Union’s
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recent passage of Amendment 171, which, if allowed to take effect,
would introduce sweeping restrictions on plant-based food labeling.
Part Three suggests that one way to facilitate the paradigm shift we
need around food is to leverage the role that emotion plays in
consumer decisions around food, and offers mandatory Graphic
Warning Labels (GWLs) as a tool to do just that. Building on
research done around the globe into the effectiveness of GWLs on
cigarette packages that blend Logos and Pathos by combining data
with scientifically accurate yet emotionally disturbing and fearinducing images, this section argues that consumers need to be
confronted with logical and emotional appeals to reject animal-based
food each and every time they pick those items off a grocery store
shelf. Ultimately, this article agrees with teenage Swedish climate
activist: “I want you to panic,” she said. “I want you to feel the fear
I feel every day. And then I want you to act.”
I. Introduction
Humanity is About to Kill 1 Million Species in a GlobeSpanning Murder-Suicide.1
What happened just now as you read those words? Did you
shift uncomfortably in your seat, perhaps, or let out a sigh of dread?
Only 11 Years Left to Prevent Irreversible Damage from
Climate Change, Speakers Warn during General Assembly HighLevel Meeting.2

* Professor of Legal Writing, The George Washington University Law School
1 Eric Levitz, Humanity Is About to Kill 1 Million Species in a Globe-Spanning
Murder-Suicide, INTELLIGENCER (May 6, 2019),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/05/un-report-humans-are-driving-1-millionspecies-extinct.html.
2 See Darryl Fears, One Million Species Face Extinction, U.N. Report Says. And
Humans Will Suffer as a Result., THE WASH. POST (May 6, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2019/05/06/one-millionspecies-face-extinction-un-panel-says-humans-will-sufferresult/?utm_term=.6aa898519958. See Press Release, Intergovernmental Sci.-Pol’y
Platform on Biodiversity &and Ecosystem Serv. (IPBES), Nature’s Dangerous
Decline ‘Unprecedented’ Species Extinction Rates ‘Accelerating’, U.N. PRESS
RELEASE (May 6,2019), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/context/ipbes-global-report-species-extinctionrate-is-accelerating/f724e478-da85-4e89-83f9f663c496f08c/?utm_term=.2a5ef9c6cc2c; Press Release, General Assembly, Only
11 Years Left to Prevent Irreversible Damage from Climate Change, Speakers
Warn During General Assembly High-Level Meeting, U.N. Press Release
GA/12131 (Mar.28, 2019).
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How about now? Is your heartbeat quickening a bit? Are
your palms beginning to sweat? What if I told you that this
headline is two years old already, so there’s only nine years
left? Feeling a bit stressed? Me too. But what are you doing
to do about it?
As a scholar of rhetoric, I see the world through the lens of
the different rhetorical narratives that are used in legal, political, and
cultural contexts. Often referred to as “Aristotle’s rhetorical
triangle,”3 the rhetorical tools of Logos (appeals to logic), Pathos
(appeals to emotion), and Ethos (appeals leveraging the credibility of
the persuader) underpin every piece of persuasion there is, from
children vying to stay up past their bedtime because they did their
chores (Logos), to fundraising ads depicting images of malnourished
children in Africa (Pathos), to a doctor entering an exam room
cloaked in a white coat (Ethos).4
Doomsday headlines like the ones above skillfully blend
Logos—one million species; eleven years left—and Pathos—
murder-suicide; irreversible damage. More often than not, when it
comes to headlines like these, fear is the particular emotion used to
get us readers to sit up and pay attention. Fear, after all, is a powerful
emotion, and reading about the sixth mass extinction unfolding at the
hands of human-fueled habitat destruction and climate change is, to
put it mildly, very scary stuff.5 But is fear powerful enough to get us
to act?

3

The Rhetorical Triangle: Making Your Communications Credible and Engaging,
MIND TOOLS, https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/RhetoricalTriangle.htm
(last visited Aug. 28, 2021)
4 For an overview of Logos, Pathos, and Ethos, see Ethos, Pathos, and Logos, THE
NATURE OF WRITING, https://natureofwriting.com/courses/introduction-torhetoric/lessons/ethos-pathos-and-logos/.
Studies have shown that patients prefer their doctors to wear white coats as
compared to any other form of attire, with white-coat-clad doctors rating the
highest “across all domains including how knowledgeable, trustworthy, caring and
approachable the physician appeared as well as how comfortable the physician
made the respondent feel.” Christopher M. Petrilli et al., Understanding Patient
Preference for Physician Attire: A Cross-Sectional Observational Study of 10
Academic Medical Centres in the USA, BMJ OPEN (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/8/5/e021239.full.pdf.
5 See, e.g., Damian Carrington, Sixth Mass Extinction of Wildlife Accelerating,
Scientists Warn, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jun/01/sixth-mass-extinction-ofwildlife-accelerating-scientists-warn and Damian Carrington, Climate Crisis:
World Is at Its Hottest for at Least 12,000 Years – Study, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 27,
2021), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/27/climate-crisisworld-now-at-its-hottest-for-12000-years.
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Unfortunately not, it seems—at least not when the fear is sparked by
an occasional headline that we scroll past on our phone or computer
screen. But emotions can be powerful influencers of human
behavior—especially when combined with data and science and
presented in the right way and at the right time.
While the human-generated causes of climate change,
species extinction, and habitat destruction are many, our appetites—
and the norms, customs, and traditions that drive them—are one of
the most significant contributors. Humans’ seemingly insatiable
appetite for animal-derived meat and milk contribute mightily to the
climate crisis we are facing, with billions of animals suffering in the
shadows until they wind up on our plates. Workers in the animal
agriculture industry suffer too; disproportionately immigrants and
people of color, factory farm and slaughterhouse workers face
grueling conditions that are harmful to both body and mind, often
with little pay, no job security, and, in 2020, the threat of Covid-19
exposure at rates higher than the general population.6
If logic carried the day, we would all go vegan tomorrow.
And yet, only about 3% of us have stopped eating animals.7 Why
doesn’t imminent climate collapse, the sixth mass extinction, and
widespread suffering of billions of farm animals conjure up even a
fraction of the behavior-changing panic we humans (justifiably) felt
in 2020 when the Covid-19 pandemic unfolded, leading our species
to rapid and widespread behavioral changes—including mass
lockdowns, social distancing, and new norms around maskwearing—took place across the globe?
Given the current climate emergency and the role the animal
agriculture industry plays in perpetuating it, combined with the real
harms the industry imposes on the animals and workers within it,
politicians and governments—given their degree of power and
influence—should ostensibly be leaders in setting policies and taking
actions that might set humanity on a course-correction. But that is far
from the case. Instead, we see fear prompting politicians and
governments to action—action designed to slow progress and thwart
change.8
Specifically, there are examples throughout the world of
state, national, and international governments alike introducing and
6

See infra section II(c).
Sage Williams, Vegan Statistics – New Data Investigation for 2021, FUTURE
KIND+ (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.futurekind.com/blogs/vegan/vegan-statistics.
8 See infra section II.
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passing legislation and regulations that amount to fear-based
linguistic battles with plant-based food. Where lawmakers could be
allies in developing strategies to promote climate-friendly plantbased food and discourage consumption of environmentally
destructive animal-based food, they are doing just the opposite,
making it harder for plant-based food advocates to have a level
playing field with the animal agriculture industry, much less get the
upper hand in the fight against climate change and species extinction.
This article explores the role that emotion—namely fear and
rage—plays in the battle over the future of food and offers a strategy
to leverage those emotions to help people more effectively confront
the impact that their dietary choices have on the environment, farm
animal welfare and exploitation, and factory farm workers. It
proceeds in three parts. Part One provides an overview of the current
climate crisis and role that emotions—including fear, rage, and
grief—play in our responses to it. Acknowledging the significant role
that the animal agriculture industry plays in contributing to the
current climate crisis, this section argues that while politicians and
governments should be doing (much) more to promote plant-based
food, they are doing just the opposite, pursuing fear-driven
legislative and regulatory efforts to protect the animal agriculture
industry through linguistic and semantic battles with plant-based
food. Unpacking the role that animal-derived meat plays in
perpetuating deeply entrenched cultural norms around traditional
masculinity, which the American Psychological Association has
identified as harmful9 and which has been identified as a driving
force behind climate skepticism, this section questions the strategy
of plant-based foods striving to fit into, rather than break free from,
the “real men eat meat” narrative. Finally, this section argues that
despite widespread resistance to a fulsome embrace of plant-based
food and fear of rejecting too enthusiastically animal-derived meat
and milk, we are at the tipping point of realizing a sweeping cultural
paradigm shift in our species’ relationship to food, and we have all
the necessary ingredients to realize it.
Part Two explores three examples of governments—state,
national, and international—using fear as a primary motivating force
to enact laws and regulations that would protect the animal
agriculture industry from real or perceived threats by plant-based
foods. Through linguistic and semantic battles over the meaning of
“meat” and “milk,” governments hide behind baseless assertions that
9

Stephanie Pappas, APA Issues First-Ever Guidelines for Practice with Men and
Boys, 50 MONITOR PSYCH. 35 (2019).
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plant-based foods will “mislead” consumers if their labels contain
“meaty” or “milky” words more commonly associated with animalderived food. This section unpacks legislative efforts in Missouri,
Arkansas, and other states to pass so-called “Real Meat Laws” that
seek to prohibit—and in one case, criminalize—the commercial
speech of producers of plant-based and cultivated meat. It explores
similar efforts in the U.S. Congress to prohibit plant milk from using
the word “milk” on its labels in a thinly veiled fear-driven attempt to
protect the dairy industry. And it explores the European Union’s
recent passage of Amendment 171, which, if allowed to take effect,
would introduce sweeping restrictions on plant-based food labeling
including prohibitions on labels declaring that those products are
“Not Milk.” This section explores the role that Swedish oat milk
producer Oatly has played on social media and elsewhere to bring
the dangers and absurdities of Amendment 171 to light, revealing the
fear that underpins the Amendment and interrogating the rationale
beneath it.
Part Three suggests that one way to facilitate the sort of
sweeping paradigm shift we need around the food we eat is to
effectively leverage the role that emotion plays in consumer
decisions around food and offers mandatory Graphic Warning Labels
(GWLs) as a tool to do just that. Building on research done around
the globe into the effectiveness of GWLs on cigarette packages that
blend Logos and Pathos by combining data with scientifically
accurate yet emotionally disturbing and fear-inducing images, this
section argues that consumers need to be confronted with logical and
emotional appeals to reject animal-based food each and every time
they pick those items off a grocery store shelf. Building on Oxford
university professor Joseph Poore’s proposal to add mandatory
labeling to all food communicating each item’s environmental
impact,10 this section argues that GWLs should communicate each
food item’s impact not only on the environment, but also on animal
well-being and exploitation and worker conditions.
Recognizing that the United States is one of the only
countries in the world yet to adopt GWLs for cigarette packages and
the First Amendment challenges that may follow any regulatory
effort to require GWLs on food, this section looks to the March 2020
FDA Rule as a blueprint for success. Taking effect in October 2022,
the Rule will, for the first time in the United States, require cigarette
Joseph Poore, We Label Fridges to Show Their Environmental Impact –Why Not
food?, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/10/we-label-fridges-to-showtheir-environmental-impact-why-not-food.
10
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packages to include one of eleven new health warnings combining
text and color images “depicting the negative health consequences of
cigarette smoking.”11 In issuing its March 2020 Rule, the FDA
provided an extensive analysis arguing that the new GWLs do not
violate the First Amendment’s protections on commercial speech.12
This section draws from the rationales offered in the FDA’s analysis
to argue that GWLs on animal-based food likewise would not violate
the First Amendment. Specifically, the government has a substantial
interest in keeping the general public safe by reducing the wideranging dangers associated by climate change and mass species
extinction, as well as in reducing the harms associated with mass
exploitation and suffering to humans and nonhuman animals in the
animal agriculture industry. Scientifically accurate GWLs on animalbased food would directly advance the government’s interest and
given the enormity and time-sensitivity of the crisis, imposing
mandatory GWLs on animal-derived food is a proportionate action
to serve that interest.
The world is at a tipping point regarding the current climate
crisis, and a sweeping paradigm shift in our species’ relationship with
food is a necessary ingredient in our efforts to avert disaster. Science
and data—Logos—tell us as much, but emotion—especially fear and
rage—can either facilitate or thwart our efforts to make a change.
Ultimately, the choice is up to us. “I don’t want your hope,” Swedish
teenage climate activist—and vegan—Greta Thunberg famously
admonished a room full of world leaders, her voice filled with rage
and disgust. “I don’t want you to be hopeful. I want you to panic. I
want you to feel the fear I feel every day. And then I want you to
act.”13

11

See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CIGARETTE LABELING AND HEALTH WARNING
REQUIREMENTS (2021), https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/labeling-andwarning-statements-tobacco-products/cigarette-labeling-and-health-warningrequirements.
12 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA PROPOSES NEW REQUIRED HEALTH
WARNINGS WITH COLOR IMAGES FOR CIGARETTE PACKAGES AND ADVERTISEMENTS
TO PROMOTE GREATER PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF NEGATIVE HEALTH
CONSEQUENCES (2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/fda-proposes-new-required-health-warnings-color-imagescigarette-packages-and-advertisements-promote.
13 Greta Thunberg, ‘Our House Is on Fire’: Greta Thunberg, 16, Urges Leaders to
Act on Climate, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jan/25/our-house-is-on-fire-gretathunberg16-urges-leaders-to-act-on-climate.
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II. Uses of Anger and Fear to Create or Hinder Change
A. Facing The Death Spiral
On May 6, 2019, the United Nations published a summary
of its report warning that human behavior was threatening up to a
million species with extinction with grave implications to our water
supplies and overall well-being and public health.14 Robert Watson,
the chairman of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services that authored the article, told
Science in stark terms: “What’s at stake here is a livable world.”15
That same day, Prince Harry and Meagan Markle’s first baby
was born. In the week that followed, ABC’s World News Tonight
spent more than seven minutes reporting on the royal baby’s birth—
more time than the program spent covering climate change during
the entirety of 2018.16 The program didn’t spend a single second
covering climate change or species extinction during the week of
May 6 – 12, 2019.17 The BBC News website did a bit better,
publishing a story on its front page titled “Humans threaten 1 million
species with extinction.”18 But it was tucked in at the bottom of the
screen beneath three splashier headline stories about the royal baby.19
Not everyone ignored or downplayed the climate story: the
environmental-focused news website Grist published a story titled
“The royal baby is cute and all, but hello, the planet is on fire”
criticizing mainstream media’s lack of coverage on the climate
crisis.20 In an article cheekily titled “Who’s Going to Tell the Royal
Baby That Our Planet Is Unequivocally Dying?,” Vice journalist
Derek Mead captured the surreality of the moment in stark terms:

Press Release, Intergovernmental Sci.-Pol’y Platform on Biodiversity &
Ecosystem Servs., supra note 2.
15 Elizabeth Kolbert, Climate Change and the New Age of Extinction, THE NEW
YORKER (May 20, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/05/20/climate-change-and-the-newage-of-extinction.
16 Lisa Hymas & Ted MacDonald, The Royal Baby Is Cute and All, but Hello, the
Planet Is on Fire, GRIST (May 21, 2019), https://grist.org/article/the-royal-baby-iscute-and-all-but-hello-the-planet-is-on-fire/.
17 Id.
18 Matt McGrath, Nature Crisis: Humans ‘Threaten 1m Species with Extinction’,
BBC (May 6, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-48169783.
19 Screenshot on file with the author.
20 Hymas and Macdonald, supra note 16.
14
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When we're talking about extinction, we're not just talking
about losing some cute monkeys bopping about in some
forest somewhere, although they are important too. We're
talking about everything we rely on to survive—our air, our
water, our food, our medicines, the basic underpinnings
of life itself—being eroded away at such a rapid clip that
without fundamentally reshaping the way we interact with
our world, we face a genuine death spiral. That might sound
hyperbolic, but it's not. It also might sound hyperbolic to say
this is the most important story, not just of today, not of this
week or year or decade, but of our lives, but it's really not. .
. . [R]oyal baby aside, the most important news of the day,
the decade, our lives, is this: We have pushed the planet far
past its limits, and we ignore that at our existential peril.”21
In his Vice article, Mead is certainly ringing the alarm bells,
stoking his readers with justified panic and fear for the future of our
planet. The trouble is that if what we humans need to take the threat
of climate change seriously is an unrelenting, consciousness-raising
alarm bell, articles like Mead’s are few and far between, too easy to
scroll past on our phone or computer screen. And mainstream, primetime media, with its tendency to prioritize stories about celebrities
and royal babies over what Mead argues is “the most important story,
not just of today, not of this week or year or decade, but of our
lives,”22 is fueling our complacency.
B. How Dare You
If small bursts of panic and fear in the form of too-easy-toscroll-past headlines about the climate crisis aren’t enough to prompt
a widescale shift in human behavior, what is? 2019—the last full year
before Covid-19 hijacked the world’s attention in an unprecedented
way—showed us that if fear isn’t always an effective tool to convince
us humans to confront our role in climate change and species
extinction, maybe anger is. That year, we saw a glimpse into the role
that precision-focused anger can play in sparking social change in
the form of a hoodie-clad teenage girl from Sweden.
In January 2019, 16-year-old climate activist Greta
Thunberg addressed an audience of world leaders in Davos,
Derek Mead, Who’s Going to Tell the Royal Baby That Our Planet Is
Unequivocally Dying?, VICE (May 6, 2019),
https://www.vice.com/en/article/9kxaga/whos-going-to-tell-the-royal-baby-thatour-planet-is-unequivocally-dying.”
22 Id.
21
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Switzerland.23 “Our house is on fire,” she began. “I am here to say,
our house is on fire.”24 Blending a wealth of scientific data (Logos)
with vivid, emotional imagery (Pathos), Thunberg captured the
world’s attention.
We are at a time in history where everyone with any insight
of the climate crisis that threatens our civilization – and the
entire biosphere – must speak out in clear language, no
matter how uncomfortable and unprofitable that may be. We
must change almost everything in our current societies. The
bigger your carbon footprint, the bigger your moral duty.
The bigger your platform, the bigger your responsibility.
Adults keep saying: ‘We owe it to the young people to give
them hope.’ But I don’t want your hope. I don’t want you to
be hopeful. I want you to panic. I want you to feel the fear I
feel every day. And then I want you to act. I want you to act
as you would in a crisis. I want you to act as if our house is
on fire. Because it is.25
Thunberg’s rhetoric used the language of fear but was
grounded in rage. That rage, combined with rational reliance on
global scientific consensus, helped catalyze millions of people to
action.
On September 23, 2019, Thunberg took the stage in New
York City to address the United Nations. She’d traveled across the
Atlantic by sailboat, shunning air travel because of its significant
carbon footprint.26 This is all wrong, Thunberg said, a look of utter
disgust on her face.27 I shouldn't be up here. I should be back in
school, on the other side of the ocean. Yet you all come to us young
people for hope. How dare you! 28
You have stolen my dreams and my childhood with your
empty words. And yet I'm one of the lucky ones. People are
23Thunberg,

supra note 13.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Jeff Brady, Teen Climate Activist Greta Thunberg Arrives in New York After
Sailing the Atlantic, NPR (Aug. 28, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/08/28/754818342/teen-climate-activist-greta-thunbergarrives-in-new-york-after-sailing-the-atlan.
27 Elizabeth Weise, 'How Dare You?' Read Greta Thunberg's Emotional Climate
Change Speech to UN and World Leaders, USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2019/09/23/greta-thunberg-tells-un-summityouth-not-forgive-climate-inaction/2421335001/.
28 Id.
24
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suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are
collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction, and
all you can talk about is money, and fairy tales of eternal
economic
growth.
How
dare
you!
For more than 30 years the science has been crystal clear.
How dare you continue to look away, and come here saying
that you're doing enough when the politics and solutions
needed are still nowhere in sight. . . . You are failing us. But
the young people are starting to understand your betrayal.
The eyes of all future generations are upon you. And if you
choose to fail us, I say: We will never forgive you. . . . We
will not let you get away with this. Right here, right now is
where we draw the line. The world is waking up. And change
is coming, whether you like it or not.29
Anger is not the only emotion Thunberg displayed. She also
spoke from a place of deep loss and grief. Thunberg, along with
countless young people and indeed people of all ages, sees the
current climate crisis as the most profound existential challenge of
their lifetimes. It’s no wonder that “climate grief” is being studied by
researchers around the world as we scramble to make sense of the
jumble of emotions we experience when confronted with the fragility
of our planet and our species’ role in harming it.30 “Climate grief”
manifests in many forms, from “bereavement-like grief and trauma”
to “anticipatory grief” to “transitional grief” to “eco-anxiety,” and “is
related both to changes that have already happened and to changes
that are coming, or are in the process of happening.”31
Grief and rage: those seem like appropriate emotions for the
times we are living in. New words and phrases are being created to
describe specific types of climate grief, sometimes rooted to a
specific place or ecosystem—“Reef Grief,” “Snow Anxiety”—and
sometimes encompassing the other emotions that are bound up with
loss and grief.32 Australian philosopher Glenn Albrecht has coined
the word “solastalgia” to describe “homesickness because of
environmental changes,” as well as “terrafurie,” which means “rage
because of mindless destruction of nature.”33
29

Id.

30See

Panu Pihkala, Climate Grief: How We Mourn a Changing Planet, BBC (Apr.
2, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20200402-climate-grief-mourningloss-due-to-climate-change.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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Much has been written about, as feminist scholar Audre
Lorde described it, “the uses of anger.”34 Anger, Lorde said, “is
loaded with information and energy.”35 When “[f]ocused with
precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress
and change.”36
“Anger is the deepest form of compassion,” wrote poet and
philosopher David Whyte.37 It is “the purest form of care, the
internal living flame of anger always illuminates what we belong to,
what we wish to protect and what we are willing to hazard ourselves
for.”38 In Rage Becomes Her: The Power of Women’s Anger, Soraya
Chemaly implores her reader to “envision[ ] anger as a transitional
tool that helps you to change the world around you.”39 “Anger has a
bad rap,” Chemaly acknowledges,
but it is actually one of the most hopeful and forward
thinking of all our emotions. It begets transformation,
manifesting our passion and keeping us invested in the
world. It is a rational and emotional response to trespass,
violation, and moral disorder. It bridges the divide between
what “is” and what “ought” to be, between a difficult past
and an improved possibility.40
Anger, says Chemaly, “isn’t what gets in our way - it is our way.”41
C. If Cows Were a Country
While there are many causes of the current climate crisis,
“food production is the largest cause of global environmental
change.”42 Our species’ seemingly insatiable hunger for dairy and
meat shoulders much of the blame. Much has been written about the

34

See AUDRE LORDE, The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism, in SISTER
OUTSIDER 124 (1984).
35 Id. at 127.
36 Id.
37 DAVID WHYTE, CONSOLATIONS: THE SOLACE, NOURISHMENT AND UNDERLYING
MEANING OF EVERYDAY WORDS 12 (2014).
38 Id.
39 SORAYA CHEMALY, RAGE BECOMES HER: THE POWER OF WOMEN’S ANGER xiii
(2018).
40 Id. at xx.
41 Id. at xxiii.
42 Walter Willet et. al., Food in the Anthropocene: The EAT–Lancet Commission
on Healthy Diets from Sustainable Food Systems, 393 LANCET 447, 449 (Jan.
2019).
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science underpinning the animal agriculture industry’s vast
contributions to the current climate crisis and habitat destruction.43
Experts typically attribute about 15 percent of the world's carbon
emissions to livestock, but the Worldwatch Institute audited that
number in 2009 and found uncounted emissions that bring the
livestock contribution to 51 percent.44 "Humans and the animals we
eat are 96% of the carbon mass of mammals in the world,” explained
Steven Chu, Nobel Prize winning physicist.45 All other mammals—
all the whales and elephants and lions and rats and deer and all the
rest—they together make up the other 4%.46 Chu put this into context
in stark terms: “If cattle and dairy cows were a country, they would
have more greenhouse gas emissions than the entire EU 28. Just
something to think about.”47
There is (much) more to say about the current science around
climate change and the huge role that animal agriculture is playing
to perpetuate it.48 “A vegan diet is probably the single biggest way to
reduce your impact on planet Earth, not just greenhouse gases, but
global acidification, eutrophication, land use and water use,” said

43See,

e.g., Francis Vergunst & Julian Savulescu, Five Ways the Meat on Your
Plate Is Killing the Planet, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://theconversation.com/five-ways-the-meat-on-your-plate-is-killing-theplanet-76128 (Laying out five ways meat is harmful: (1) The environmental impact
is huge; (2) It requires masses of grain, water and land; (3) It hurts the global poor;
(4) It causes unnecessary animal suffering, and (5) It is making us ill).
44 Jeff McMahon, Meat and Agriculture Are Worse for the Climate Than Power
Generation, Steven Chu Says, FORBES (April 4, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2019/04/04/meat-and-agriculture-areworse-for-the-climate-than-dirty-energy-steven-chu-says/?sh=720217fe11f9.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 A 2018 study conducted by University of Michigan and Tulane University and
published in Environmental Research Letters showed that meat and dairy are
responsible for over 83% of diet-related greenhouse has emissions in the United
States. See Martin C. Heller et. al., Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Energy Use
Associated with Production of Individual Self-selected US Diets, ENV’T RSCH.
LETTERS (Mar. 2018), https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aab0ac.
See also Joe Loria, 15,00 Scientists from 184 Countries Urge People to Go Vegan
to Save the Planet, MERCY FOR ANIMALS (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://mercyforanimals.org/blog/15000-scientists-from-184-countries-urge/ (“The
Alliance of World Scientists, a group of 15,000 scientists from 184 countries, met
last month to discuss preventing environmental destruction and concluded that it’s
time for humans to change their behavior and switch to a plant-based diet.”) See
also Damian Carrington, Avoiding Meat and Dairy Is ‘Single Biggest Way’ to
Reduce Your Impact on Earth, THE GUARDIAN (May 31, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/may/31/avoiding-meat-and-dairyis-single-biggest-way-to-reduce-your-impact-on-earth.
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Joseph Poore, a researcher at the University of Oxford.49 “It is far
bigger than cutting down on your flights or buying an electric car.”50
This article takes that science as a given and works from the
premise that unless we do something drastic to stop the march toward
irreversible climate disaster that involves our relationship to the
things we consider food, the effects will be unthinkable.51 This article
is concerned with the urgency of the current climate crisis, what is
being done about it with respect to the food we eat and why those
efforts are falling short, and what should be done instead.52
This article also works from the premise that the animal
agriculture industry is dangerous not only because of its contribution
to the climate crisis and the sixth mass extinction. It also represents
a global system of unimaginable suffering and cruelty that—socially
acceptable and legally sanctioned—exploits, oppresses, and
commodifies billions of individuals every single year.53 The vast

49

Carrington, supra note 48
Id.
51 See, e.g., Fredrik Hedenus et. al, The Importance of Reduced Meat and Dairy
Consumption for Meeting Stringent Climate Change Targets, 124 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 79 (2014).
52 See Emily Kasriel, Can Dairy Adapt to Climate Change?, BBC (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201208-climate-change-can-dairy-farmingbecome-sustainable.
53 See Andrew Jacobs, Is Dairy Farming Cruel to Cows?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/science/dairy-farming-cowsmilk.html. In the article, Jacobs acknowledges some basic truths about the lives of
cows born into the dairy industry: “Dairy cows are repeatedly impregnated by
artificial insemination and have their newborns taken away at birth. Female calves
are confined to individual pens and have their horn buds destroyed when they are
about eight weeks old. The males are not so lucky. Soon after birth, they are
trucked off to veal farms or cattle ranches where they end up as hamburger meat.
The typical dairy cow in the United States will spend its entire life inside a
concrete-floored enclosure, and although they can live 20 years, most are sent to
slaughter after four or five years when their milk production wanes.” Id.
Confronting the plight of the animals whose lives are wholly trapped within the
meat and dairy industries is an emotional thing. In his 2020 Academy Awards
speech, longtime animal rights activist Joaquin Phoenix’s voice cracked and
strained with emotion as he urged the audience to consider the lives of dairy cows.
See Oscars, Joaquin Phoenix Wins Best Actor, YOUTUBE (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qiiWdTz_MNc. “We feel entitled to
artificially inseminate a cow and when she gives birth we steal her baby, even
though her cries of anguish are unmistakable,” he said. “And then we take her milk
that’s intended for the calf and we put it in our coffee and cereal.” Id. See also
Kelsey Piper, Farms Have Bred Chickens So Large That They’re in Constant Pain,
VOX (Sep. 23, 2020) https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/21437054/chickensfactory-farming-animal-cruelty-welfare. See also Eric Schlosser, America’s
Slaughterhouses Aren’t Just Killing Animals, THE ATLANTIC (May 12, 2020),
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majority of those individuals are nonhuman animals whose entire
lived experience from birth to death is regulated and controlled
according to a complex web of market forces, but the rest are human
workers—disproportionately immigrants and people of color—who
spend day after day plucking, debeaking, milking, and killing—all
for low wages and at great risk to their own physical and mental
health.54
The logical conclusion of this grim reality? Eating animals
is an outdated practice that causes more harm than good according to
virtually every conceivable metric.55 If ever there was a moment
where science supported a coordinated global effort to bring forth a
drastic change to our consumption habits, this is it. If this sounds like
a stretch, we have in 2020 proof of the fact that when faced with a
serious imminent threat to our well-being, our species is in fact
capable of widespread, life-altering changes to our behavior.56 What
makes imminent climate collapse, the sixth mass extinction, and
widespread suffering of billions of farm animals and millions of
workers feel less urgently threatening to us than Covid-19?

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/essentials-meatpeackingcoronavirus/611437/.
54 See, e.g., Dylan Matthews & Byrd Pinkerton, How Chicken Plants Became More
Dangerous Places to Work than Coal Mines, VOX (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/21502225/chicken-meatpacking-plant-futureperfect-podcast. See also Schlosser, supra note 53. See also Amy J. Fitzgerald et
al, Slaughterhouses and Increased Crime Rates: An Empirical Analysis of the
Spillover from “The Jungle” into the Surrounding Community, ORG. & ENV’T
ORG. & ENV’T 1, 8, 10 (2009),
http://www.animalstudies.msu.edu/Slaughterhouses_and_Increased_Crime_Rates.
pdf. See also Tom Philpott, Refugees Make Your Dinner. Literally. MOTHER JONES
(Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2017/01/meatindustry-refugees-trump/. John Oliver did a segment called Meatpacking in
February 2021 in which he heighted the many harms facing workers in the animal
agriculture industry. See Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Meatpacking (HBO
Feb. 22, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IhO1FcjDMV4&feature=share.
55 It may even contribute to and future pandemics and public health crises. See,
e.g., Danush Parvaneh, The Next Pandemic Could Come from Factory Farms, VOX
(Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.vox.com/videos/2020/8/18/21374061/factoryfarming-meat-coronavirus-pandemic.
56See Lydia Denworth, Masks Reveal New Social Norms: What a Difference a
Plague Makes, SCI. AM. (May 14, 2020),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/masks-reveal-new-social-norms-whata-difference-a-plague-makes/.
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D. “Real Meat” and #SoyBoys
People are hardwired to resist change and cling to the safety
of the past.57 And in exploring our species’ appetite for animalderived meat and dairy, it’s important to consider the significant role
that traditional gender roles, masculinity ideals, and speciesism play
in dominant food culture.58 A close look reveals a narrative of fear
perpetuating our current food culture. Meat and meat-eating occupies
a very specific cultural space in that not only signifies “the good old
days” and tradition, but also serves as a long-standing symbol of
traditional–and white—masculinity, dominance, and power.59 Meateating is central aspect in our patriarchal world, one that literally
exploits female bodies and reproductive lives for human
consumption, one that figuratively views women as nothing more
than pieces of meat.
In her landmark work The Sexual Politics of Meat: A
Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory, feminist scholar Carol J.
Adams explored the relationship between patriarchal values and
meat eating and argues that “male dominance and animals’
oppression are linked by the way that both women and animals
function as absent referents in meat eating and dairy production, and
that feminist theory logically contains a vegan critique . . . just as
veganism covertly challenges patriarchal society.”60 She describes as
a “racialized politics of meat” that worked to split the “world into
intellectually superior meat eaters and inferior plant eaters”61
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Eleanor Bruce, Resisting Change, MINDTOOLS (May 30, 2019),
https://www.mindtools.com/blog/resisting-change/.
58 For an examination of the historical and contemporary connections between
attitudes around plant- and animal-eating, gender, and race, see Iselin Gambert &
Tobias Linné, From Rice Eaters to Soy Boys: Race, Gender, and Tropes of ‘Plant
Food Masculinity,’ 7 ANIMAL STUD. J., 129, 133 (2018)
59 Juliana Roth, The Meat Industry’s Exploitation of Toxic Masculinity Hurts Us
All, THE ESTABLISHMENT (Mar. 29, 2016), https://medium.com/theestablishment/how-the-meat-industry-exploits-toxic-masculinity-868f10989e
(“Eating meat, after all, has long been associated with masculinity; since pretty
much the dawn of advertising, commercials have explicitly linked meat-eating to
desirable manliness. To name but a few of the most egregious examples from the
last few years, there was the Carl’s Jr.’s ad depicting X-Men’s Mystique morphing
into a ripped manly man after consuming a bacon cheeseburger (with the tagline
“Man Up”); Burger King’s “I Am Man” commercial, in which a guy sings about
not settling for “chick food”; and the Taco Bell “Guys Love Bacon” campaign.”)
60 See CAROL J. ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT: A FEMINIST-VEGETARIAN
CRITICAL THEORY (20th Anniversary ed. Continuum, 2010). See also Carol J.
Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat: The Book, https://caroljadams.com/spom-thebook (last visited Sept. 8, 2021).
61 See ADAMS, supra note 60 at 54.

2021]

I WANT YOU TO PANIC

57

In the late 19th century, the confluence of institutionalized
racism, sexism, and colonialism “led to widespread sentiments
connecting animal-eating (ie, meat and dairy) to intellectual
superiority and virile masculinity exemplified by the white western
man.”62 Plant-eating, meanwhile, “was associated with Asian and
other non-white cultures, and was thought to represent emasculation
and to confer weakness of both mind and body.”63
The colonial-era tropes around plant- and animal-eating are
alive and well in today’s culture. Mainstream TV shows and movies
increasingly include references to plant-based meat, often in
disparaging ways that imply that plant-based meat could never taste
as good as animal-derived meat,64 or as a not-so-subtle attack on
traditional norms of masculinity.65 The tropes extend beyond the
screen: “In France, they take offence if you don’t eat meat, like you
are rejecting their culture,” said Lori Chen, member of a 2016
delegation from the Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation promoting “a Day
of Meatlessness.”66 Added delegation member Hanford Lin, “In
China, you are emasculated if you only eat plants.”67
The culture wars of the Trump Era included various attacks
on vegan advocates and plant-based food. The alt-right slur and viral
social media hashtag “Soy Boy,” which references the idea of men
who consume soy products, is used to attack men who are perceived
to be feminine in appearance and in ideology.68
Needless to say, the trope of “real men eat meat” is a
powerful one in today’s society.69 Scholar Laura Wright has explored
62

Gambert & Linné, supra note 58, at 133 (citing Melanie DuPuis, Angels and
Vegetables: A Brief History of Food Advice in America, 7 GASTRONOMICA: THE J.
FOOD & CULTURE 34-44 (2007)).
63 Id. (“the racial rhetoric of the day … portrayed Asians as effeminate and
enfeebled and the Chinese ‘leaf diet’ as a cause of degeneracy”).
64 See, e.g., the opening scenes of COMING TO AMERICA 2 (Paramount Pictures
2021), where plant-based meat is humorously dismissed as sustainable yet
inedible.
65 See, e.g., The Crew (Netflix 2021) (featuring a woman-owned NASCAR team
sponsored by the fictional plant-based meat brand “Fake Steak”).
66 Paris Climate Change Summit and the Taboo of Meat-Eating, EURONEWS (Sept.
12, 2015), https://www.euronews.com/2015/12/09/paris-climate-change-summitand-the-taboo-of-meat-eating.
67 Id.
68 See Gambert & Linné, supra note 58, at 133.
69 See Victoria Gagliardo-Silver, Fragile Masculinity Says Meat Is Manly. If We
Don't Challenge That, People Will Die and the Earth Will Be Irreversibly
Damaged, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/fragile-masculinity-mean-eaters-death-
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veganism and the threatening space that it occupies in today’s
culture.70 The vegan body, she argues, “threatens the status quo in
terms of what we eat, wear, and purchase—and also in how vegans
choose not to participate in many aspects of the mechanisms
undergirding mainstream culture.71 These threats,” she argues, “are
acutely felt in light of post-9/11 anxieties over American strength and
virility.72 A discourse has emerged that seeks, among other things, to
bully veganism out of existence as it is poised to alter the dominant
cultural mindset.”73
In considering meat’s long-standing association with norms
of traditional masculinity, it’s important to recognize that those
norms are harmful in a much broader sense. In January 2019, the
American Psychological Association published a report concluding
that “traditional masculinity—marked by stoicism, competitiveness,
dominance and aggression—is, on the whole, harmful.”74
The idea that people, and especially men, might be shamed
for embracing vegan food is a real one, with recent research
indicating that one of the biggest barriers to veganism for men is
shame, fear, social stigma, and traditional masculinity ideals. A study
from the University of Southampton found that young men “are
afraid to choose the vegetarian option in a restaurant for fear of being
socially shunned,” even if they dislike animal-derived meat.75 The
yearlong research study found that men “experienced ‘social
isolation’ among friends after admitting to reducing their
consumption of meat.”76 In a Twitter poll directed at men, 45% of
respondents reported their biggest barrier to leading a vegan diet was
social stigma. 39% said their biggest barrier was masculinity.77
Given the deep-seeded and deeply enmeshed fears around
plant-eating being linked to emasculation and weakness, it makes
vegan-vegetarian-earth-a8855331.html (citing Tweet declaring ““real men eat red
meat and punch nerds in the face”).
70 See LAURA WRIGHT, THE VEGAN STUDIES PROJECT: FOOD, ANIMALS, AND
GENDER IN THE AGE OF TERROR ( 2015), available at
https://ugapress.org/book/9780820348568/the-vegan-studies-project/.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Pappas, supra note 9, at 34.
75 Men Fear Social Shame of Ordering Vegetarian Dishes, Study Finds, THE
TELEGRAPH, (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/26/menfear-social-shame-orderingvegetarian-dishes-studyfinds/?WT.mc_id=tmg_share_fb .
76 See id.
77 Gagliardo-Silver, supra note 69.
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sense that vegan food advocates and producers have recently been
playing into dominant masculinity narratives, offering burgers that
“bleed” and using marketing designed to appeal to men who are
afraid that vegan eating may make them weak or effeminate.78
Darlene Juschka, a professor in Religious and Women’s Studies at
the University of Regina, argues that “the raw and bloody beef burger
is associated with a kind of robust masculinity,” and she perceives
the “simulated bleeding [of some vegan burgers] as a way of perhaps
making permissible an otherwise ‘soft’ and ‘feminine’ vegan
food.”79 Apart from bleeding burgers, brands like Beyond Meat have
branded their vegan burgers with masculine ideas like “Beast,” and
used traditionally masculine, muscular men to promote their
products.80
The current trend of plant-based food brands marketing
“bleeding” or “beast” burgers amounts to an approach of
assimilation, of trying to shed previous associations of vegan food
being coded as “feminine” or a sign of weakness or emasculation and
reframing these products so that they occupy the same cultural space
of strength and traditional masculinity as animal-based food.
Journalist Sarah Todd summed it up this way: “The strategy is a
practical one: Rather than trying to push men to eat less meat and
embrace plant-based diets, Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods want
to expand the definition of what meat is.”81 In other words, vegan
meat is “real meat” too.
While the notion of men who adhere to traditional
masculinity norms embracing vegan diets is a good one, it’s less clear
whether the strategy of perpetuating those norms in a plant-based
package is sound. Marketing vegan food to exist rhetorically within
traditional norms of masculinity may succeed in getting more people
to eat incrementally more vegan food—and that is surely a good
thing for animals and for the planet. But is it enough to create the sort
See Lara Williams, Why Even Vegans Crave Burgers That "Bleed,” VICE, (Nov.
15, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en/article/nepbad/why-even-vegans-craveburgers-that-bleed.
79 Id.
80 Roth, supra note 59 (“One vegan meat company, Beyond Meat, even offers a
“Beast Burger” that is packaged in colors that may appeal to men, along with a
photograph of the burger sizzling on a grill. The use of the masculine word “beast”
might attract meat-eating men who identify with traditional masculine norms
looking to switch over.).
81 Sarah Todd, Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods Burgers Could Change the
Way We Think About Masculinity, QUARTZ (Apr. 27, 2019),
https://qz.com/quartzy/1603993/beyond-meats-vegan-burgers-could-change-theway-we-think-about-masculinity/.
78
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of fundamental paradigm shift we need in the way we think about
food, and the way we think about ourselves?
Max Elder, the research director at the Institute for the
Future, a nonprofit research center in Silicon Valley, is skeptical,
saying that “If Beyond Meat and Impossible Foods succeed in
instilling this new idea of meat, the cultural link between meat and
masculinity may well remain intact. . . . We can’t just eat our way
out of toxic masculinity.”82 He argues that “because these companies
emphasize how similar their products are to meat in taste and texture,
they may be less likely to make people question their meat-eating
habits and engage in deeper reflections about the relationship
between food and gender.”83
There is arguably an even bigger danger inherent in
promoting vegan food within the rhetoric of traditional masculinity,
and it has to do with fear and rage. Given the known harms inherent
in norms of traditional masculinity both to individuals and society
more broadly,84 perpetuating rhetoric that binds vegan food to those
norms may make it more difficult for people to break free from the
effects of those harms.
E. The Misogyny of Climate Deniers and Greta Haters
Given the degree to which veganism threatens to disrupt
long-held norms around masculinity and food, it’s no wonder that
plant-based foods are being met with resistance everywhere from
social media to the halls of Congress. Because of the role that animalderived food plays in exacerbating the current climate crisis and
threat of mass species extinction, it’s also necessary to understand
the role that traditional masculinity norms play in perpetuating
skepticism among some people around the effects—or even
existence of—climate change, as well as a resistance to take
meaningful action to prevent it.
After Greta Thunberg’s speech at the UN in 2019, she faced
an outpouring of misogynistic rage. This was perhaps unsurprising:
a 2014 study analyzing the language of a focus group of climate
skeptics revealed that “for climate skeptics . . . it was not the
environment that was threatened, [but rather] a certain kind of
modern industrial society built and dominated by their form of
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Id.
Id.
84 See Pappas, supra note 34.
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masculinity.”85 In an article published about the misogynistic
response to Thunberg’s activism, scholars expanded on previous
research that demonstrates a link between climate change denial and
misogyny.86 “At a deep level,” they wrote, “the language of climate
denialism is tied up with a form of masculine identity predicated on
modern industrial capitalism – specifically, the Promethean idea of
the conquest of nature by man, in a world especially made for men.
By attacking industrial capitalism, and its ethos of politics as usual,
Thunberg is not only attacking the core beliefs and world view of
certain sorts of men, but also their sense of masculine self-worth.
Male rage is their knee-jerk response.”87 The authors noted that while
her attackers want to frame her as nothing more than a hysterical
child, “in reality, Thunberg is cutting through - rather than displaying
- emotionalism. What certain kinds of men do not wish to
acknowledge is that asking for action on climate change is entirely
rational.”88
Given this tendency towards “male rage” as a fear response
to rational discussions around the broad changes we need to make in
our dominant food culture in response to impending climate disaster,
where do we go from here? Is promoting vegan food within the
framework of traditional masculinity really the path to the cultural
shift we need in this moment? Given what we know about misogyny
and the harms of the rhetoric of so-called traditional masculinity, a
better approach would be for veganism to embrace an explicit
rejection of that rhetoric rather than assimilate into it.
F. Change is Coming, Whether You Like It or Not
Politicians on the right and the left are fearful of disrupting
the status quo when it comes to our cultural obsession with animalderived meat and milk. At the 2019 Conservative Political Action
Conference (or C-PAC), former Trump White House adviser
Sebastian Gorka infamously denounced Rep. Alexandria OcasioCortez and the Green New Deal with the pithy admonishment, “They
want to take away your hamburgers.”89 The irony of Gorka attacking
85

Martin Gelin, The Misogyny of Climate Deniers, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 28,
2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154879/misogyny-climate-deniers.
86 See Camilla Nelson & Meg Vertigan, Misogyny, Male Rage and the Words Men
Use to Describe Greta Thunberg, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://theconversation.com/misogyny-male-rage-and-the-words-men-use-todescribe-greta-thunberg-124347.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Antonia Noori Farzan, The Latest Right-Wing Attack on Democrats: ‘They Want
to Take Away Your Hamburgers,’ THE WASH. POST, (Mar. 1, 2019),
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Ocasio-Cortez and the Green New Deal is that none of the politicians
supporting the Deal, which endeavors to tackle the climate crisis in
sweeping ways,90 have actually suggested outlawing beef or other
animal meat consumption.91 Ocasio-Cortez herself isn’t even
vegetarian, much less vegan (though she allegedly went vegetarian
for lent in 2021).92
With respect to the Green New Deal, Ocasio-Cortez appears
keenly aware of the prevailing fear-driven rhetoric around the threat
that plant-based foods pose to the animal agriculture industry. Not
only is she reluctant to try to challenge it, but in some cases, she has
even perpetuated it:
In the [Green New] Deal, what we talk about, and it’s true,
is that we need to take a look at factory farming, you know?
Period. It’s wild. And so, it’s not to say you get rid of
agriculture, it’s not to say we’re gonna force everybody to
go vegan or anything crazy like that. But it’s to say, ‘Listen,
we gotta address factory farming. Maybe we shouldn’t be
eating a hamburger for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Like,
let’s keep it real.93
By invoking the trope of the “crazy vegan”—a common
rebuke of vegan and plant-based advocacy—Ocasio-Cortez’s
rhetoric reinforces and perpetuates the idea that it would be “crazy”
for large numbers of people to go vegan, and implies that all that is
needed to tackle the current climate crisis is a small incremental
change amounting to not eating a hamburger three times a day (query
whether twice a day would be good enough). The problem with this
rhetoric is that given the science around animal meat and dairy’s
contributions to climate change and the exploitation bound up in the

https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/03/01/latest-right-wing-attackdemocrats-they-want-take-away-your-hamburgers/.
90 Lisa Friedman, What Is the Green New Deal? A Climate Proposal, Explained,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/greennew-deal-questions-answers.html.
91 Farzan, supra note 89.
92 Chelsea Ritschel, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Goes Vegetarian in Memory of
Colleague's Son, THE INDEPENDENT, (Feb.19, 2021),
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/aoc-vegetarian-lent-jamie-raskin-tommyvegan-b1804888.html.
93 Kat Smith, How the Green New Deal Will Affect the Way We Eat, LIVE KINDLY,
https://www.livekindly.co/how-will-the-green-new-deal-affect-agriculture/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2021).
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animal agriculture industry, small incremental changes are not
enough.94
As Greta Thunberg—herself a vegan—told a room full of
leaders several times her age, “[t]he world is waking up. And change
is coming, whether you like it or not.”95 We ignore that fact at our
peril. What’s needed is a total paradigm shift around the idea of, and
our relationship to, food. And the best news is that it appears that the
moment we are living in contains all the necessary ingredients that
social scientists say is necessary to create meaningful behavioral
change.
Building on work done by David Gleicher in the 1960s,
organizational development consultant and community activist
Kathie Dannemiller developed a “Formula for Change” that provides
a model to assess the capacity for individual or collective change.96
Dannemiller’s formula, C = D × V × F > R, represents the notion
that three factors must be present for meaningful change to occur.97
These factors are: (1) Dissatisfaction with how things currently are;
(2) a Vision of what alternative is possible; and (3) the First concrete
steps that can be taken towards that Vision.98 If the sum of these three
factors is greater than any existing Resistance to change, then
Change is possible.99 So, C = D × V × F > R. As this paper will
show, we have all of Dannemiller’s ingredients for change at our
fingertips: the question is whether they are greater than the current
resistance to it.
That the Covid-19 crisis normalized in a matter of months
drastic behavioral changes throughout the globe including significant
reductions in travel, social distancing, and mask-wearing shows us
that rapid, widespread behavioral change is in fact possible for us
change-resistant humans. “Social norms can change rapidly,”
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See Dylan Moon, Why Do Some Green Activists Eat Meat?, SCI. AM. (May 21,
2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/why-do-some-greenactivists-eat-meat/ (discussing the fact that multinational organizations and
gatherings like the UN and Amnesty International gather to discuss ways to
reverse the negative effects of climate change, they serve meat and dairy at their
catered events).
95 Weise, supra note 27.
96 Kathleen D. Dannemiller & Robert W. Jacobs, Changing the Way Organizations
Change: A Revolution of Common Sense, J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI., 480, 498 (1992).
See also Al Blixt, Kathie Dannemiller on the DVF Formula for Change, YOUTUBE
(Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ysNuM2oVqBU .
97 Dannemiller, supra note 96, at 480.
98 Id. at 483.
99 Id.
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explained social psychologist Catherine Sanderson, “and it doesn’t
take everybody. . . . The tipping point for achieving enough critical
mass to initiate social change proved to be just 25 percent of
participants. They become the social influencers, the trendsetters.
You get this sweep.”100 Science writer Lydia Denworth notes that
even “weird behaviors can become standard, and long-standing
customs can change,” citing indoor smoking as one example.101 “To
bring about such change,” she writes, “a new behavior must first
ascend to the status of a social norm. Norms include both the
perception of how a group behaves and a sense of social approval or
censure
for
violating
that
conduct.”102
This article explores the “uses of anger” and other
emotions—in particular, fear and grief—as tools of, or hindrances to,
change. Specifically, this article is interested in “change” as it relates
to humans’ relationship to food insofar as our animal-laden diets are
a key contributor to climate change and other harms. It examines the
roles that fear, rage, and other emotions play in shaping the legal and
cultural discourse around the food we eat, the words we use to
describe that food, and what we even consider to be “food” in the
first place. It argues that fear is a powerful rhetorical tool leveraged
by policymakers and legislators to hold on to the status quo, to
preserve outdated norms and customs, to cling to the past. The future,
with its technologically innovative milks and meats made from plants
or grown from cultured cells, is frightening to those who feel
comforted by tradition, by things staying the same as they’ve always
been, by those who don’t want to change.103 This is why fear-driven
rhetoric works well when used by animal agriculture industry
advocates and not nearly as well when it’s been used in doomsday
news headlines as a means to persuade consumers to take a different
path.
Maybe there’s a smarter way to leverage the power of fear—
and rage— to inspire consumer change. This article offers mandatory
100

Denworth, supra note 56.
Id.
102 Id.
103 See Brief of State of Missouri at 4-6, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson,
992 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-3154) (quoting Gillian Tett, Can You
Swallow the Idea of Lab-Grown Meat?, FIN. AM. (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://channels.ft.com/en/rethink/lab-grown-meat/) (“Artificial meat alternatives
are moving from science fiction to supermarket shelves” and “Today, science
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alternatives . . . As one food writer put it, ‘When I originally heard about labgrown meat, my first thought was ‘yuck.’ The idea of ‘growing’ a steak or chicken
leg in a test tube sounds like a scene from science fiction, not haute cuisine.’”).
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Graphic Warning Labels (GWLs) on animal-derived food as one way
to blend scientific data with emotionally provocative imagery to
change human behavior. Whatever the tactics, change is coming, and
it can’t come soon enough. In her essay “The Uses of Anger,”
feminist scholar Audre Lorde wrote of the need for change to be
sweeping, to draw a boundary between what used to be and what
comes next.104 “And when I speak of change,” she said, “I do not
mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessoning of
tensions, nor the ability to smile or feel good. I am speaking of a
basic and radical alteration in those assumptions underlying our
lives.”105 The change we need in our relationship to food is of the sort
Lorde envisions. It is a line in the sand. It says loudly and clearly,
this behavior ends now. A new world is waiting, if we would only
create it.
III. Uses of Fear to Protect the Animal Agriculture
Industry
Before sweeping paradigm-shifting change can take place,
we humans need to want to change, and be encouraged to change.
Given the current climate emergency and the role the animal
agriculture industry plays in perpetuating it, combined with the real
harms the industry imposes on the animals and workers within it,
politicians and governments—given their degree of power and
influence—should be leading the charge. Instead, we see fear driving
them to action designed to protect the animal agriculture industry,
slowing progress and thwarting change.
Specifically, there are examples throughout the world of
state, national, and international governments alike introducing and
passing legislation that amount to fear-based linguistic battles with
plant-based food. Where lawmakers could be allies in developing
strategies to promote climate-friendly plant-based food and
discourage consumption of environmentally destructive animalbased food, they are doing just the opposite, making it harder for
plant-based food advocates to have a level playing field with the
animal agriculture industry, much less get the upper hand in the fight
against climate change and species extinction. This section explores
three examples of lawmakers trying to do just that.
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In each example explored below, lawmakers have attempted
(often successfully) to pass laws that would make it difficult if not
impossible for plant-based foods to use words like “meat” and “milk”
on their packages. The proposed laws, while distinct in their specific
wording, share a common theme in their attempt to justify their own
existence: they claim that the laws are necessary to prevent plantbased foods from “misleading” or “confusing” consumers who may
mistake them for animal-derived meat and dairy.106 As this paper will
illustrate, these arguments are disingenuous at best and themselves
misleading at worst. At bottom, they mask the real motivation behind
lawmakers’ interest in passing these laws: fear. Namely, fear about
the possible decline of the animal agriculture industry in light of the
rise in popularity of plant-based food and cultured meat.

A.

“Real Meat” Acts: Misleading Arguments about Meaty
Words for Plant-Based Foods

Since 2018 at least 18 states in the United States have either
introduced or passed legislation restricting use of the word “meat.”107
See Real MEAT Act of 2019, H.R. 4881, 116th Cong. § 2(5) (2019) (“Both
USDA and FDA are responsible for enforcing a universal standard that labels are
truthful and not misleading.”) See also MO. REV. STAT. § 265.494 (2018)
(“No person advertising, offering for sale or selling all or part of a carcass or food
plan shall engage in any misleading or deceptive practices, including, but not
limited to, any one or more of the following: . . . (7) Misrepresenting the cut,
grade, brand or trade name, or weight or measure of any product, or
misrepresenting a product as meat that is not derived from harvested production
livestock or poultry….”)
The stated legislative purpose of Arkansas’ Act 501 is “to protect consumers
from being misled or confused by false or misleading labeling of agricultural
products that are edible by humans. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-301 (2019). Report of
the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulations
Establishing a Common Organisation of the Markets in Agricultural Products, at
172, COM (1308/2013) (July 5, 2019) A8-0198. Amendment 171 seeks to protect
the dairy industry by prohibiting “any [ ] commercial indication or practice likely
to mislead the consumer as to the product’s true nature or composition.
The “misleading” consumer argument has also been pursued—so far
unsuccessfully—in the courts in the context of plant milk. For an overview of
cases where courts rejected the “misleading consumers” argument as it relates to
plant milk products using the word “milk,” see Iselin Gambert, Got Mylk?: The
Disruptive Possibilities of Plant Milk, 84 BROOKLYN L. REV. 801, 812–17 (2019).
107 Elaine Watson, Plant-Based and Cell-Cultured ‘Meat’ Labeling Under Attack
in 25 States, FOOD NAVIGATOR-USA (May 29, 2019), https://www.foodnavigatorusa.com/Article/2019/05/29/Plant-based-and-cell-cultured-meat-labeling-underattack-in-25-states.
See also Brief of State of Missouri, supra note 103, at 12 (“In 2019, 60 bills
were introduced in 31 states, and more than 12 were enacted.”). The following
states have introduced legislation: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois,
106
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The states have taken a range of approaches, but they all seek to
define the word “meat” as the substance that comes from slaughtered
animals. The goal is virtually always to prohibit cultured meat—
sometimes referred to as “cellular meat” or “clean meat”— from
using the term “meat” on its packaging or advertising, but some
states have also sought to prohibit plant-based meat from using the
term—even when those products use qualifiers like “plant-based”
before the word.108
The rhetoric around these new laws is almost always that
meat from a slaughtered animal is “real,” discrediting other types of
meat—plant meat and cultured meat—by implying that they are
“fake” or the “stuff of futurism and science fiction.”109 Governments
aren’t subtle about it, either: Mississippi introduced its “Fake Meat
Bill” in January 2019, and Montana enacted its “Real Meat Act” in
April of that year.110 In October 2019, the “Real Marketing Edible
Artificials Truthfully Act of 2019”—or “Real MEAT Act”—was
introduced to Congress.111 Montana’s Real Meat Act characterizes
cultivated meat as “Cell-cultured edible product" and defines it as
“the concept of meat.”112 In justifying the need for Montana’s Real
Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming. Id. See also Dan
Flynn, The Ban Against Lab-Grown Food Using “Meat’ on the Label Grows to 7
States, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2019/04/the-ban-against-lab-grown-food-usingmeat-on-the-label-grows-to-7-states/; Ed Maxiner, Alternative Protein Labeling
Battle Hits States, AGRI- PULSE (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.agripulse.com/articles/12053-alternative-protein-labeling-battle-hits-states.
108 See § 265.494.
109 Brief of State of Missouri, supra note 103 at 4.
110 Alex Lowery, Fake Meat Bill Passes House, Heads to Senate, FARM BUREAU
MISS. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://msfb.org/2019/01/25/fake-meat-bill-passes-househeads-to-senate/. See also Real Meat Act, ch. 186, 2019 Mont. Laws.
111 Real MEAT Act of 2019, H.R. 4881, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).H.R. 4881§ 1,
supra note106; See also Real MEAT Act of 2019, S. 3016, 116th Cong. § 1
(2019). As of the time of this writing, the Real Meat Act of 2019 has not become
law.
112 Real Meat Act, ch. 186, sec. 1, § 50-31-103(4), 2019 Mont. Laws 1. Montana’s
Act defines "Meat" as “the edible flesh of livestock or poultry and includes
livestock and poultry products” and states that “[t]his term does not include cellcultured edible products as defined in this section.” Id. at sec. 6, § 81-9-217(7),
2019 Mont. Laws 12. It defines “Cell-cultured edible product" as “the concept of
meat, including but not limited to muscle cells, fat cells, connective tissue, blood,
and other components produced via cell culture, rather than from a whole
slaughtered animal.” Id. at sec. 1, § 50-31-103(4), 2019 Mont. Laws 1. The Act
states that “cell-cultured edible product derived from meat muscle cells, fat cells,
connective tissue, blood, or other meat components must contain labeling
indicating it is derived from those cells, tissues, blood, or components.” Id. at sec.
1, § 50-31-103(4), 2019 Mont. Laws 1.
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Meat Act, Rep. Alan Redfield, sought to conjure up images to make
consumers queasy. “Picture, if you will, on the grill a nice, juicy
burger,” he said. “Then picture another thing on the grill that came
from a petri dish.”113
The truth is that there is nothing fake or contrived, radical or
even remarkable about referring to plant-based food as “meat.” That
word—both in the dictionary and in our vernacular—is not and has
never been limited to animal flesh. The Oxford English Dictionary
has a multitude of definitions for the word; the definition of plantbased meat appears right below the one for animal-based meat.114
The earliest reference of the centuries-old linguistic tradition of using
the word “meat” to refer to plant-based food dates back to 1425.115
There is a reference to plant-based meat in the King James Bible.116
What is remarkable is the degree to which lawmakers have
been so transparent about the fact that fear is one of, if not the
primary motivating force behind the laws and regulations seeking to
restrict the use of words “meat” to describe plant-based or cultivated
meat. Namely, fear that the market for animal-based meat may suffer
a significant decline as these products offer consumers alternatives
that are less environmentally destructive and avoid the suffering and
exploitation involved in the animal agriculture industry. “I don’t
make laws for me,” said Claire Blood, the Nebraska Democratic
State Senator—and vegetarian! —who introduced a bill to exclude

113

Tim Pierce, 'Real Meat Act' Passes Legislature, MONT. PUB. RADIO (Mar. 27,
2019, https://www.mtpr.org/post/real-meat-act-passeslegislature#:~:text=House%20Bill%20327%20adds%20a,flesh%20of%20a%20sla
ughtered%20animal.
114 See Meat, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, (3d ed. 2021).
(Meat, noun
I.
Senses relating to food generally.
II.
Senses relating specifically to flesh.
4. a. The flesh of animals used as food, esp. excluding fish and
sometimes poultry, and usually in contrast to the bones and other
inedible parts[.]
5. The flesh of a fruit, nut, egg, etc., likened in texture to the flesh of
animals; the edible pulp, kernel, yolk or white, etc., as opposed to the
rind, peel, or shell.)
115 See id. The dictionary also includes this sentence, from 1613, showing the
longstanding use of the word “meat” to refer to plant-based food: “Of the meat of
the Nut dried, they make oyle.” Samuel Purchas · Purchas his pilgrimage; or,
Relations of the world and the religions obserued in all ages and places
discouered · 1st edition, 1613 (1 vol.).
116 Genesis 1:29 (King James) (“And God said, Behold I have given you every
herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in which
is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat.”).
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plant- and cell-based products from the term ‘meat.’117 “I make laws
for Nebraskans. Part of what I have to do is protect our No. 1
industry, and that’s cattle in Nebraska.”118
A pair of cases brought by well-known plant-based food brand
Tofurky highlight the extent to which the narrative offered by
legislators in introducing their versions of “Real Meat Acts”— that
these laws are necessary to protect unwitting consumers seeking to
consume animal-derived meat from the threat of confusion and
deception wrought by companies selling products devoid of
slaughtered animals—is a guise concealing the truth: that legislators’
interest in protecting the profits of the animal agriculture industry is
greater than their interest in meaningfully tackling the root causes of
the current climate crisis and facilitating consumers’ access to
greener and less exploitative alternatives.
1. Missouri’s fear of “the stuff of futurism and science
fiction”
In August 2018, Missouri enacted Mo. Rev. Stat. § 265.494,
becoming the first state in the nation to take aim at plant-based and
cultivated meat products’ use of “meaty” words.119 Specifically, the
statute provides that:
No person advertising, offering for sale or selling all or part
of a carcass or food plan shall engage in any misleading or
deceptive practices, including, but not limited to, any one or
more of the following: . . . (7) Misrepresenting the cut, grade,
brand or trade name, or weight or measure of any product,
or misrepresenting a product as meat that is not derived
from harvested production livestock or poultry.120
Unlike other similar state statutes that carry only civil
penalties, Missouri’s statute criminalizes the speech it seeks to
prohibit, with violations of the statute constituting a Class A
misdemeanor, punishable by incarceration up to one year and a fine
up to $1,000.121

Elaine Povich, ‘Fake Meat’ Battle Spreads to More States, PEW (Jan. 25,
2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2019/01/25/fake-meat-battle-spreads-to-more-states.
118 Id.
119 See MO. REV. STAT. § 265.494 (West 2018).
120 Id.
121 See MO. REV. STAT. § 265.496 (West 2018). See also Turtle Island Foods, SPC
v. Richardson, 425 F.Supp.3d 1131, 1134 (W.D. Mo. 2019).
117
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Missouri’s statute defines “meat” as: “any edible portion of
livestock, poultry, or captive cervid carcass or part thereof.”122 The
law does not define the term “misleading,” but its broad definition of
the term “misrepresent” includes “any untrue, misleading or
deceptive oral or written statement, advertisement, label, display,
picture, illustration or sample.”123 Further, “misrepresenting a
product as meat that is not derived from harvested production
livestock or poultry” is classified as a prohibited “misleading or
deceptive” practice.124
While § 265.494’s focuses on “misleading or deceptive
practices,” Missouri has not received a single consumer complaint
about plant-based products being mistaken for animal-derived
meat.125 Indeed, “[w]hen it enacted the new law, Missouri did not
rely on any evidence that . . . any plant-based meat producer’s
marketing materials [] are misleading.”126
The legislators who supported the passage of § 265.494 were
rather more transparent than the statute itself in articulating the real
motivation behind the statute, which is to protect the animal
agriculture industry from the threat of plant-based and cultivated
meat.127 “We want to protect our cattlemen in Missouri and protect
our beef brand,” said Senator Crawford.128 “[A]ll we’re trying to do
is basically just protect our meat industry,” said Rep. Razer.129 “We
have to protect our cattle industry, our hog farmers, our chicken
industry,” said Rep. Knight, who also said, “This bill is basically just
trying to protect the integrity of the meat industry.”130
What are those statements describing if not fear? In August
2018, the well-known plant-based meat producer Tofurky (formally
known as Turtle Island Foods) filed suit together with the advocacy
organization The Good Food Institute (GFI) challenging §
265.494.131 The plaintiffs (hereinafter “Tofurky”) argued that the
122

MO. REV. STAT. § 265.300(7) (West 2018).
MO. REV. STAT. § 265.490(6) (West 2018).
124 MO. REV. STAT. § 265.494(7) (West 2018).
125 See Appellants’ Brief at 14, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson (8th Cir.
2020) (No. 19-3154).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 15.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Tofurky’s formal business name is Turtle Island Foods SPC, d/b/a The Tofurky
Company. Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Richardson, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (W.D.
Mo. 2019). See also Appellants’ Brief, supra note 125, at 1.
123
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statute violates their First Amendment rights, their due process
rights, and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.132 The suit was
filed against the Cole County prosecuting attorney, on behalf of a
putative defendant class of prosecutors.133 Tofurky gave notice to the
Missouri Attorney General that they were challenging the
constitutionality of a state statute, and the State intervened.134 In
October 2018, Tofurky filed a motion for preliminary injunction
based on its First Amendment claim, which the court denied on
September 30, 2019.135 Tofurky filed a notice of appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that same day.136
In its order denying Tofurky’s motion for preliminary
injunction, the district court focused heavily on non-binding
guidance issued by the Missouri Department of Agriculture (MDA)
two days after § 265.494 took effect that recommend that plant-based
products using a “qualifier” and a disclaimer should be exempt from
prosecution.137 That guidance stated that:
MDA will not refer products whose labels contain the
following:
 Prominent statement on the front of the package,
immediately before or immediately after the product name,
that the product is “plant-based,” “veggie,” “lab-grown,”
“lab-created,” or a comparable qualifier; and
 Prominent statement on the package that the product is
“made from plants,” “grown in a lab,” or a comparable
disclosure.138
132

See Turtle Island Foods, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1134-35. See also Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Richardson
(W.D. Mo. 2018) (No. 18-4173).
133 See Turtle Island Foods, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1134.
134 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 125, at 18–19.
135 Turtle Island Foods, SPC, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1142. See also Appellants’ Brief,
supra note 125, at 19–20 (“[T]he court concluded that the balance-of-harms and
public-interest factors weighed against a preliminary injunction and it therefore
denied the motion.”).
136 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 125, at 20.
137 See Turtle Island Foods, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1140–41. See Turtle Island Foods,
425 F. Supp. 3d at 1140–41. The district court noted that “The State argues that
plaintiffs will not suffer irreparable harm without an injunction because the statute
does not prohibit their labels and they face no realistic threat of enforcement of a
contrary reading of the statute. The State argues that there is no risk of irreparable
harm to plaintiffs because the statute does not do what plaintiffs say it does.”
Turtle Island Foods, SPC, 425 F.Supp.3d at 1140.
138 Memorandum from the Mo. Dept. of Agric. Dir.’s Off. to the Mo. Dept. of
Agric. Meat Inspection Program (Aug. 8, 2018).
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MDA further stated that “[i]n MDA’s opinion, products that
contain these statements do not misrepresent themselves as meat and
thus do not violate Section 265.494(7).”139
Referencing MDA’s non-binding guidelines and the fact that
“[t]he labels and marketing materials of Tofurky, as well as the plantbased meat companies that GFI advocates for, all clearly indicate
their products are plant based, meatless, vegetarian or vegan,”140 the
district court dismissed Tofurky’s claim that “because its labels
include terms which are also applied to conventional meat like
‘kielbasa’ ‘hot dogs’ ‘ham roast’ ‘burgers’ and ‘bologna,’ it
reasonably fears prosecution under the statute.”141 The court
ultimately held that “plaintiffs have shown no risk of irreparable
harm because their labels truthfully disclose that their products are
plant-based or lab-grown and the Missouri Department of
Agriculture has advised that products with these types of statements
on their labels do not misrepresent themselves.”142
In its appeal to the Eighth Circuit, Tofurky argues that the
district court “rewrote the statute in a manner not supported by its
text,”143 and “did not consider, as it was required to do, what the law
actually says as opposed to what the government now argues it would
like the law to say.”144 In its brief, Tofurky makes clear that it “does
not want consumers to believe its plant-based meats are animal
products; to the contrary, it wants to make clear that its products are
not made from animals.”145 Tofurky claims that it “fears prosecution”
because § 265.494 “provides no exception for plant-based meat
producers that use descriptors or qualifiers to identify their products
as being vegetarian, vegan, or made from plants.”146 As for the
guidelines issued by MDA that seem to protect Tofurky from
prosecution for its existing plant-based meat products, Tofurky
emphasizes that the MDA guidelines actually do “nothing” to
prohibit country prosecutors from filing charges against the
company.147 “Indeed,” notes Tofurky, “the MDA lacks the power to
protect a plant-based meat producer from prosecution under the law.

139

Id.
Turtle Island Foods, 425 F. Supp. 3d at 1135.
141 See id. at 1135, 1141.
142 Id. at 1141.
143 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 125, at 1.
144 Id. at 11.
145 Id. at 13.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 16.
140
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Even if a producer follows the memorandum’s guidelines, a
prosecutor may still bring charges against the producer.”148
Tofurky also underscores the idea that “references to meat
are crucial to Tofurky’s business model” and that “avoid[ing]
references to meat,” as the plain language of the statute suggests it
needs to do, “will gravely and irreparably harm” the brand.149
Tofurky asserts that its business model “requires Tofurky to convey
to consumers, many of whom are looking for ways to replace animalbased meat, that Tofurky products may be used” as main-dish
alternatives to animal meat.150 “[B]y using terms such as ‘vegetarian
ham roast,’” explains Tofurky, the brand “is conveying its firmly
held ideological view that Americans don’t need to slaughter animals
for a meal. Tofurky conveys this view by using language which
presents its products as plant-based alternatives to animal-based
meat—rather than just side dishes.”151
In its reply brief, the state of Missouri argued that “because
the law does not apply to [Tofurky’s] apparently truthful labels for
their plant-based products, the district court correctly refused to
enjoin Missouri’s law.”152 The government’s brief takes issue with
Tofurky’s fear of prosecution under § 265.494, arguing that “the
behavior with which the statute is concerned is not the use any
particular word or words, but the result of whatever words are on the
label.”153 In other words, the government claims that the statute
allows plant-based and cultivated meat products to identify
themselves as “meat” as long as those products’ labels do not
“suggest that plant-based or lab-grown meat alternatives are
conventional meat from an animal carcass.”154 The government does
not directly respond to Tofurky’s argument that the statute, on its
face, makes no mention of the use of “qualifiers,” and that Missouri’s
reliance on MDA’s non-binding guidelines do not guarantee safety
from prosecution for Tofurky or related brands.155 “If the law were
truly intended to require plant-based meat products only to include
appropriate disclosures,” argued Tofurky in its reply brief, “then it
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Id.
Id. at 18.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Brief of State of Missouri, supra note 103, at 3.
153 Id. at 40.
154 Id. at 39-40.
155 Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5–9, Turtle Island Foods v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694
(8th Cir. 2020).
149

74

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 17

would simply say so using plain language. The State would not need
to graft a nonbinding memo onto the law.”156
Missouri’s brief also attempts to conjure up an emotional
response, namely one of skepticism and distain for plant-based and
cultivated meat. Casting it as “the stuff of futurism and science
fiction” and citing Star Trek’s Captain Kirk,157 Missouri cautioned
that “not every consumer may be eager right away to chow down on
a vat-created muscle tissue entrée at the breakfast table or work
cafeteria.”158 Underscoring the fact that its “science fiction” rhetoric
was intended to unsettle rather than excite its readers, Missouri’s
brief cited a food writer who said this: “When I originally heard
about lab-grown meat, my first thought was ‘yuck.’ The idea of
‘growing’ a steak or chicken leg in a test tube sounds like a scene
from science fiction, not haute cuisine.”159
The government’s brief goes on to cite “safety concerns” and
“competing environmental concerns” as reasons consumers may be
wary of cultivated meat.160 “The growing trend against processed
food and genetically modified food means that many consumers want
food that is more natural and more organic—the opposite of food that
was made in a factory, sold in a box, and created by chemical
processes never found in nature.”161 Referencing “early reports”—
but not citing those reports directly—Missouri goes on suggest that
“however well-intentioned or humanitarian may be the concept of
mass producing lab-grown animal-cell meat alternatives . . . the
industry may impose a greater environmental impact than traditional
ranching and farming, increasing carbon dioxide emissions, which
are of concern to many who worry about climate change.”162 A close
look at the single study referenced in the news article that the
government cites reveals that its key takeaway is that “cultured meat
is not prima facie climatically superior to cattle; its relative impact
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Id. at 7.
Brief of State of Missouri, supra note 103, at 4 (quoting Star Trek: Charlie X
(CBS broadcast Sept.15, 1966) (“On Earth today, it’s Thanksgiving. If the crew
has to eat synthetic meat loaf, I want it to look like turkey.”).
158 Id. at 6.
159 Brief of State of Missouri, supra note 103, at 6 (citing Gillian Tett, Can You
Swallow the Idea of Lab-Grown Meat?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/903beb2e-3cb0-11eab232-000f4477fbca).
160 Id. at 6-7.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 7. The “report” that the government references is apparently Climate
Impacts of Cultured Meat and Beef Cattle. John Lynch & Raymond Pierrehumbert,
Climate Impacts of Cultured Meat and Beef Cattle, FRONTIERS SUSTAINABLE FOOD
SYS. (2019), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsufs.2019.00005/full.
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instead depends on the availability of decarbonized energy
generation and the specific production systems that are realized.”163
The brief makes no mention of species extinction, habitat loss, or
other aspects of the climate crisis. There is no data about the
treatment of animals in the animal agriculture industry.164
On March 29, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit issued an order affirming the district court’s denial
of Tofurky’s motion for preliminary injunction.165 Noting that it
“find[s] no reason to disturb the district court's ruling as to Plaintiffs’
likelihood of success on the merits,” the Eighth Circuit held that “the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining Plaintiffs
failed to show irreparable harm.” 166 The Court noted that because
“the evidentiary record is scant and the scope of [its] review is
limited . . . we emphasize that our analysis here may provide little
guidance as to the appropriate disposition on the merits.” 167
A similar case Tofurky filed in Arkansas reveals that states
seeking to justify their “Real Meat Acts” by claiming that consumers
may be misled by plant-based meat products are likely to find that
courts aren’t buying that argument.
2. Arkansas’ misplaced insistence that meaty words
mislead consumers

Lynch & Pierrehumbert, supra note 162. (“The scale of cattle production
required for the very high levels of beef consumption modeled here would result in
significant global warming, but it is not yet clear whether cultured meat production
would provide a more climatically sustainable alternative. The climate impacts of
cultured meat production will depend on what level of decarbonized energy
generation can be achieved, and the specific environmental footprints of
production. There is a need for detailed and transparent LCA of real cultured meat
production systems. Based on currently available data, cultured production does
not necessarily give license for unrestrained meat consumption.”)
164 The government argues that some consumers may prefer animal meat to “any of
these processed vegetarian products because they enjoy meat more or because
these plant-based products can still produce as many carbon emissions as
producing meats like chicken.” Brief of State of Missouri, supra note 103, at 8. See
also Olivia Roos, Is Fake Meat Better for You, or the Environment?, NBC NEWS
(Oct. 13, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fake-meatbetter-you-orenvironment-n1065231 (stating without citation the claim that “[c]ellular-based
meat alternatives release five times the emissions as chicken, putting their
emissions just under beef. Plant-based meat alternatives produce the same amount
of emissions as chicken — which are about five times the emissions of legumes
and vegetables.”).
165
Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2021).
166
Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694, 701-02 (8th Cir. 2021).
167
Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694, 702 (8th Cir. 2021).
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In March 2019, Arkansas enacted Act 501, titled “An Act to
Require Truth in Labeling of Agricultural Products that are Edible
by Humans; and for Other Purposes” (“Act 501”).168 Act 501, like
Missouri’s § 265.494, takes aim at plant-based and cultivated meat
products’ use of “meaty” words. Not only that, but certain provisions
of the Act can be interpreted as prohibiting the use of “milky” words
for foods not derived from animal-based milk.
The stated legislative purpose of Act 501 is “to protect
consumers from being misled or confused by false or misleading
labeling of agricultural products that are edible by humans.”169 The
Act defines “agricultural product” broadly as “a horticultural,
viticultural, forestry, dairy, livestock, poultry, or bee product or any
other farm, ranch, plantation, or range product[.]”170 It defines
“meat” as “a portion of a livestock, poultry, or cervid carcass that is
edible by humans” and specifies that “meat” “does not include a: (i)
Synthetic product derived from a plant, insect, or other source; or (ii)
Product grown in a laboratory from animal cells[.]”171 It defines
“misrepresent” as “to use any untrue, misleading, or deceptive oral
or written statement, advertising, label, display, picture, 28
illustration, or sample[.]”172 The Act does not provide a definition for
the terms “misled” or “confused.”
Act 501 prohibits a broad range of activities, including,
amongst other things, “[r]epresenting the agricultural product as
meat or a meat product when the agricultural product is not derived
from harvested livestock, poultry, or cervids” and “[u]tilizing a term
that is the same as or similar to a term that has been used or defined
historically in reference to a specific agricultural product[.]”173 The
breadth of the activities prohibited in the Act, combined with the
Act’s silence on whether “qualifiers” such as “plant-based” may be
used by plant-based foods alongside “meaty” or “milky” words, casts
a wide net that seemingly encompasses not just plant-based and
cultivated meat but plant milk and related plant-based dairy products
as well.

168

ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-301 (2019).

169Id.
170

ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-302(1) (2021).
§ 2-1-302(7).
172 § 2-1-302(10).
173 ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-305(6), (10) (2019).
171
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Act 501 imposes civil penalties for violation of its provisions, with
each violation of Act 501 punishable by a civil penalty of up to
$1,000.174
Tofurky filed suit against the state of Arkansas in July 2019
at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Central
Division, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to challenge the constitutionality of Arkansas Act 501.175 In
August 2019 Tofurky filed a motion for preliminary injunction,
focusing on its first amendment claims and the claim that “Act 501
also violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause’s
prohibition against vague statutes.”176 On December 11, 2019, Judge
Kristine G. Baker granted Tofurky’s motion for a preliminary
injunction “enjoining enforcement of the six provisions of Act 501
challenged by Tofurky and as applied to Tofurky[.]”177
In its Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Tofurky stated that
“[t]he question in this case is whether the government can prohibit
companies from using terms like ‘veggie burger’ or ‘tofu hot dog’ to
describe their products.”178 Asserting that Act 501 was passed “[i]n
response to vigorous lobbying from the agriculture industry,”179
Tofurky attacked the Act’s purported purpose of preventing
consumer confusion, arguing that:
The law’s stated purpose is to prevent consumer confusion,
but there is no evidence in the legislative record that
consumers are confused about whether a veggie burger
comes from a cow. To the contrary, people buy plant-based
meats precisely because they are not made from slaughtered
animals. Far from preventing consumer deception, the law is
more likely to create consumer confusion by prohibiting
companies from continuing to use self-evident terms like
‘vegan sausage’ to accurately describe the taste, appearance,
and texture of their products. The law’s tendency to confuse,
rather than inform, is no accident; the legislative history

174
175

176

ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-306(a)(1) (2019).
Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 561 (E.D. Ark. 2019).

Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 13, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 552 (No. 4:19cv-514-KGB).
177 Turtle Island Foods, SPC, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 579.
178 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 173, at 1.
179 Id. at 2.
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reveals that the law’s true purpose is to benefit the meat
industry by censoring the competition.180
Tofurky defines “plant-based meats” as “foods that
approximate the texture, flavor, and appearance of meat derived from
slaughtered animals.”181 Tofurky argues that “[s]imilar to other
plant-based meat producers, Tofurky’s packaging and marketing
materials—which use terms like ‘chorizo,’ ‘hot dogs,’ and ‘ham
roast’ to effectively describe its products—all clearly indicate that
these products are plant based, meatless, vegetarian, or vegan.”182
Tofurky argues that its products “already comply with federal food
labeling regulations and numerous state and federal consumer
protection laws, which prohibit the deceptive labeling and marketing
of food products and consumer products more generally.”183 Tofurky
argues that in the face of Act 501, it must “either completely overhaul
its labeling and marketing practices to comply with the Act’s
restrictions on truthful and non-misleading commercial speech, or
face the threat of ruinous civil penalties.”184
Tofurky goes on to argue that “Act 501 unconstitutionally
restricts Tofurky’s truthful and non-misleading commercial speech
in violation of the First Amendment,” and proceeds to offer an
analysis of its labels as commercial speech under the framework
provided in the landmark Supreme Court case Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.185
180

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 3.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 173, at 3-4.
185 Id. at 4-13 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980)).
On p. 19 of its order granting Tofurky’s motion for preliminary injunction, the
court set out the four-part Central Hudson test: “In analyzing restrictions on
commercial speech, the Supreme Court articulated an intermediate scrutiny
framework for commercial speech in Central Hudson resulting in a four-part test. 4
447 U.S. at 765. Under the Central Hudson test, courts “test the constitutionality of
laws burdening commercial speech” by considering: “(1) whether the commercial
speech at issue concerns unlawful activity or is misleading; (2) whether the
governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the challenged regulation directly
advances the government’s asserted interest; and (4) whether the regulation is no
more extensive than necessary to further the government’s interest.” Preliminary
Injunction Order at 19, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552
(No. 4:19-cv-514-KGB) (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). See also 1-800411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045, 1055 (citing Cent. Hudson,
447 U.S. at 566). Provided that the speech is not false or inherently misleading,
“[e]ach of these latter three inquiries must be answered in the affirmative for the
181
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Noting that “the Court must determine whether the
commercial speech restricted by Act 501 is protected under the First
Amendment” and recognizing that this inquiry requires the court to
determine “whether the commercial speech regulated by the Act is
false or inherently misleading,” Tofurky attacks the notion that its
labels may be at all “misleading” to consumers.186 Pointing out the
long history of plant-based foods using “meaty” words, Tofurky
asserts that “the State cannot plausibly maintain that any use of words
like ‘meat,’ ‘burger,’ or ‘steak’ on plant-based food labels is
inherently misleading.”187 Citing a passage from Genesis 1:29 from
the King James Bible, Tofurky noted that “[f]or decades—and in
some cases centuries—these words have been used to describe foods
that are not made from slaughtered animals, such as coconut meat,
veggie burgers, and beefsteak tomatoes.”188
In arguing that Act 501 does not advance a substantial
governmental interest, Tofurky notes that “there is no evidence in the
legislative record demonstrating that consumers are confused or
deceived by labeling or marketing materials for plant-based meats”
and that there is no evidence “that prohibiting Tofurky and other
plant-based meat purveyors from using meat-based terms will in fact
alleviate consumer confusion to a material degree.”189
Tofurky goes a step further, arguing not only that “meaty”
words on plant-based food labels are not confusing to consumers, but
that “Act 501 is likely to create consumer confusion where, for
decades, none has existed.”190 Tofurky argues that
[t]he Act’s restriction on the use of these terms will make it
much more difficult for consumers to identify the plantbased meats they want to consume in lieu of meat from
slaughtered animals. For example, Tofurky’s ‘Plant-Based
Original Italian Sausage’ communicates that the product is
regulation to be found constitutional.”” Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535
U.S. 357, 367 (2002); See also Missouri. ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323
F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir. 2003).
186 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 173, at 6-7.
187 Id. at 7.
188 Id. (citing Genesis 1:29 (King James) (“And God said, Behold I have given you
every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in
which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat.”)).
189 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 173, at 8-9.
190 Id. at 9.
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made from plants and has the shape and seasonings
commonly associated with sausage made from animal meat.
The Act requires Tofurky to replace ‘sausage’ with less
descriptive terms like ‘roll’ or ‘tube.’ Consumers who
confront a package that reads ’plant-based protein’ or
‘veggie tube’ in the grocery store will have no idea what they
are
buying.191
Tofurky elaborates on its argument that its labels are not
misleading to consumers in its analysis of its due process claim.
Arguing that Act 501 “also violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause’s prohibition against vague statutes,” the company
points out that while the Arkansas statute defines “meat” as being
derived from animal flesh, the word has been used “to refer to the
flesh of fruits or nuts” in documents as wide-ranging as the King
James Bible and FDA documents.192 Further, notes Tofurky, words
like “patty,” “burger,” and “steak” have long been associated with
“non-animalian food,” such as nut burgers and peppermint patties.193
“[E]ven more confusing,” argues Tofurky, is the Act’s
prohibition against terms “similar” to those “historically used in
reference to specific agricultural products. Does the Act prohibit
‘beetballs’ because it is similar to ‘meatballs;? Is Tofurky prohibited
from using its own registered trademark in Arkansas because it is
‘similar’ to the word ‘turkey’?”194
Tofurky also attacks the very premise that Act 501 was
enacted to protect consumers from being confused or misled,
identifying the true purpose as one grounded in fear. Citing a
comment from the Arkansas Cattlemen’s Association that “the Act
is necessary to protect the industry’s ‘brand I.D.’ from ‘[c]ounterfeit
products,’ Tofurky asserts that “[t]he Act’s true purpose is not to
protect consumers, but to stoke confusion in order to benefit the
economic interests of the meat industry. It is no secret that agriculture
industry advocates lobbied for the Act because they fear a decline in
sales ‘as shoppers choose from a growing pantry of alternatives.’”195
Arkansas’ response to Tofurky’s motion for preliminary
injunction argues that “Tofurky’s misleading commercial speech is
191

Id.
Id. at 13-14.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 14.
195 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 173, at 9.
192
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not protected by the First Amendment.”196 Arkansas argues that
“Tofurky’s labels for its ‘plant-based’ products are inherently
misleading because they use the names and descriptors of traditional
meat items but do not actually include the product they invoke.”197
Unlike Missouri, who argued that Tofurky’s labels were not
misleading because they contained “qualifiers,” Arkansas dismisses
Tofurky’s qualifiers, asserting that its labels “rarely identify the
components of its products. Instead, many of its labels bury the term
‘plant-based’ somewhere on its packaging or otherwise resorts to fine
print to identify some of the components of its product.”198 Taking
issue with Tofurky’s label for “slow roasted chick’n,” the state
argues that the label “does not dispel the notion that it is an actual
poultry product until the consumer finds the term ‘plant-based’
buried in the bottom corner of the label.”199 Arkansas provides no
evidence that even a single consumer has actually been confused or
misled by these labels.
Dismissing Tofurky’s argument that “meaty” words have
been used for centuries to refer to plant-based foods—and seemingly
discrediting the language invoked in the King James Bible—
Arkansas argues that “[t]he fact that such words have been
misapplied in the past does not categorically mean they are no longer
misleading to consumers.”200 The state also argues that Tofurky is
unlikely to succeed on its Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim
because “the Company only identifies one subsection of Act 501 that
it claims is impermissibly vague” and “[c]onsidering the Act as a
whole, it is plain what Act 501 regulates.”201 Seeming to
acknowledge that the provision Tofurky identified, Ark. Code Ann.
§ 2-1-305(10), may be unconstitutionally vague, the state argues that
even if the court finds that provision to be impermissibly vague, “the
Court should sever the provision it determines is unconstitutionally
vague and allow the remainder of the statute to remain in effect.”202
Arkansas also rejects Tofurky’s assertion that Act 501’s
“true purpose” is “to stoke confusion in order to benefit the economic

Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, at 13,
Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (No.
4:19-cv-00514-KGB).
197 Id. at 15.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 16.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 24.
202 Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra
note 193, at 24.
196
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interests of the meat industry.”203 Arguing that “Tofurky’s
unfounded fear of an industry-wide conspiracy is dispelled by its
own evidence,” Arkansas ignores the quote Tofurky provided by the
Arkansas Cattlemen’s Association and focuses instead on the fact
that the same spokesperson also cited concern for the consumer in
supporting the Act.204
In its order granting Tofurky’s motion for preliminary
injunction, the Court determined that “Tofurky has demonstrated it
is likely to prevail on the merits of its First Amendment claim as
applied,” and therefore did not reach Tofurky’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim.205 The Court found that “[a]s applied, Act 501
prohibits Tofurky from using words like ‘meat,’ ‘beef,’ ‘chorizo,’
‘sausage,’ and ‘roast’ to describe its plant-based meat products,” and
notes “[t]he statute provides no exception for plant-based meat
producers that clearly identify their products as being vegetarian,
vegan, or made from plants[.]”206
The Court then proceeds to conduct a First Amendment
analysis using the Central Hudson test, beginning with an inquiry
into whether Tofurky’s commercial speech—in the form of its
product labels—is “inherently misleading.”207 The Court identifies
seven labels—“Veggie Burger,” “Deli Slices,” “Chorizo Style
Sausage,” “Slow Roasted Chick'n,” “Original Sausage Kielbasa,”
“Hot Dogs,” and “Vegetarian Ham Roast”—and “finds the speech at
issue not inherently misleading.”208 “It is true,” the Court
acknowledges, “that these labels use some words traditionally
associated with animal-based meat. However, the simple use of a
word frequently used in relation to animal-based meats does not
make use of that word in a different context inherently
misleading.”209 Noting the labels’ use of “qualifier” words like
“veggie,” “all vegan,” and “plant-based,” the Court emphasized that
its finding that the labels are not inherently misleading “rings
particularly true since the labels also make disclosures to inform
consumers as to the plant-based nature of the products contained
therein.”210 “[T]his is not a case of key information in minuscule type
buried deep among many ingredients,” said the Court, in apparent
203

Id. at 18.
Id.
205 Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Soman, 424 F. Supp. 3d 552, 571 (E.D. Ark. 2019).
206 Id. at 563.
207 Id. at 573-75.
208 Id. at 573-74.
209 Preliminary Injunction Order at 23, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Soman 424 F.
Supp. 3d 552 (E.D. Ark. 2019) (No. 4:19-CV-00514).
210 Id.
204
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response to the state’s argument that the Tofurky labels’ qualifiers
appeared in “fine print” or were “buried” in a corner of the label.211
The Court calls “unwarranted” Arkansas’ assertion “that the
simple use of the word ‘burger,’ ‘ham,’ or ‘sausage’ leaves the
typical consumer confused,” and finds that Tofurky’s labels “include
ample terminology to indicate the vegan or vegetarian nature of the
products.”212 The Court also notes that there is no evidence of any
consumer confusion by Tofurky’s “packaging, labeling, or
marketing.”213 Noting that Tofurky “identifies several in-effect
federal and state laws directed at prohibiting deceptive labeling and
marketing of food products, and consumer products more generally,
with which Tofurky contends its food labeling complies,” the Court
also held that there is “no convincing argument as to why each of
these laws is ineffective at policing the alleged deceptive or
confusing practices the State purports to target.”214 The Court offered
that, instead of the prohibition in Act 501, the state could “create a
symbol to go on the labeling and packaging of plant-based products
indicating their vegan composition, or require a disclaimer that the
products do not contain meat if further laws are deemed necessary to
advance its stated purpose.”215 Because it found that Tofurky “is
likely to prevail in demonstrating that Act 501 does not advance the
stated governmental interest of protecting consumers from being
misled or confused,” it declined to reach the question of “whether the
stated interests the Court identifies are not the actual interests served
by Act 501.”216
The district court’s grant of Tofurky’s motion for
preliminary injunction in Arkansas was a win for advocates of plantbased foods who believe that “Real Meat” laws claiming to protect
consumers from being misled or confused are really thinly-veiled and
fear-driven attempts at protecting the animal agriculture industry’s
bottom line. Lawsuits in other states against similar laws echo the
same refrain.

Id. at 24. See also Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, supra note 193, at 13.
212 Preliminary Injunction Order, supra note 206, at 24 (citing Ang v. Whitewave
Foods Co., No. 13-CV-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2013)).
213 Preliminary Injunction Order, supra note 209, at 24.
214 Id. at 27.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 27-28.
211
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3. Mississippi, Louisiana, and Oklahoma pursue
statutory “clear losers”
A spate of other states have pursued legislation to prohibit
plant-based food from using meaty words on their packaging. Time
and time again, proponents of those laws reveal that it isn’t consumer
confusion they are afraid of, but rather the threat that plant-based
products may hurt the animal agriculture industry’s bottom line.
“This bill will protect our cattle farmers from having to
compete with products not harvested from an animal,” said
Mississippi Farm Bureau Federation president Mike McCormick in
January 2019 when Mississippi’s “Fake Meat Bill” passed in the
Mississippi state House.217 The law went into effect in July 2019, and
was immediately challenged in court by vegan food company
Upton’s Naturals in a suit joined by the Plant Based Foods
Association (PBFA) and the Institute for Justice (IJ).218 In September
2019 Mississippi proposed new regulations allowing for plant-based
foods to use meaty words so long as they are accompanied by a
“qualifier” like “plant-based” that is “prominently displayed on the
front of the package[.]”219
In October 2020 Tofurky—together with GFI and the
Animal Legal Defense Fund sued the Louisiana Department of
Agriculture and Forestry, challenging its new law that seeks to
prohibit meaty words for plant-based foods.220 The law “prohibits
companies from ‘[u]tilizing a term that is the same as or deceptively
similar to a term that has been used or defined historically in

217

Lowery, supra note 110.
Andrew Wimer, New Lawsuit Challenges Mississippi Labeling Law That
Makes Selling “Veggie Burgers” a Crime, INST. FOR JUSTICE (July 2, 2019),
https://ij.org/press-release/new-lawsuit-challenges-mississippi-labeling-law-thatmakes-selling-veggie-burgers-a-crime/.
219 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2, Turtle Island Foods
SPC v. Strain, No. 20CV00674, 2020 U.S. Dist. (M.D. La. 2021).
See also Kelsey Piper, Mississippi Will No Longer Ban Calling Veggie Burgers
“Veggie Burgers,” VOX (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2019/9/6/20853246/mississippi-veggie-burger-ban-laws-plant-based.
See also 02-001-407 MISS. CODE R. § 112.01 (LexisNexis 2021).
220 Nigel Barrella, How Plant-Based Companies Are Fighting Back Against Label
Censorship, GOOD FOOD INST. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://gfi.org/blog/labelcensorship-lawsuits/. The complaint for the case is available here:
Complaint at https://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/LAComplaint-Tofurky.pdf.
218
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reference to a specific agricultural product.’”221 Supporters of the law
argued in testimony in the Louisiana state legislature that it “was
necessary to ‘protect our industries’ in the face of ‘a growing trend’
of consumers deciding to purchase different products. ‘We must
protect our industry in this state: agriculture. It’s the number one
industry in the state of Louisiana,’ the bill’s Senate sponsor, Francis
Thompson (D-Delhi) argued during legislative hearings.”222
“It’s bemusing that these laws keep getting passed,” says
Amanda Howell, an ALDF attorney co-counsel on the Louisiana
case.223 “It’s bemusing that given the win in Arkansas the states don’t
see these laws as clear losers. It’s a waste of state resources and it’s
insulting to all consumers. Passing laws to protect one industry over
another is not the job of our government.”224
And yet, the laws keep coming. In October 2020, Upton’s
Naturals filed suit in Oklahoma in 2020 against a “strange new type
of labeling law that tries to micromanage font sizes for disclosures
on plant-based products.”225 Other laws—and legal challenges to
them—may well be on the horizon.
Journalist Kelsey Piper notes that states’ “backlash” against
plant-based food companies “might seem premature. While plantbased meat is certainly rising in popularity, all plant-based meat
products still account for only a tiny fraction of the demand for meat.
And plant-based alternatives aren’t changing the meat industry yet:
Demand for meat actually grew last year.”226

221

Kelsey Piper, Tofurky Is Suing Louisiana for the Right to Label Its Veggie
Burgers “Veggie Burgers,” VOX (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/21507907/louisiana-veggie-burger-ban-tofurky-lawsuit.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Barrella, supra note 220. See also Truth in Labeling Laws(uits)—Update, The
National Agricultural Law Center, at https://nationalaglawcenter.org/truth-inlabeling-lawsuits-update/.
226 Kelsey Piper, Mississippi Is Forbidding Grocery Stores from Calling Veggie
Burgers “Veggie Burgers,” VOX (July 3, 2019), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2019/7/3/20680731/mississippi-veggie-burgers-illegal-meatless-meat.
See also Eliza Barclay, Americans Should Eat Less Meat, but They’re Eating More
and More, VOX (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/8/18/12248226/eatless-meat-campaign-fail (“consumption of meat in the United States rose by 5
percent in 2015 — the biggest increase in 40 years”).
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But, notes Piper, fear is a powerful driving force behind this
spate of laws seeking to cling to the animal-meat-laden status quo.227
“It’s past time for meat companies to move past trying to outlaw their
competition,” argues Piper in a different article, “and toward
addressing the problems that are driving consumers toward plantbased meat: environmental concerns, the mistreatment of
slaughterhouse workers, animal cruelty, and public health.”228

B.

Fear and Dairy PRIDE

Milk occupies a sacred space in human culture; it’s so bound
up with human civilization that the ancient Greeks named our galaxy
after it, and at least fourteen languages do the same today.229 Dairy
milk in particular is a central fixture of Western culture, a fact of life
many take for granted, but not a particularly logical one given that a
majority of people of color are unable able to digest it.230
Despite the firm hold that dairy milk has in the cultural
landscape of the United States and Europe, dairy milk consumption
has fallen by forty percent since 1975.231 In the U.S., 20,000 dairy
farms have shuttered over the last decade—a 30 percent decline.232
Meanwhile, sales in plant milk have skyrocketed in recent years,
threatening to further disrupt the once-ironclad hold that dairy milk
had in the milk industry.233
See Piper, supra note 226. “[P]lant-based meat advocates hope — and sellers of
conventional meat fear — that someday, that might change. A more climateconscious population is increasingly bothered by the carbon footprint and land use
problems associated with conventional meat production, and economies of scale
may enable plant-based meat alternatives to be more competitive on price. While
that day is far off, and still quite speculative, the possibility has clearly spurred
lobbyists to action.” Id.
228 Piper, supra note 221.
229 See Robinson Meyer, How to Refer to the Milky Way Across the Globe, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/08/how-to-refer-to-themilky-way-across-the-globe/278506/.
230 See Andrew Curry, The Milk Revolution, 500 NATURE 20, 20-21 (2013). See
also Andrea Freeman, The Unbearable Whiteness of Milk: Food Oppression and
the USDA, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1251, 1269–73 (2013) (discussing the concept of
“food oppression” and the role dairy plays in perpetuating it); Mathilde Cohen,
Animal Colonialism: The Case of Milk, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 267, 268–69
(2017) (discussing the role dairy milk and “lactating animals became integral parts
of colonial and neocolonial projects).
231 Jacobs, supra note 53.
232 Id.
233 See Oliver Franklin-Wallis, White Gold: The Unstoppable Rise of Alternative
Milks, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/jan/29/white-gold-the-unstoppable-rise227
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Over the last decade a series of lawsuits and legislative
efforts on both sides of the Atlantic reveal the great lengths dairy
milk advocates will go to in order to protect the dairy industry from
the perceived threat of plant-based milk. Like the linguistic and
semantic battles over the word “meat,” these “milk wars” are
typically fought under the guise of needing to protect the “misled”
consumer, but at bottom are really about something entirely
different: fear.
In the United States, a trio of federal cases out of California
brought by plaintiffs claiming consumers may be “misled” or
confused by plant milk using the word “milk”; in each case, the court
dismissed the notion that anyone may mistake plant milk for the stuff
that comes from cows.234 “[I]t is simply implausible that a reasonable
consumer would mistake a product like soymilk or almond milk with
dairy milk from a cow,” the Northern District of California stated in
the 2013 case Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co.235 “The first words in the
products’ names should be obvious enough to even the least
discerning of consumers,” said the Court.236 Dismissing the notion
that a reasonable consumer may view a term like “soymilk” and
“assume that the [drink] came from cows” as one that “stretches the
bounds of credulity,” the Court concluded that under that logic, “a
reasonable consumer might also believe that veggie bacon contains
pork, that flourless chocolate cake contains flour, or that e-books are
made out of paper.”237
The “milk wars” entered the halls of Congress in the United
States in 2017, when a bipartisan group of lawmakers introduced the
DAIRY PRIDE Act to Congress.238 If passed, the Act—which was
re-introduced in 2019 and is formally known as the Defending
of-alternative-milks-oat-soy-rice-coconut-plant (discussing the rise in popularity of
plant milks in Europe and the United States).
234 Ang v. Whitewave Foods Co., No. 13-cv-1953, 2013 WL 6492353, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 10, 2013); Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 13-cv-01333-VC, 2015 WL
9121232, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2015); Painter v. Blue Diamond Growers, 757
Fed. Appx. 517, 519 (9th Cir. 2018).
For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Gambert, supra note 106, at 81217.
235 Whitewave, 2013 WL 6492353 at *4. See Gambert, supra note 106, at 812-17,
for an in-depth discussion of the case.
236 Whitewave, 2013 WL 6492353 at *4.
237 Id.
238 See Dairy PRIDE Act, S. 130, 115th Cong. (2017).
It’s probably no coincidence that the lawmakers who introduced the bill were
democrats from Vermont and Wisconsin – big dairy states where increasingly
plant milk sales may be an especially big threat. Id.
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Against Imitations and Replacements of Yogurt, Milk, and Cheese
To Promote Regular Intake of Dairy Everyday Act—would prohibit
plant-based milk from using the word “milk” on its packaging.239
This sort of prohibition is already in place in the EU and Canada.240
A narrative of fear runs through the rhetoric surrounding the
efforts of lawmakers to make it harder for plant-based products to
compete with dairy. Specifically, fear that plant milk and related
plant-based products may threaten the economic bottom line of the
dairy industry. Shortly before the DAIRY PRIDE Act was
introduced, 32 congressmen sent a letter to the FDA filled with feardriven rhetoric about the dangers facing “hard-working
Americans.”241 The congressmen’s letter unapologetically framed its
arguments around a pathos-driven narrative designed to conjure
sympathy for the plight of American dairy farmers. “[D]airy farmers
are facing a serious financial crisis,” the letter reads.242 “These hard
working Americans have experienced deep cuts in income as milk
prices have plunged 40% since 2014. . . . Unless more is done, many
more farmers will be forced to sell their herds.”243
What’s misleading about this rhetoric about “hard working
Americans” is that in the US, a majority of workers in the dairy
industry are immigrants, many of them noncitizens.244 The farms
themselves are often owned by huge dairy conglomerates.245 In a

239

See DAIRY PRIDE Act, S. 792, 116th Cong. (2019). The Act would also
prohibit other products, such as plant-based yogurt and cheese, from using the
words “yogurt” or “cheese” on their packaging. Id.
240 See Council Regulation 1898/87, 1987 O.J. (L182) 36, 36, 38 (EC); Food and
Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c 870, s B.08.003 (Can.).
241 See Letter from Rep. Peter Welch, Mike Simpson & Members of Congress to
Hon. Robert M. Califf, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin. (Dec. 16, 2016)
[hereinafter “Welch-Simpson Letter”], available at
http://www.nmpf.org/files/Welch-Simpson%20Letter.pdf.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 FLYNN ADCOCK ET AL, CTR. FOR N. AM. STUD., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
IMMIGRANT LABOR ON U.S. DAIRY FARMS (2015),
https://1yoo7k3mjej72y4ffj396xcv-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/02/CNAS-pub-Immigrant-Labor-Impacts-on-DairyFinal.pdf. See also Memorandum from Farmworker Justice on Selected Statistics
on Farmworkers, available at
https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/NAWS%20data%20factsht%
201-13-15FINAL.pdf.
In 2014, immigrant labor accounted for 51% of all dairy labor, and dairies that
employ immigrant labor produced 79% percent of the US milk supply. Id.
245 See Debbie Weingarten, ‘There Are Ghosts in the Land’: How US MegaDairies Are Killing Off Small Farms, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2021),
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2019 story about the crisis President Trump’s immigration policies
were having on the dairy industry, the New York Times noted that
“[i]t has long been an open secret in upstate New York that the dairy
industry has been able to survive only by relying on undocumented
immigrants for its work force.”246
The U.S. is not the only place where fears of harming the
animal agriculture industry prompt politicians to pursue laws that
hinder the ability of plant-based meat and milk to play an even more
meaningful role in our species’ fight against climate change. A recent
amendment passed by the European parliament is the latest battle in
the European “milk wars” that began in 2014 when the Swedish dairy
lobby sued a small (and at the time relatively obscure) Swedish oat
milk company called Oatly, accusing it of misleading consumers.247
Oatly lost that particular battle, but has in recent years boomed in
popularity across the globe and, as one of the key players in the latest
scourge of the “milk wars,” seems intent on winning the war.

C.

Amendment 171: “A wacko, incomprehensible direction to
take in the middle of a climate crisis”
“Not milk.”
“Milk alternative.”
“Does NOT contain milk.”248

In late 2020 and early 2021, it appeared that phrases such as
these commonly found on cartons of soy, almond, and oat milk were
poised to become illegal in the European Union. In October 2020,
under the guise of protecting customers from being “misled,” the
European parliament passed Amendment 171 by a narrow 54%
majority that, if allowed to become law,249 would have introduced
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jun/01/there-are-ghosts-in-theland-how-us-mega-dairies-are-killing-off-small-farms.
246 Christina Goldbaum, Trump Crackdown Unnerves Immigrants, and the
Farmers Who Rely on Them, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/nyregion/ny-farmers-undocumentedworkers-trumpimmigration.html.
247 See Marknadsdomstolen [MD] ([Market Court]) 2015 case no. C 23/14,
available at
http://avgoranden.domstol.se/Files/MD_Public/Avgoranden/Domar/Dom201518.pdf (Swed.).
248 See Liam Giliver, Oatly Slams EU over ‘Incomprehensible’ Decision to
Support ‘Dairy Ban,’ PLANT BASED NEWS (Oct. 25, 2020),
https://plantbasednews.org/lifestyle/food/oatly-slams-eu-over-dairy-ban/.
249 “It now needs approval from the EU Council of Ministers, which will consider
the proposal at the trilogue meetings with the parliament and European
Commission on January 27-28. If it’s agreed by the council and the commission, it
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sweeping changes that would ban these and related labels on plantbased food products throughout the EU.250
In targeting plant milk and other non-dairy food alternatives,
Amendment 171 sought to protect the dairy industry by invoking
familiar fear-driven rhetoric, aiming to prohibit “any [ ] commercial
indication or practice likely to mislead the consumer as to the
product’s true nature or composition.”251 Despite the persistence of
dairy advocates in perpetuating the fear-driven narrative that a
consumer may mistakenly purchase a container of oat milk
containing the label “Not Milk” thinking that she is buying dairy
milk, no evidence has been presented that a consumer might ever
actually make that mistake.
If allowed to become law, Amendment 171 would have
explicitly prohibited words such as “milk,” “butter,” and “yogurt”
from appearing on plant-based food labels in any way that amounts
to “any direct or indirect commercial use of [those words]” by
“comparable products or products presented as capable of being
substituted not complying with the corresponding definition” of
those words, or “in so far as such use exploits the reputation
associated with [those words.]”252 Also prohibited is “any misuse,
imitation or evocation, even if the composition or true nature of the
product or service is indicated or accompanied by an expression such
as ‘style’, ‘type’, ‘method’, ‘as produced in’, ‘imitation’, ‘flavour’,
‘substitute’, ‘like’ or similar[.]”253
The European Alliance for Plant-based Foods called the
Amendment’s broad language “worrying,” noting that “[i]n its most
will become law.” Enrico Bonadio & Andrea Borghini, Vegan ‘Dairy’ Products
Face EU Ban from Using Milk Cartons and Yoghurt Pots – and the UK Could Be
Next, THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 26, 2021), https://theconversation.com/vegandairy-products-face-eu-ban-from-using-milk-cartons-and-yoghurt-pots-and-ukcould-be-next-153564.
250 Id. See also Tiffany Duong, New EU Laws Could Censor Vegan ‘Dairy’
Products, ECOWATCH (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.ecowatch.com/eu-vegan-dairylaw-2650162992.html?rebelltitem=1#rebelltitem1; Flora Southey, ‘Plant-Based
Dairy Censorship’: Oatly, Upfield and ProVeg Petition to Overthrow Amendment
171, FOOD NAVIGATOR (Jan. 14, 2021),
https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/01/14/How-Oatly-Upfield-andProVeg-plan-to-overthrow-Amendment-171; Gilliver, supra note 245.
251 See Report of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development on the
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Amending Regulations Establishing a Common Organization of the Markets in
Agricultural Products, supra note 106, at 172.
252 Id.
253 Id.
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restrictive interpretation, [the Amendment] could result in bans on
plant-based food packaging that looks visually similar to dairy foods.
For example, a ban on packaging for plant-based desserts that
resembles a yoghurt pot.”254
In a characteristically cheeky media campaign titled “Are
you stupid?,” Swedish oat milk producer Oatly took aim at
Amendment 171.255 No stranger to the cultural or legal “milk wars,”
Oatly is well known for using humor, wit, and social media savvy to
attack the rhetoric of its significantly more deep-pocketed
competitors in the dairy industry.256 Its January 2021 YouTube ads
began with the premise that “the milk lobby seems to think that when
plant-based products use descriptions like ‘alternative to yogurt’ or
‘not milk’ or ‘creamy texture’, it’s hard for consumers to tell the
difference between them and dairy.”257 Oatly’s stated goal was to
“find out if the people of Europe really are that stupid.”258 In the ads,
Oatly gathered people around a table for “focus groups” and were
asked to point to the dairy milk container after being presented with
a bottle of dairy and a bottle of Oatly oat milk.259 Needless to say,
everyone pointed immediately to the carton emblazoned with an
image of a cow, providing that no one was “that stupid.”260
Oatly and other plant-based food advocates were vocal not
only about the absurdity of the claim that consumers may be “misled”
by plant milk using phrases like “milk alternative” on its packaging,
but also about the bigger and more consequential impact that
Amendment 171 would have on existing efforts to promote plantbased foods as meaningful alternatives to meat and dairy in the global

254

European Alliance for Plant-Based Foods, What Is Amendment 171 and How
Could It Affect Plant-Based Foods?, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.politico.eu/sponsored-content/what-is-amendment-171-and-howcould-it-affect-plant-based-foods/. Oatly presented a visual of a spray bottle of oat
milk shaped like household cleaner to prove the same point. See Are You Stupid?,
OATLY, https://www.oatly.com/int/stop-plant-based-censorship (last visited Sept.
7, 2021).
255 See Are You Stupid?, supra note 251; see also Oatly, A Quick & Colorful
Guide to AM 171 | Stop AM 171 | Oatly, YOUTUBE (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1rCc8-uGAj0; Stop Plant-Based Dairy
Censorship, PROVEG INT’L, https://stopam171.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2021).
256 For a detailed overview of Oatly’s legal and cultural battles against the Swedish
dairy lobby, see See Gambert, supra note 106, at 832-37.
257 See Oatly, Where’s the Milk? | Stop AM 171 | Oatly, YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 2021),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_WMGDldA9pw&t=1s.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
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fight against climate change and species extinction.261 In a section
called “And what about the climate?,” Oatly’s webpage about
Amendment 171 said this:
The EU seems confused there, too. Amendment 171 will
contradict the EU’s own sustainability ambitions. As part of
the European Green Deal (with the goal to make the EU
climate neutral by 2050), the Farm to Fork Strategy
highlights the fact that current EU food consumption
patterns are unsustainable, calling for a shift to more plantbased diets, both for reasons of public health and for
environmental protection. Amendment 171 is a move in the
opposite direction, creating a huge road block for both
consumers and the European plant-based food sector.262
Oatly’s Director of Public Affairs and Sustainable Eating,
Cecilia McAleavey, had harsh words about the advocates pursuing
the passage of Amendment 171. “Given the climate crisis, it’s
irresponsible to try and prevent us from encouraging people to make
the switch to plant-based and help protect the planet in the process,”
she said.263 “People are not stupid—everyone understands that this is
an attempt by the dairy lobby to hinder the shift towards sustainable
plant-based eating.”264
Jasmijn de Boo, Vice President of ProVeg International,
agreed. “It is baffling to once again be forced to justify sustainability.
We would be sabotage innovation? Who will benefit?”265 “We need
to adapt across every part of our food chain if we’re to tackle the
climate crisis,” she continued.266 “Genuinely sustainable food
production must be enabled. How will we reach our climate goals if
we allow the influence of powerful but unsustainable industries to
determine our collective fate?”267
Oatly characteristically leveraged social media to spread the
word about the dangers of Amendment 171 to efforts to combat
climate change. “This past Friday the EU Parliament voted Yes to
Amendment 171 which will make it illegal for plant-based foods to
be compared to dairy products in the future,” said Oatly in an
261

See Are You Stupid?, supra note 254.
Id.
263 Southey, supra note 250.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
262
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Instagram post on Oct. 24, 2020, alongside an image of an Oatly
container emblazoned with the words “Not Milk.”268
This means we can no longer call our products milk-free or
talk about any of the health and environmental advantages
they offer. It’s a wacko, incomprehensible direction to take
in the middle of a climate crisis. Especially since this
amendment runs contrary to the EU’s own climate goals and
their ambition to encourage the consumption of plant-based
foods. Actually though, it isn’t so surprising considering
there are more milk lobbyists in Brussels than actual cows
in
pasture
during
the
summer
months.269
Specifically targeting Amendment 171’s prohibition on
comparisons made between dairy and plant milk and other vegan
foods, Oatly took aim at the dairy lobby:
Consider this. If a liter of cow’s milk generates 293% more
greenhouse gas emissions than a liter of oat drink270, doesn’t
it make perfect sense that the number one priority of all those
milk lobbyists is to forbid this weakness from being exposed?
And when the Milk Lobby decides to flex its protein-rich
muscles we all know what happens—the public loses out.
How will consumers now be able to easily compare different
food products in order to make more informed decisions
about what they eat? 271
To be clear: Amendment 171 was not about whether plant
milk should be allowed to use the word “milk” on its packaging: the
European Union already has regulations dating back to 1987 that
narrowly define “milk” as animal in nature, save for a few carefully
delineated exceptions.272 As a result, soy, almond, rice, oat, and other
plant-based milks and dairy substitutes are already required to use
268

See Oatly (@oatly), INSTAGRAM (Oct. 24, 2020),
https://www.instagram.com/p/CGuedRNM2aK/?utm_source=ig_embed.
269 Id.
270 Id. (“This comparison specifically refers to Swedish cow’s milk 1.5% and Oatly
Oat Drink 1.5%.”)
271 Id.
272 See Council Regulation 1898/87, art. 2, 1987 O.J. (L 182) 36, 36 (EC). For
exceptions, see Commission Decision 2010/791/EU, annex I, 2010 O.J. (L 336)
55, 56 (citing Council Regulation 1234/2007, annex XII, 2010 O.J. (L 299) 1, 105
(EC)).The regulations also allow for the legal description of nondairy products
such as “peanut butter,” “cream crackers,” and “shea butter.” Id. Note that use of
the word “milk” by plant milk companies in the U.S. remains contested. See
Gambert, supra note 106, at 812-17.
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terms like “soy beverage” or “oat drink” on their packaging.273 When
Amendment 171 was first passed, the European Dairy Association
(EDA) said that it was a “good day” for the “EU lactosphere,” adding
that “non-dairy products cannot hijack our dairy terms and the welldeserved reputation of excellence in milk and dairy.”274
Amendment 171 was grounded not in logic, but fear. But
logic—and public pressure—won out in the end: in May 2021—after
Oatly and other plant milk advocates gathered over 450,000 citizen
signatures on a petition to oust Amendment 171—the European
Parliament voted to withdraw the Amendment by a vote of 124–
37.275

IV. Want You To Panic: Embracing Fear And Rage As
A Catalyst To Action
When it comes to confronting the idea that we humans may
need to drastically reduce our meat consumption in the name of
averting the current climate crisis, Jo Leinen, an omnivorous German
member of the European Parliament, was cautious: “This is one of
the most delicate issues with climate protection, because we all have
our habits and diet is something quite holy for some people, not to
be meddled with.”276
Federal dietary guidelines have been reluctant to
unequivocally recommend against animal meat consumption for
environmental purposes. In 2016, new federal dietary guidelines
urged Americans to cut sugar intake and for the first time suggested
that teenage boys and men cut down on their consumption of protein
in the form of meat, chicken and eggs.277 Draft recommendations
“had suggested all Americans adopt more environmentally273

See Council Regulation 1898/87, art. 2, 1987 O.J. (L182) 36, 36. Gambert,
supra note 106, at 806.
274 Southey, supra note 250.
275
Flora Southey, Amendment 171 off the table: Europe allows for ‘creamy’ and
‘buttery’ plant-based dairy, Food Navigator (May 26, 2021),
https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2021/05/26/Europe-drops-Amendment171-allowing-for-creamy-and-buttery-plant-based-dairy. See also Stop Plant Based
Censorship, Oatly, https://www.oatly.com/en-us/things-we-do/initiatives/stopplant-based-censorship (last visited Dec. 9, 2021).
276 Paris Climate Change Summit and the Taboo of Meat-Eating, supra note 67.
277 Anahad O’Connor, New Dietary Guidelines Urge Less Sugar for All and Less
Protein for Boys and Men, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/new-diet-guidelines-urge-less-sugarfor-all-and-less-meat-for-boys-and-men/.
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sustainable eating habits by cutting back on meat,” but that advice
was removed from the final published guidelines.278 In 2015, a
government-assembled
committee
of
nutrition
experts
“recommended that the dietary guidelines encourage all Americans
to consume more plant-based foods and less meat to help promote
environmentally sustainable eating habits.”279 The suggestion was
met with “intense lobbying and criticism from the food and meat
industries” that led to a congressional hearing.280 That December,
congress called for a review of the dietary guidelines by the National
Academy of Medicine and limited the scope of those guidelines to
nutrition, “which essentially eliminated the advice about following
an environmentally-sustainable diet.”281 “That was the most
controversial thing,” said Dr. Michael F. Jacobson, executive
director of the Center for Science in the Public Interest, “and now it’s
on the cutting-room floor.”282
And yet, the science is clear: our collective appetite for meat
and dairy is a massive contributor to the current climate crisis and
species extinction. It’s also an undeniable fact that the animal
agriculture industry perpetuates animal exploitation and suffering on
a grand scale. It’s no exaggeration to say that the harms caused by
the animal agriculture industry should be taken every bit as seriously
as other threats to our collective health and well-being, from cigarette
smoking to Covid-19.
If Logos carried the day, we would all go vegan tomorrow.
But despite The Economist dubbing 2019 “The Year of the
Vegan,”283 it’s estimated that only about 3% of the world’s
population actually eats a strictly plant-based diet.284 “Everyone I
spoke with agreed that customers aren’t going to buy [plant-based
foods] to save the planet,” reflected Washington Post journalist
Tamar Haspel in an article about how unlikely it is for plant-based
meat to significantly transform and disrupt the animal meat
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280 Id.
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283 Davide Banis, Everything Is Ready to Make 2019 the "Year of the Vegan". Are
you?, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidebanis/2018/12/31/everything-is-ready-tomake-2019-the-year-of-the-vegan-are-you/?sh=561d5b3a57df.
284 Williams, supra note 7.
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industry.285 “[W]e’re not rational when it comes to food.”286
Despite acknowledging that rice and beans is “a nutritionally
perfect food and it basically costs nothing,” journalist Joel Stein
admitted that “I care about animals and the environment and, even
more, virtue signaling about how much I care about animals and the
environment. I just don’t want to make any effort or sacrifice any
pleasure.”287 Emotions played a significant role in Stein’s experiment
of hosting a vegan dinner party “filled with bleeding edge products
that don’t bleed.”288 “I felt vaguely superior,” he said about his
meal—which featured exotic plant-based ingredients like fake bacon
made from a mycelium called kogi and ravioli stuffed with cheese
from beta-lactoglobulin and coconut oil— “as if we were leaving the
Animal Age. I know it isn’t all that hard to be vegan where I live in
Southern California. . . . But it seemed more possible when I
replaced meat with this fun futuristic world than a simple gatherer
past.”289
In the article, Stein asked Moby, musician and longtime
vegan and animal rights activist, why he bothered producing a
documentary about cultivated based meat when he himself was
content to eat rice and beans.290 Moby reflected on what appears to
be true about human nature. “We live in a broken world filled with
irrational institutions,” he said.291 “If you want to change the world,
you have to work inside those irrational institutions.”292 “That made
sense,” acknowledged Stein, “especially later that night when I was
knuckle-deep in a pint of plant-based Hazelnut Chocolate Chunk ice
cream. I realized where those institutions were. They were in my
head.”293
If logic and rational thinking—Logos—isn’t enough to
inspire us to change our behavior, it’s worth considering whether
285

Tamar Haspel, One Thing Might Keep the Impossible Burger from Saving the
Planet: Steak, WASH. POST (May 28, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/one-thing-might-eep-theimpossible-burger-from-saving-the-planet-steak/2019/05/23/729836b0-7d69-11e9a5b3-34f3edf1351e_story.html.
286 Id.
287 Joel Stein, Could This Be the Lab-Made Dinner Party of Our Future?, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/21/business/fake-meateggs-dairy-products.html?referringSource=articleShare.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.

2021]

I WANT YOU TO PANIC

97

emotion—Pathos—will.294 Specifically, by taking cues from other
initiatives to change human behavior—namely the use of Graphic
Warning Labels to curb cigarette consumption—it appears that a
blend of Logos and Pathos that taps into the power of emotional fearbased narratives may help people radically reshape their relationship
to—and choices about—food.
A. Leveraging Fear Through Mandatory Graphic Warning
Labels
In order to create policies that are likely to result in people
choosing to significantly change their diets in response to the threat
of the climate crisis, it’s helpful to consider what we already know
about getting people to respond to an urgent threat: they need
information and a feeling that that are part of the solution. In the early
days of the Covid-19 pandemic, medical anthropologist Monica
Schoch-Spana at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
explained that it’s important to “inform and involve people in
crafting solutions to the threat. . . You respect the public’s autonomy,
and you give them the information they need.”295 “I firmly believe
we will manage this task if really all citizens see it as their task,”
German Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked in March 2020.296
“Nobody is expendable. Everybody counts. It requires effort by all
of us.”297
To get people to see themselves as part of the solution to the
crisis fueled by meat and dairy, they need information. One way to
convey that information is through mandatory labeling of all food
products to show each item’s impact on the environment and its
relationship to worker and animal exploitation and suffering.298
In an article honoring Dennis Mileti, one of the world’s leading experts on how
humans behave in disasters and who died of Covid-19 in January 2021, it was
noted that “Mileti did serious quantitative research, but he also knew how to talk
so people would listen. He understood that emotion, social networks and group
identity matter more than most things in disaster planning.” See Amanda Ripley,
Opinion: A disaster Expert Died Two Days Before He Was Set to Be Vaccinated.
Here’s How to Honor Him., WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/02/17/dennis-mileti-deathpandemic-psychology/.
295 Amanda Ripley, We Know How to Prepare the Public for a Crisis. Why Aren’t
We Doing it?, WASH. POST (March 25, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/25/we-know-how-preparepublic-crisis-why-arent-we-doing-it/.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 The internet is full of sites like the BBC’s “Follow the Food” quiz that allows
consumers to get a rough estimate of their diet’s climate footprint, but such sites
294
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Oxford university professor Joseph Poore, who researches
agriculture and the environment, has already proposed mandatory
labeling of all food to show each item’s environmental impact.299
Poore argues that these labels “would change how we produce and
consume in three far-reaching ways.”300 First, “producers would have
to measure their impacts in a uniform way and be accountable for the
results.”301 Second, “mandatory labels support sustainable
consumption” because they would allow consumers to meaningfully
compare otherwise-similar products, such as locally-produced and
imported varieties of the same product.302 Finally, mandatory
environmental labels “would create information about the food
system, and today this information is scarce. This could underpin
better policy, particularly taxes or subsidies linked to actual
environmental harm.”303
Poore is clear that such labels must be mandatory, because
voluntary labeling has not been successful in changing consumer
behavior.304 “[V]oluntary labelling doesn’t leverage consumer
behavior because shoppers are more likely to stop buying brands they
perceive as unethical than to start buying those they perceive to be
ethical,” he says.305 “Mandatory labels would highlight both highand low-impact producers, in the same way, across multiple
products. This would encourage more people to think about their
choices by exposing them to the facts every time they are in the
shops.”306

are limited in utility both because they rely on generalities and because they are
entirely voluntary, failing to provide critical information at the moment a
consumer is holding a product in her hands in the grocery store aisle. See, e.g.,
Follow the Food, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/future/bespoke/follow-thefood/calculate-the-environmental-footprint-of-your-food.html (last visited Sep. 5,
2021).
299 Poore, supra note 10.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 See Id. Oatly has also envisioned mandatory warning labels for food. In an
October 24, 2020 Instagram post criticizing the implications of Amendment 171, it
reasoned that “[o]ne way forward is to make it mandatory for dairy companies to
state the climate impact of their products on their cartons so that consumers can
make their own comparisons.” Oatly (@Oatly), supra note 268
305 Poore, supra note 10.
306 Id. Mandatory labels will have the effect of confronting consumers in the
grocery store aisles every single time they are making purchasing decisions. This is
very different than websites like the “Follow the Food” one the BBC offers, which
allows people to select from a variety of generic food choices to see the
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Poore’s vision of mandatory labels on food is a simple yet
visionary way to put critical information into the hands of consumers
right at the moment it matters most—when they are in the grocery
aisles scanning the aisles to decide what to put in their cart. 307 But
would Poore’s labels be enough to dissuade vast numbers of people
from selecting burgers and milk derived from a cow over their plantbased alternatives?
The mandatory labels that Poore envisions focus exclusively
on the food product’s environmental impact and are “emotionally
neutral” in appearance, making use of red, orange, and green shapes
to indicate how well a product scores on a variety of metrics such as
water consumption, emissions, pesticide toxicity, and impact on
biodiversity.308 The danger of Poore’s bright, emotionally neutral
labels is that they’re too Logos-driven and don’t pack enough of a
Pathos-punch. To leverage the power of emotion-driven persuasion,
mandatory food labels should leverage what we already know about
using fear to change people’s behavior. Taking a cue from antismoking initiatives, graphic imagery should appear on the labels of
all animal-based food. The labels should communicate each food’s
impact not only on the environment, but also on animal well-being
and exploitation and worker conditions.309
Research indicates that in the cigarette realm, Graphic
Warning Labels (GWLs) “generally leads to a continuous drop in
smoking rates.”310 GWLs on cigarette packages have been shown to
be significantly more effective than simple text-based warning labels
because they create a fear and anger response that led to a stronger
environmental “foodprint” of their selected diet across a variety of metrics. See
Follow the Food, supra note 298.
307 Proponents of Graphic Warning Labels on cigarette packages recognize that
“People are more likely to see an anti-smoking message if it is present in the form
of a label right on the outside of the cigarette box they are holding,” which is why
they are particularly effective. See https://tobacco.stanford.edu/ad_tags/arteries/.
308 Poore, supra note 10.
309 Ideally all food items—plant-based and animal-derived alike—would come
with these mandatory labels, but given the particularized harms caused by animalderived meat and dairy, it’s absolutely essential that all animal-derived food be
labeled.
310 See, e.g., Minsoo Jung, Implications of Graphic Cigarette Warning Labels on
Smoking Behavior: An International Perspective, 21 J. CANCER PREV. 21 (2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4819662/. See also Christophe
Haubursin, Those Gross, Graphic Warnings on Cigarette Labels? This Study
Shows They Actually Work., VOX (April 8, 2015),
https://www.vox.com/2015/4/8/8371613/graphic-warnings-on-cigarette-packs-arechanging-the-smoking.
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intention to quit smoking.311 A 2018 report from Australia titled
Evaluation of effectiveness of graphic health warnings on tobacco
product packaging showed that GWLs were good at “attracting
attention and being noticed,” with the most common descriptions of
the labels being that they contained “gross/ ugly/ disgusting/ bad/
confronting/ graphic pictures.”312 The report found that GWLs “are
remembered and encoded in memory,” with roughly 70% of people
being able to “describe one of the graphics or messages when asked
what pictures they could recall on packaging.”313 Some images
proved more memorable than others, but on the whole people’s
“[r]ecall of written health warnings was considerably lower than
recall of the graphics,” with only 39% of people being able to recall
a written warning.314 Graphic images have the added benefit of
communicating effectively to people with low literacy, as well as to
immigrants who are not yet able to read the national language(s).315
Further, research also shows that health information on cigarette
labels is conveyed better when that information is were combined
with GWLs.316 Thus, combining written messages with a graphic
image that evokes negative emotions is likely to elicit the strongest
response among consumers.
Research also indicates that label size matters: the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) recommends
that GWLs extend across at least 50% of the cigarette package
cover.317 Larger GWLs have the create more space to provide
information mixed with graphic imagery, and do a better job of
competing for the consumer’s attention than smaller labels do on a
Jung, Supra, note 310. “When functional magnetic resonance imaging of neural
responses generated after exposing smokers to GWLs were analyzed, the images
aroused strong emotional reactions, which increase cognitive efforts that
accompany information processing. This increases the memory of the images and
reduces the desire to smoke. In other words, smokers exposed to GWLs exhibited
more fear and a stronger intention to quit smoking than did smokers exposed to
simple warning messages.” Id.
312 See ESSENCE COMMUNICATIONS, EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS OF GRAPHIC
HEALTH WARNINGS ON TOBACCO PRODUCT PACKAGING 7 (2018). The Australian
report found that when smokers and recent smokers see GWLs on cigarette
packaging, 57% felt “some emotional response,” with the most common emotions
being: “disgusted (14%), worry/concern (6%), guilty, fearful/scared (6%), thinking
they should stop (5%) and relief they aren’t smoking (7% non-smokers).” Id. at 9.
Nearly a third (31%) claimed to feel nothing or reported that they ignored or were
desensitized to the GWLs. Id. at 9.
313 Id. at 7.
314 Id.
315 CANADIAN CANCER SOCIETY, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS:
INTERNATIONAL STATUS REPORT 7 (6th ed. 2018).
316 Jung, supra note 310.
317 Id.
311
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package.318 As of 2018, 107 countries required warnings covering at
least 50% of the package, up from 24 countries in 2008.319 Some
countries go bigger: mandatory GWLs must cover 90% of the
cigarette pack in Nepal, 87.5% of the pack in New Zealand, 85% in
India, and 82.5% in Australia.320
In Canada, masculinity itself is an explicit target of the feardriven rhetoric leveraged by GWLs, with some cigarette packages
containing warnings that “tobacco use can make you impotent”
paired with a humorous image of a limp, dropping cigarette.321
As of 2018, 118 countries (or jurisdictions) worldwide require
“picture warnings” on cigarette packages, reaching 58% of the
world’s population.322 This is up from 18 countries in 2008.323
Meanwhile, 107 countries require warning labels to cover at least
50% of the package front and back, up from 24 countries in 2008.324
The United States, meanwhile, is not a party to the FCTC and until
very recently had no requirement that graphic images or “picture
warnings” be used on cigarette packages at all.325
Given the longstanding resistance in the United States to
embracing GWLs on cigarette packages—at odds with most of the
rest of the world—it stands to reason that efforts to implement
mandatory food labeling for environmental and animal impact would
face similar resistance. A recent FDA rule—issued in March 2020
and going into effect in January 2022—offers a framework for
success.326
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CANADIAN CANCER SOCIETY, supra note 315, at 7.
Id. at 2.
320 Id. at 8.
321 See Yucky but Effective, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN SENTINEL (Feb. 24, 2001),
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2001-02-24-0102231047story.html. See also James Brooke, Canada Seeks to Jolt Smokers with a Picture
on Each Pack, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/20/world/canada-seeks-to-jolt-smokers-with-apicture-on-each-pack.html. (“[T]o illustrate a link between cigarette smoking and
male impotence, Canadian health authorities chose a photograph of a symbolically
limp cigarette. Trying to blunt smoking's sex appeal, the warning would read:
''Cigarettes may cause sexual impotence due to decreased blood flow to the penis.
This can prevent you from having an erection.''”).
322 CANADIAN CANCER SOCIETY, supra note 315, at 7.
323 Id. at 7.
324 Id. at 2.
325 Id. at 11.
326 Cigarette Labeling and Health Warning Requirements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/labeling-andwarning-statements-tobacco-products/cigarette-labeling-and-health-warningrequirements.
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B. The 2020 FDA Rule: a Blueprint for Mandatory Graphic
Labeling Success
Any regulatory effort to impose GWLs on animal-derived
food would do well to understand the long and controversial history
that attempts to impose GWLs on cigarette packages have faced in
the United States. A recent development in the form of a yet-to-be
implemented FDA rule provides a blueprint that advocates of GWLs
for food can follow.
In March 2020, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in
the United States issued “a final rule to establish new cigarette health
warnings for cigarette packages and advertisements” that “amends
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) of
1965 to require each cigarette package and advertisement to bear one
of the new required warnings. The final rule specifies the 11 new
textual warning label statements and accompanying color
graphics.”327 The FDA stated that it is “taking this action to promote
greater public understanding of the negative health consequences of
cigarette smoking,”328 noting that current written warnings, “which
have not changed in 35 years, have been described as ‘invisible’ . . .
and fail to convey relevant information in an effective way[.]”329 The
rule was supposed to go into effect on June 18, 2021,330 but the date
has been pushed back to January 14, 2022.331
Once implemented, the new FDA rule will bring the United
States in line with the 118 countries that already require GWLs on
cigarette packages. The rule states that the new warnings will
“consist of textual warning statements accompanied by color
graphics, in the form of concordant photorealistic images, depicting
the negative health consequences of cigarette smoking.”332 Further,
the warnings “warnings must appear prominently on packages and in
advertisements, occupying the top 50 percent of the area of the front
and rear panels of cigarette packages and at least 20 percent of the
area at the top of cigarette advertisements.”333

327 Tobacco Products; Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,638 (June 18, 2021) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
1141).
328 Id.
329 Id. at 15,639.
330 Id. at 15,638.
331 Cigarette Labeling and Health Warning Requirements, supra note 322.
332 Tobacco Products; Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 85 Fed. Reg. at 15,638.
333 Id.
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In issuing its rule, the FDA noted that it received comments
from a number of constituencies arguing that the new required
warnings “violate the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution under a variety of legal standards” and that “the
Government's interest in promoting greater public understanding of
the negative health consequences of cigarette smoking is not
substantial.”334 The FDA rejected those arguments. It asserted that
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
governs this matter, and that under the Zauderer framework, a
government interest supporting factual disclosures need not be
substantial—but emphasized that “even if a substantial interest were
required, that standard is easily met for these required warnings.”335
It also discussed the First Amendment argument at great length.336
The FDA rejected the argument that images that intend to
“evoke an emotional response, shock the viewer into retaining
information, or convey an ideological message about how consumers
should behave” cannot qualify as factual and accurate “based on their
assertion that they are designed to evoke an emotional response, such
as disgust.”337 The FDA argues that the planned warning images
“illustrate the factual and accurate textual statements with which they
are paired,” and emphasized that the FDA developed the images via
a “a science-based, iterative research process” that created images
that were factually accurate; that depicted common visual
presentations of the health conditions and/or showed disease
states and symptoms as they are typically experienced; that
presented the health conditions in a realistic and objective
format devoid of non-essential elements; and that study
participants found were concordant with the statements on
the same health conditions. To do this, FDA staff, including
internal medical experts from a range of specialties, worked
closely with a certified medical illustrator to develop high
quality, factually accurate photorealistic images[.]338
Food labeling in the United States is regulated by a
combination of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), with the FDA governing dairy
and plant-based foods and USDA being responsible for meat and
poultry labeling (both agencies regulate eggs, but in distinct
334

Id. at 15,643.
Id. at 15,644.
336 Id. at 15,643.
337 Id. at 15,646.
338 Id.
335
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forms).339 The FDA and USDA are “in close coordination” on
labeling matters, and “intend to work together to reach a common
goal that will best assist consumers in making healthy dietary
choices.”340
Advocates of GWLs for animal-derived food should have no
problem showing that the government has a significant interest in
keeping the general public safe by reducing the wide-ranging dangers
associated by climate change and mass species extinction, as well as
in reducing the harms associated with mass exploitation and
suffering to humans and nonhuman animals in the animal agriculture
industry. To the extent the FDA (or USDA) faced First Amendment
challenges in any effort to impose mandatory GWLs on animalderived food, it could turn to the rationale it presented in the FDA’s
March 2020 rule as a blueprint. Specifically, so long as food labels
contained “factual and accurate textual statements” paired with
graphic images that are accurate and developed via “a science-based,
iterative research process,” they should withstand any challenge that
images intended to evoke an emotional response cannot qualify as
“factual and accurate.”341
GWLs for animal-derived food may be met with challenges
based on the D.C. Circuit's 2012 decision R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
v. FDA, which struck down GWLs the FDA issued in 2011.342 In that
case, the D.C. Circuit emphasized that “[n]o one doubts the
government can promote smoking cessation programs; can use
339

Guidance for Industry: Letter Regarding Point of Purchase Food
Labeling, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (October 21, 2009),
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidancedocuments/guidance-industry-letter-regarding-point-purchase-food-labeling. For
an overview of what food labeling is governed by the FDA and what is governed
by the USDA, see Ralph Meer, Understanding Key USDA and FDA Food
Labeling Differences: Part One, MERIEUX NUTRISCIENCES (June 28, 2018),
http://foodsafety.merieuxnutrisciences.com/2018/06/28/understanding-key-usdafda-food-labeling-differences-part-one/ and Ralph Meer, Understanding Key
USDA and FDA Food Labeling Differences: Part Two, MERIEUX NUTRISCIENCES
(July 19, 2018),
http://foodsafety.merieuxnutrisciences.com/2018/07/19/understanding-key-usdafda-food-labeling-differences-part-two/. For a discussion on mandatory vs.
voluntary GMO labeling, see Food Labeling – An Overview, THE NAT’L AGRIC. L.
CTR., https://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/food-labeling/ (last visited Sept. 6,
2021).
340 Guidance for Industry: Letter Regarding Point of Purchase Food Labeling,
supra note 339.
341Tobacco Products; Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and
Advertisements, 85 Fed. Reg. at 15,646.
342 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1222
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
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shock, shame, and moral opprobrium to discourage people from
becoming smokers; and can use its taxing and regulatory authority to
make smoking economically prohibitive and socially onerous. And
the government can certainly require that consumers be fully
informed about the dangers of hazardous products.”343 The issue in
R.J. Reynolds, the Court, said, was about the “scope of the
government's authority to force the manufacturer of a product to go
beyond making purely factual and accurate commercial disclosures
and undermine its own economic interest—in this case, by making
‘every single pack of cigarettes in the country [a] mini billboard’ for
the government's anti-smoking message.”344 In other words, said the
Court, “how much leeway should this Court grant the government
when it seeks to compel a product's manufacturer to convey the
state's subjective—and perhaps even ideological—view that
consumers should reject this otherwise legal, but disfavored,
product?”345
These are critical questions to be sure. The D.C. Circuit
ultimately held that the FDA’s 2011 GWLs “do not constitute the
type of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ information, or ‘accurate
statement[s],’ to which the Zauderer standard may be applied.346
Noting that the FDA “concedes that the images are not meant to be
interpreted literally,” the R.J. Reynolds court held that the 2011
GWLs were not “purely” factual because “they are primarily
intended to evoke an emotional response, or, at most, shock the
viewer into retaining the information in the text warning.”347 “These
inflammatory images,” reasoned the R.J. Reynolds court, cannot
rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to
consumers. They are unabashed attempts to evoke emotion (and
perhaps embarrassment) and browbeat consumers into quitting.”348
The Court acknowledged that “none of these images are patently
false,” but held that “they certainly do not impart purely factual,
accurate, or uncontroversial information to consumers” and that
“[c]onsequently, the images fall outside the ambit of Zauderer.”349
343

Id. at 1212.
Id.
345 Id
346 Id. at 1216.
347 Id. (citing Brief for Appellants at 33, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. V. Food &
Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No.11-5332) (quoting S. David
(citing research showing that “pictures are easier to remember than words”); id. at
38 (citing FDA's finding that a substantial body of scientific literature shows that
emotional responses, such as worry and disgust, “reliably predict the likelihood
that consumers will understand and appreciate the substance of the warnings”)).
348 Id. at 1216-17.
349 Id. at 1217.
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Proponents of GWLs for animal-derived food will have to
contend with the D.C. Circuit’s holdings in R.J. Reynolds, but that
case alone should not bar their efforts. First, it is likely that other
circuits may see the issue differently, and until the U.S. Supreme
Court rules on these issues, they remain unsettled. Second, the FDA’s
2020 Rule provides important updates to its 2011 GWL strategy,
including developing the images via a “a science-based, iterative
research process” that focuses on presenting images in “a realistic
and objective format devoid of non-essential element[.]”350 The FDA
rejects the argument that when GWLs evoke an emotional response
they cannot also be factual, reasoning that with regard to its 2020
GWLs, “an emotional reaction on the part of some individuals would
not render the warnings or the health information they convey
‘controversial’ or ‘inflammatory.’”351 The same arguments could be
made in with respect to GWLs for animal-derived food.
C. Envisioning GWLs for Animal-derived Food
Images of clear-cut rainforests, veal calves separated from
their mothers, or pregnant pigs in cramped gestation crates may be
disturbing to look at but do not render them “controversial” or any
less “accurate” than less emotionally laden images might be.
We humans are loathe to consider—really pause and
reflect—on the lived experience of the billions of cows, pigs,
chicken, and sheep whose lives from birth to death are wholly
controlled the animal agriculture industry. Before their flesh and
bodily fluids ended up in yogurt tins, cartons of milk, pints of ice
cream, or packages of shrink-wrapped bacon, ground beef, or
chicken breasts, what lives did they live? What social relationships
did they have? Were they allowed to bond with their young? Did they
suffer injuries from overcrowding, or overmilking? How much of
their natural lifespan was left on the day they were corralled into the
slaughterhouse, their bodies worth more to the humans who owned
them dead than alive? Did they ever see the light of day, feel sunshine
on their faces, or grass under their feet?
In a telling moment that underscores how uncomfortable we
humans are with the fact that we breed and kill other animals for the
pleasure of our own appetites, the D.C. Circuit in American Meat
350

Tobacco Products; Required Warnings for Cigarette Packaging and
Advertisements, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,638, 15,646 (Mar. 18, 2020) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 1141).
351 Id.
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Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture failed to unequivocally
reject the American Meat Institute’s (AMI) objection to the word
“slaughter” being used on meat labels.352 “Though it seems a plain,
blunt word for a plain, blunt action, we can understand a claim that
‘slaughter,’ used on a product of any origin, might convey a certain
innuendo,” the Court said, ultimately concluding that it need not
address AMI’s objection because AMI did not object to “the truth of
the facts required to be disclosed, so there is no claim that they are
controversial in that sense,” and furthermore the more benign word
“harvested” was permitted under the regulations as an alternative to
“slaughtered,” and AMI did not object to use of that word.353
As for the “certain innuendo” that the word “slaughter” may
convey, the D.C. Circuit did not elaborate, but in tacitly agreeing
with AMI that it is a word that the meat industry may want to avoid
on its packaging, the court acknowledged the cognitive dissonance
that the animal agriculture industry seeks to perpetuate to keep its
consumers from thinking too deeply about the lives—and deaths—
of the animals whose bodies they are selling.
A closer look at the arguments offered against use of the
word “slaughter” on meat labels reveals a deep discomfort within the
meat industry of the idea of confronting consumers with factually
accurate information about the death of the animals they are selling.
The word “slaughtering” is “not accurate” and “offensive,” said one
AMI member.354 “Consumers will have to think about slaughter
every time they buy or prepare meat,” said a another.355 “[R]equiring
labels to declare ‘Born, Raised, and Slaughtered in the U.S.’ could
adversely affect demand by bringing front and center the issue of
slaughtering livestock,” said a third.356
That the word “slaughter” or other words that may force
consumers to confront the fact that animals are killed for their meat
and may evoke an emotional reaction does not make those words
factually inaccurate. To the contrary. Proponents of GWLs for
animal-derived food should not be deterred from using factually
accurate words precisely because they are likely to elicit an

352

Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric.,760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en
banc).
353 Id.
354 Reply Brief for Appellants, at 8 n.2, Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 760
F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (No. 13-5281).
355 Id.
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emotional reaction. The truth has been sanitized for consumers for
too long, and it does not serve the crisis we now face.
In envisioning what GWLs for animal-based food should
look like, advocates should lean on the rhetorical tool Logos,
partnering closely with scientists and experts to ensure the data
information communicated is accurate. But they should also lean on
the rhetorical tool Pathos, casting a vivid and emotionally
provocative spotlight on the environmental harms, suffering, and
exploitation inherent in the animal agriculture industry that has, for
far too long, been too easy to ignore.
V. CONCLUSION
Our food culture is broken. Not only does “[f]ood in the
Anthropocene represents one of the greatest health and
environmental challenges of the 21st century,”357 but our relationship
to food—in particular animal-derived meat, eggs, and dairy—is
harmful in other ways as well. Our tendency to associate meat-eating
with masculinity and strength and plant-eating with femininity and
weakness is grounded in deeply-entrenched gender norms that
perpetuate a form of idealized “traditional masculinity” that is itself
harmful.358 Our seemingly insatiable appetite for meat and milk is
harmful to the workers of the animal agriculture industry—a cohort
that is disproportionately comprised of immigrants and people of
color whose working conditions expose them to large-scale suffering
and death for low wages, few benefits, and, more recently, perilous
exposure to Covid-19.359 As if this multitude of harms were not
enough, the greatest harms are borne by the billions of animals bred
into existence each year for the sole purpose of commodification and
consumption, with little regard for the quality of their lived
experience, their social bonds, or their desire to life a life free from
interventions like artificial insemination, cramped quarters, limited
to no exposure to sunlight and grass, separation between mother and
young, and an untimely death.360
This needs to stop. A 2019 report published by the Lancet
Commission titled Food in the Anthropocene: the EAT–Lancet
Commission on healthy diets from sustainable food systems urged
that “global efforts are urgently needed to collectively transform
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diets and food production.”361 What is needed, argued Lancet, is
“rapid adoption of numerous changes and unprecedented global
collaboration and commitment: nothing less than a Great Food
Transformation.” 362
How, then, do we achieve a Great Food Transformation? Do
plant based foods need to occupy the same rhetorical space as
animal-derived food, reinforcing tropes of traditional masculinity,
strength, and bleeding burgers, to create a meaningful paradigm
shift? Or is something more disruptive, more norm-shattering,
necessary to fundamentally change the way we humans think about
food? Can an environmentally sustainable and animal-and-worker
friendly plant-based food culture become dominant without the fearbased narratives that have so far kept animal meat in the center of our
plates for generations?
As this article suggests, perhaps advocates of plant-based
food should lean into fear and other emotion-driven narratives to
achieve a paradigm shift in the way we think about food. Kathie
Dannemiller’s “Formula for Change” (C = D × V × F > R) argues
that change occurs when there is Dissatisfaction with how things
currently are combined with a Vision of what alternative is possible,
and the First concrete steps for realizing that vision.363 This article
argues that we have these three ingredients in spades.
Of course, mandatory GWLs for animal-derived food won’t
single-handedly solve the climate crisis or change our attitudes and
cultural norms around food overnight. But, they could be an
important component of a multi-faceted strategy that would need to
include bold local, national, and international action and
coordination undertaken by governments, industry, and civil
society.364
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Willet et al., supra note 42, at 447.
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363 See Dannemiller & Jacobs, supra note 96, at 483.
364 See Willet et al., supra note 42, at 478 tbl.6 (illustrating “the Nuffield Ladder of
Policy Intervention to Health Diets from Sustainable Food Systems” depicting
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Again, we have in our grasp all the ingredients for change in
Dannemiller’s formula. But for them to be successful, they must be
greater than any existing resistance to change.365 As the Lancet
Report says, there will be no Great Food Transformation “without
people changing how they view and engage with food systems.”366
And to do that, what’s really needed is a change in how we view and
engage with ourselves, who we are, and who we want to be.
Like any great transformation, the one before us will be
messy, and it will be emotional. Change always is, even when we
know logically that it is the right thing to do. But as Audre Lorde and
other feminist scholars have so poignantly pointed out, there are uses
for our anger, our rage, our pain, and our grief.367 Powerful emotions
can be catalysts for powerful, sweeping, paradigm-shifting change.
As we gather the science and data necessary to support policy
decisions that may change our relationship to food forever, we should
also expand our willingness to recognize those powerful and
complicated emotions, and our vocabulary to describe them.368
Ultimately, Greta Thunberg is right: we need to panic. Not
about the loss of our old ways of life, or about the decline of powerful
and exploitative industries. We need a new narrative around food,
one that rejects both the inherent injustices and climate-related harms
bound up in animal-derived meat and dairy and the harms inherent
in linking dominant food culture to the rhetoric of traditional
masculinity. And we can leverage the rhetoric of fear, and panic, and
rage as one tool among many that can combine to create a
fundamental paradigm shift in our relationship to food. “I want you
to panic,” Thunberg said. “I want you to feel the fear I feel every day.
And then I want you to act.”369
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The Right to Food Comes to America
Wendy Heipt*
Abstract
The people of Maine recently exercised an opportunity no
citizen of this country has ever had before: the ability to vote on
whether to enshrine a right to food in their state constitution. This
Essay provides an overview of Maine’s experience with food rights
in order to explain how the state came to occupy this unique position.
I. Introduction
The Right to Food (“RtF”) movement holds that hunger is a
human rights violation and not an inevitable systematic by-product.1
Although many people assume the RtF confers an affirmative
obligation on the government to provide sufficient food directly to
each person, rarely is this the case.2 The RtF movement looks at food
*

Wendy Heipt is a human rights attorney and a member of the board of
WhyHunger, a nonprofit founded in 1975 by the late musician Harry Chapin and
Radio DJ Bill Ayres.
1 While the term ‘right to food’ most correctly describes the state constitutional
push this article focuses on, ‘food sovereignty’ is an aligned movement whose
definition often overlaps with RtF principles. The term ‘food sovereignty’ was
introduced at the 1996 World Food Summit by Via Campesina, an international
movement founded in 1993 working on behalf of peasant agriculture. Although the
term is now in widespread use with numerous definitions, as forwarded by Via
Campesina it includes free access to seeds and the right of consumers to be able to
decide what they consume and by whom it is produced. See LA VIA CAMPESINA,
https://viacampesina.org/en (last visited Oct. 3, 2021); Tina D. Beuchelt & Detlef
Virchow, Food Sovereignty or the Human Right to Adequate Food: Which
Concept Serves Better as International Development Policy for Global Hunger
and Poverty Reduction, 29 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 259, 259-261 (2012);
Declaration of Nyéléni, NYÉLÉNI (Feb. 27, 2007),
https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf; Jessica Clendenning et al., Food
Justice or Food Sovereignty? Understanding the Rise of Urban Food Movements
in the USA, 33 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 165, 169 (2016). The term ‘food security’
is also distinguishable from the RtF, as it is not a legal concept and does not confer
legal obligations.
2 Certain events and subpopulations, such as prisoners, do confer such an
obligation, as the state is the only source of food for people who are incarcerated.
Prisoners have a right to safely receive nutritionally adequate food that must
comport with the 1st and 8th Amendments to the Constitution. Lawsuits over prison
food have focused on religious dietary needs, food safety, and food discipline,
most notoriously over ‘nutraloaf,’ a composite food made up of rotating
ingredients fed to inmates as punishment. See Complaint at 14, Estate of Thomas v.
Milwaukee County, No. 2:17-cv-01128 (E.D. Wis. dismissed May 13, 2019)
(alleging that the nutraloaf served at the Milwaukee County Jail was so dry that the
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determination as a human right and seeks to ensure that conditions
allow for citizens to access adequate amounts of appropriate and
available food themselves. In other words, the right to food is a
person’s right to feed themself, through their own efforts, with
dignity. In order to fulfill this right, governments must afford the
conditions that allow full realization of the right. There is no
internationally agreed-upon model language for the RtF,3 and
assorted treaties, constitutions and international bodies have used
different definitions in explaining the right.4 I employ what I have
termed the ‘4As’ to most clearly define the RtF. The ‘4As’ are: (1)
Availability, (2) Accessibility, (3) Adequacy, and (4)
Appropriateness. Availability means that individuals are able to
produce, procure, and/or purchase the amount and types of food they
need and desire. Accessibility means that there is sufficient
infrastructure, both physical and economic, in a nation and a
community, to allow individuals physical proximity to the food they
need and desire and the resources to purchase that food without
sacrificing other basic needs. Adequacy means that individuals are
getting and will continue to get, enough calories, nutrients and
micronutrients to lead healthy and safe lives. Appropriateness means
that individuals are able to access food relating to their cultural
preferences in a dignified manner and that food systems are
environmentally sustainable over time.
The 4As emphasize that the RtF is one part of the human
rights framework – an interdependent element whose achievement
rests on the realization of other rights.5 This is because human rights
dust from the loaf set off the fire alarm); Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 733 (7th
Cir. 2012).
3 See DUBRAVKA BOJIC BULTRINI, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
GUIDE ON LEGISLATING FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD 1, 3 (2009) (noting no model can
account for each state’s context, history or systems, but discussing key elements).
4 For example, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food defines it as the
right to have regular, permanent, and unrestricted access — directly or by means of
financial purchases — to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and sufficient
food corresponding to the cultural traditions to which the consumer belongs, and
which ensure a physical and mental, individual and collective, fulfilling, and
dignified life free of fear. The Committee on Economic, Social and Social Rights,
general comment No. 12, determined that the right to adequate food is realized
when every man, woman and child, alone or in community with others, has
physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its
procurement. U.N., Off. of the High Comm’r, About the Right to Food and Human
Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Food/Pages/AboutHRFood.aspx (last
visited Oct. 3, 2021).
5 Many international instruments recognize that using a human rights framework
when discussing the RtF implicates multiple other rights. For example, the
ICESCR recognizes the RtF is connected to the rights to health, housing and social
security. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.
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are integrally intertwined and the full realization of any one of them
depends on the progress of others.6 To illustrate at its extreme,
starvation will essentially nullify the fulfillment of all other rights.
Less dramatically, a lack of sufficient food hinders the full realization
of other rights. To ensure that human beings can fully realize all their
fundamental human rights, they must be able to feed themselves
amid conditions allowing for adequate realization of this right. The
RtF asks that the government refrain from actions that stymie its
realization and act in a manner that will facilitate realization of the
right. It also means that the government will step in to ensure that
third-party actors are not permitted to undermine the right.7 RtF
amendments including the 4As provides future courts with a
structure for interpretation and pushes recognition of the fact that
hunger is a human rights and social access issue that effects
marginalized communities most acutely.8
While the Rtf is recognized under international law and by
governments around the globe, the United States has no such right in
its federal constitution and has not signed onto any documents that
would give that right to its citizens.9 Until Maine made history with
9, 11, 12, Dec. 16, 1966, U.N.T.S.14531. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development is built around seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
which recognize that ending hunger is inextricably linked with ending other
deprivations and with strategies promoting economic growth and justice. See U.N.,
Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affs., The Sustainable Development Goals Report (2018),
https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2018/interlinkages/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2021).
6 See K. Heather Devine, Vermont Food Access and the “Right to Food”: Using
the Human Right to Food to Address Hunger in Vermont, 41 VERMONT L. REV.
177, 181-82 (2016).
7 As one example, this is thought to include proactive measures to eliminate
harmful pesticides and the adoption of policies addressing climate change. See
Hum. Rgts. Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/34/48 (2017); Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food),
Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/70/287 (2015).
8 That said, not every nation with an explicit or implicit right to food incorporates
the 4As. This is not only because this is an evolving right but also because
incorporating all of the 4As makes it more difficult to pass amendments when
there is opposition. As explained below, this holds true for the experience in
Maine, where drafters had to hone their proposed language to garner the votes
necessary for passage. See H.R. 95, 130th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Me. 2021).
9 U.N. Food & Agric. Org., The Right to Food Around the Globe,
http://www.fao.org/right-to-food-around-the-globe/countries/usa/en/ (last visited
Oct. 1, 2021). The most comprehensive RtF language is found in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Other relevant
documents include the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child,
1996 World Food Summit and Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities. See generally Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of
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their RtF amendment, concerns over food regulations, availability
and equity in the United States have focused on only two areas: the
food regulatory system and programs to feed the hungry. Efforts to
challenge the food regulatory system have resulted in ‘cottage food’
or ‘food freedom’ laws, both of which provide small-scale producers
with the ability to sell or donate certain food products. Efforts to
address issues of food availability and equity have resulted in antihunger efforts such as federal nutrition programs and charitable food
banks,10 both of which received increased attention during the Covid19 pandemic.11 All of these efforts to address problems with the food
system actually further entrench the current structure, allow the
monetization of food waste, and depend on the populace embracing
temporary charity as a solution to the structural problem of hunger .12
International Human Rights Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393 (2006)
(discussing state behavior and international human rights). The existence of the
RtF on the world stage provides two things to advocates in this country: a
framework for pursuing the right and proof of an evolving standard.
10 The largest food nutrition entitlement program is the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP), which actually provides significantly more food than
food banks. See Dan Charles, Food Banks Say SNAP is a Better Way to Get Food
to People, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 21, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/21/860475302/food-banks-say-snap-is-a-better-wayto-get-food-to-people. In order to qualify for SNAP in Maine, a family of four
must have a before-tax annual household income below $49,025. Maine
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, BENEFITS.GOV,
https://www.benefits.gov/benefit/1272 (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
11 Covid-19 exposed the depths of food insecurity in the country. The term food
insecurity, as officially monitored by the USDA, describes households that do not
have sufficient access at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life. Food
Security in the U.S, ECON. RSCH. SERV.,U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/
(Sept. 8, 2021). Many others have written about the exposure of food insecurity
during the pandemic. ee generally, Lauren Bauer, The Covid-19 Crisis Has
Already Left Too Many Children Hungry in America, BROOKINGS (May 6, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/05/06/the-covid-19-crisis-hasalready-left-too-many-children-hungry-in-america/ (noting April 2020 survey
finding a 400% increase in hunger rates); John Burnett, Thousands of Cars Line
Up at One Texas Food Bank as Job Losses Hit Hard, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 17,
2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/17/837141457/thousands-of-cars-line-up-atone-texas-food-bank-as-job-losses-hit-hard (showing aerial footage of Texans
lining up outside a San Antonio food bank); and Helena Bottemiller Evich,
‘There’s Only so Much We Can Do: Food Banks Plead for Help, POLITICO (June,
8, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/08/food-banks-plead-for-help306492 (discussing the choice to increase public food dispersal rather than increase
benefits).
12 One way the current system has monetized waste is by reframing it as
“charity” and distributing it to marginalized communities via programs such as the
government’s pandemic Farmers to Families Food Box Program. Jocelyn Meyer,
Burdening Food Banks with the Charity of Waste, ME. J. CONSERVATION &
SUSTAINABILITY (2021), https://umaine.edu/spire/2021/04/08/meyer/#_edn4. See
also Andrew Coe, Free Produce, With a Side of Shaming, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
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Unlike the RtF, none of these avenues use a human rights lens, and
none provide a whole-scale transformation of a system where hungry
people exist while there is sufficient food to feed everyone.13 But the
realization that there are issues with the current system and efforts to
address these problems provided a foundation of food-rights work
that the RtF movement in Maine built on.
How a RtF will explicitly play out in Maine, or in any other
locale, depends on what the people do with the right once it is
ratified. While international human rights language provides a RtF
framework, once the right is a part of the Maine constitution, the
meaning it holds will be shaped by the way in which those adopting
it adapt it to fit their local concerns.14 At the least, the people of
Maine will be able to rely on this amendment if they believe that an
existing or proposed law, regulation, or ordinance infringes on their
RtF. But the means of its implementation will no doubt build on the
food independence work Mainers have been doing for decades.15
II. Maine’s History of Food Advocacy
Maine’s RtF work rests on a recognition of food insecurity
and a foundation of local food advocacy and independent local
government action that has been particularly strong for the last three
decades.16 Historically, the relationship between the state of Maine
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/opinion/snap-food-pantry-aid.html.
Food is often rejected after reaching grocery stores, as it is often easier for stores to
discard and write-off what they do not want, even if hungry people are
geographically close.
13 See Eric Holt-Giménez et al., We Already Grow Enough Food for 10 Billion
People...and Still Can't End Hunger, 36 JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE
595, 595 (2012). See also Victor Rodriguez, How to Feed 10 Billion People,
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (2020), https://www.unep.org/newsand-stories/story/how-feed-10-billion-people; Bridget Shirvell, Should Emergency
Food Be the Long-Term Solution to Hunger?, HUNTER COLL. FOOD POL’Y CENTER.
(Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nycfoodpolicy.org/should-emergency-food-be-thelong-term-solution-to-hunger/; Olivier de Schutter et al., Food Banks Are No
Solution to Poverty, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/mar/24/food-banks-are-no-solution-topoverty.
14 The manner in which localities adopt human rights claims to their particular
needs is termed ‘vernacularization.’ See Peggy Levitt & Sally Merry,
Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global Women’s Rights in Peru,
China, India and the United States, 9 GLOB. NETWORKS 441, 441 (2009).
15 Naomi Hossain & Dolf te Lintelo, A Common Sense Approach to the Right to
Food, 10 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 367 (2019).
16 According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service,
Maine has a food insecurity rate above the national average. See State Fact Sheets:
Maine, ECON. RSCH. SERV.,U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
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and its localities held that municipalities were subdivisions of the
state without independence.17 Over time it became clear that local
issues required individualized solutions and having to procure state
approval for each problem was a burden to both the municipality
involved and to the state. In response, Maine added a home rule
constitutional amendment in 1969, which has been accorded liberal
construction and gives a presumption of authority to local
enactments.18 Home rule began to flourish in the 1990s when judicial
interpretation gave the amendment more teeth.19 At about the same
time, Maine began a “farm renaissance,” with the number of farms,
new farmers, farm production, farm size, and the percent of principal
farm operators all increasing, and giving Maine the largest number
of farms in New England.20 Maine is also particularly supportive of
community-supported agriculture and farmers’ markets – the state
ranked fifth in the most recent Locavore Index and second in direct
sales per capita, meaning that it has one of the nation’s strongest
communities of producers and consumers of local food.21 Finally,
Maine has also shown a willingness to innovate, resulting in its being
first in the nation in a number of areas of food systems and access.
For example, Maine has one of the earliest cottage food laws in the

https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?StateFIPS=23&StateName=Maine&ID=178
54 (Sept. 9, 2021). The rate of food insecurity in Maine is higher in BIPOC
communities than in white communities. See James Myall, Issue Brief: Food
Insecurity in Maine, ME. CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y (Dec. 23, 2019),
https://www.mecep.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/MECEP-Hunger-Issue-Brief2019.pdf.
17 Sarah Schindler, Food Federalism: States, Local Governments, and the Fight for
Food Sovereignty, 79 OHIO ST. L. J. 772, 773, 776 (2018).
18 This amendment came out of a 1967 commission set up to study the issue, which
forwarded their recommendations in 1968. A Home Rule Enabling Act was passed
in 1970. In the U.S., ‘home rule’ definitions vary but generally mean that localities
have the ability to exercise some governing power without express state
delegation, generally resulting in a decrease in state influence over pockets of the
state and a rejection of Dillon's Rule. See ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1.
19 Shane Wright, Smith v. Town of Pittston: Municipal Home Rule's Narrow
Escape from the Morass of Implicit Preemption, 57 ME. L. REV. 613, 614 (2005).
This builds on a tradition of new England farmers who bucked authority in favor
of autonomy, going back as far as the American Revolution.
20 Gary Keough, Maine Agriculture is “Up” in More Ways than One, U.S. DEP’T.
OF AGRIC. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2017), http://blogs.usda.gov/2014/07/10/maineagriculture-is-up-in-moreways-than-one/; Timothy B. Clark, Can Maine Lead New
England to a Farming Renaissance?, ROUTE FIFTY (Aug. 11, 2015),
https://www.route-fifty.com/management/2015/08/maine-farming-new-englandagriculture/119025/.
21 For the most recent results, see Locavore Index 2019, STROLLING OF THE
HEIFERS (May 31, 2019), https://www.strollingoftheheifers.com/locavore/.

2021]

THE RIGHT TO FOOD

117

country, a ‘home manufacturing’ law that has been in place since
1980. 22
Against this backdrop, the modern story of Maine and food
advocacy began in 2011, with the passage of the Food Safety
Modernization Act.23 The legislation represented an overhaul of
food-handling regulations aimed at increasing safety. Still,
opponents worried it would negatively impact small farmers by,
among other things, imposing expensive regulations, reducing access
to local food, increasing chemical use, decreasing natural fertilizers,
and making it harder for farms to diversify.24 This law was seen as
the latest affront to small farmers and food advocates in Maine, who
had been battling what they saw as overly onerous regulations
relating to issues such as poultry and milk since at least 2009.25
Relying on the tradition of town meetings and the state’s strong home
22

On the other side, Maine was one of the first states to begin limiting SNAP,
reducing the number of childless adults receiving aid by 80% but increasing
reliance on food banks and the percentage of food-insecure people in the state.
Aimee Picchi, Must Work for Food Stamps: A Modest Proposal or Recipe for
Hunger?, CBS News (May 18, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mustworkfor-food-stamps-a-modest-proposal-or-recipe-for-hunger/.
23 Prior to passage of the Food Safety Modernization Act, Maine advocates had
formed GE Free Maine, an organization that worked with Maine communities to
pass resolutions against genetically engineered foods. In 2006 GE Free Maine
merged with the Independent Food Project, a local organization working on food
sovereignty issues, to form Food for Maine’s Future. Food for Maine’s Future
continued the work of both these organizations, and supported the town of
Montville when, in 2008, they became the first Maine town to pass a binding
ordinance banning the cultivation of genetically engineered crops in their
community. About, FOOD FOR MAINE’S FUTURE,
https://savingseeds.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2022).
24
Top 10 Problems with the Food and Drug Administration’s Proposed Food
Safety Regulations for Farmers and Local Food Businesses, NAT’L SUSTAINABLE
AGRIC. COAL. (Oct. 11, 2013), https://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/food-safetycomments-top-10/.
25 HILDA E. KURTZ ET AL., SCALING BIOPOLITICS: ENACTING FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN
MAINE (USA) 8, 10-12 (2013), available at
https://www.tni.org/files/download/40_kurtz_2013.pdf. During this time period,
Maine farmers and food advocates also had to contend with state officials
encouraging compliance with the National Animal Identification System (NAIS), a
program that sought to identify and track most livestock. Small farmers across the
country opposed the system, and in 2006 Maine agriculture officials were
assaulted with manure at a meeting discussing the system. Matthew E. Rohrbaugh,
It's Eleven O'Clock, Do You Know Where Your Chicken Is? The Controversy
Surrounding the National Animal Identification System and Its Application to
Small and Organic Farmers, 32 Vt. L. Rev. 407, ? (2007). In 2010, the USDA
ended the NAIS program, giving a victory to farmers and their allies in Maine.
Animal Identification & Tracing: An Overview, THE NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR.,
https://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/animalid/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2022).
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rule, a group of farmers and their allies met, consulted various
community organizations, surveyed the food freedom laws being
discussed and researched rights based ordinances enacted in Maine
relating to water extraction. Before the Food Safety Modernization
Act Passed through Congress, the group had drafted the “Local Food
and Community Self-Governance Ordinance,” in order to exempt
small local producers selling products for home consumption from
state license and inspection regulations.26 This ordinance was passed
by four towns in Maine’s Hancock County,26 one of which, Blue Hill,
passed it by an overwhelming voice vote margin at their annual town
meeting.27 While there was no official state support for these
ordinances, the legislature did pass a joint resolution expressing their
support for food sovereignty and specifically their opposition to “any
federal statute, law or regulation that attempts to threaten our basic
human right to save seed and grow, process, consume and exchange
food and farm products within the State of Maine.”28
It was within this context – the passage of the Food Safety
Modernization Act and the Blue Hill Self-Governance Ordinance –
that farmer Dan Brown literally stepped in. Brown, a raw milk
producer, had been selling his product without a license and without
labels notifying consumers the milk was unpasteurized. Brown had
been offering his wares since 2006 at his farm stand and at local
farmers’ markets in the town of Blue Hill. In 2011, state officials
ordered him to cease selling his product without proper licensing and
labeling. Citing the local ordinance, Brown continued his operation,
and on November 3, 2011 the state of Maine filed a lawsuit against
Brown.29

26

These advocates were Heather and Phil Retberg, Deborah Evans, Bob St. Peter,
and Larissa Curlik, and were supported by Kevin Ross and Liz Solet. The
Ordinance caught the attention of the Community Environmental Legal Defense
Fund, who brought farmer and advocate Heather Retberg to a Democracy School
they sponsored.
26 The other Hancock Country towns were Sedgwick, Penobscot, and Trenton,
joined by a fifth town (Hope) in Knox County. Subsequently, other selfgovernance food ordinances were passed in and outside of Maine.
27 Blue Hill, Me, Local Food and Community Self-Governance Ordinance of 2011
(Apr. 1, 2011), available at
https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/lousmebluehillfarmingandfoodprodu
ction.pdf.
28 H.P. 1176, 125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011). Two state bills along the same
lines were also introduced although neither passed, LD 366 and LD 330, both of
which were proposed by Representative Walter Kumiega.
29 Summons at 1, State v. Brown, ELLSC-CV-11-70 (Me. Super. Ct., Han. Cty.,
Nov. 3, 2011).
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While the state claimed that a sample of Brown’s raw milk
had levels of bacteria high above the state’s standard, they also
acknowledged that the case was part of a regulatory turf war.30 In
response, Brown declared that he would rely on the Blue Hill
ordinance and continue to sell his milk. Brown became a cause
célèbre, and support for his position grew.31 On November 18, 2011
the Blue Hill Board of Selectmen unanimously voted to request that
the state drop the charges against Brown. Despite the support, the
charges remained and in April 2013, the Hancock County Superior
Court granted summary judgment to the state of Maine and imposed
civil penalties and costs on Brown.32 The court also enjoined Brown
from selling milk without a license, selling unpasteurized milk
without labeling it as such, and operating a food establishment
without a license.33 Support for Brown’s position remained strong in
the state, and Brown appealed his loss.34 In June 2014, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, relying on statutory construction, upheld the
lower court’s decision that Brown had broken the law.35
Maine’s food independence fight continued after Brown’s
loss, and by the following year seventeen towns had passed local
food ordinances. At this point, activists in Maine decided to pursue a
RtF at the state constitutional level. They viewed the RtF as a human
right demanding forward-thinking unlike litigation, which most often
looks backward to address wrongs already committed. A
constitutional amendment would establish a RtF beyond the reach of
30

Kevin Miller, State Sues Blue Hill Farmer for Selling Unpasteurized Milk at
Farmers’ Markets, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011),
https://bangordailynews.com/2011/11/16/news/hancock/blue-hill-farmer-cited-forviolating-state-law/?ref=inline. See Press Release, Food for Maine’s Future,
Internal Dept. of Ag Emails Raise Questions About Motivation in Farmer Brown
Case (Apr. 4, 2012) (on file with author).
31 See We Are All Farmer Brown, Farmer Brown Tells His Story, YOUTUBE (Nov.
14, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NeS4RZ50uWU (explaining that
his behavior hadn’t changed but the Department of Agriculture rules had).
32 State v. Brown, ELLSC-CV-11-70 at 1 (Me. Super. Ct., Han. Cty., Apr. 27,
2013) (Murray, J.).
33 Id. at 9. Brown has since become a medical marijuana grower. Jennifer Osborn,
Marijuana Growing Supply Shop Opening in Blue Hill, ELSWORTH AM. (Feb. 21,
2017), https://www.ellsworthamerican.com/maine-news/business-news/marijuanagrowing-supply-shop-opening-blue-hill/.
34 In the midst of Farmer Brown’s fight state legislator Craig Hickman introduced
concept draft HP 325. Entitled “An Act to Increase Food Sovereignty in Local
Communities,” it sought to “preserve the ability of local communities to produce,
process, sell, purchase and consume local foods.” On April 11, 2013, it received a
10-2 vote of “ought not to pass.” H.P. 325, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013).
35 The court did not address the ordinance or Brown’s claim that the ordinance
exempted him from state licensing requirements and from their health and
sanitation regulations. State v. Brown, 95 A.3d 82, 90 (Me 2014).
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changing legislatures and would transform the conversation from one
about marginalized individuals seeking special handouts to one about
empowered communities demanding accountability.36 They also
recognized that a RtF embraces both positive and negative rights and
that state constitutions are historically disposed to recognize positive
social and economic rights.37
Rep. Craig Hickman introduced the first of what would be
several attempts to pass a RtF constitutional amendment in the 20152016 session.38 The language for the proposed amendment was based
on work done by food sovereignty advocates in the state, who had
surveyed RtF language used internationally and also assessed food
sovereignty issues nationwide in an effort to construct a proposal that
reflected both human rights concerns and practical applications.39
While the first attempts to pass the amendment did not have the
necessary support to pass, they did receive notable backing from
within the state and individuals outside Maine’s borders.40

36

In addition, state constitutions are also largely flexible documents amenable to
modification, offering fifty opportunities to try out different solutions. They also
provide a forum for evolving standards that go beyond federal constitutional
mandates. State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982). This flexibility
provides an opportunity to more accurately represent human rights values
reflecting community standards particular to a single state. The close relationship
between the voice of the community and their state representatives is reflected in
Maine’s constitutional process, where the voting public will ultimately get to vote
on the RtF Amendment 384.
37 Because our federal constitution is commonly believed to be an exceptional and
negative document lacking positive rights, the idea of amending it to include a
positive social right is generally dismissed at the outset. Negative rights are
constraints on the government to prevent it from intruding on citizens’ lives, and
positive rights obligate the government to provide something for its citizens. While
not completely accurate, it is true that for the most part, and as compared to other
countries, the U.S. Constitution is more a document of negative than positive
rights. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY
STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 4, 8 (2013). The
creation of both negative and positive rights attached to the RtF has been
recognized even when those specific terms are not used. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC.
ORG., VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES TO SUPPORT THE PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF THE
RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY 3, 5
(2004).
38 H.P. 532, 127th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me 2015).
39 These advocates include Heather Retberg and Craig Hickman, who consulted
with legislative committee members, farmworkers, and members of the Maine
Farm Bureau.”
40 For example, these RtF proposals were supported by Food for Maine’s Future,
the Farm-to-Consumer-Legal-Defense-Fund, the Maine State Grange, Local Food
Rules, the Maine Organic Farmers and Gardeners Association, the Houlton Band
of Maliseet Indians, the Passamaquoddy Tribe, and numerous local food cooperatives.
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In 2017, Maine again made food news history when it
passed LD 725, “An Act to Recognize Local Control Regarding
Food Systems,” a bill that gave Maine towns and cities the right to
pass local ordinances allowing food products to be exempt from
state and federal regulation or inspection.41 This exemption
included but was not limited to, meat, poultry, milk, dairy products,
processed foods, canned foods, juice, eggs, fish, and seafood. The
governor signed the bill, and the Maine Food Sovereignty Act was
set to take effect November 1, 2017, by which point twenty Maine
towns had passed these ordinances.42 The USDA reacted quickly,
sending a letter that questioned whether the state would be able to
maintain sufficient food safety standards to enable it to retain its
inspection authority.43 If Maine lost that authority, it would no
longer be legal to sell meat processed at state facilities. Practically,
this would mean fewer facilities for processing, increased and more
expensive transportation for farmers, longer waits for products, and,
ironically, increased federal involvement. Maine farmers, faced
with a shutdown of the meat inspection program during their fall
season – a shutdown that would likely close the doors of smallscale livestock and poultry farmers and slaughterhouses – began to
support a proposed fix to the bill.44 In response to the USDA’s
warning and the farmers’ concerns, the state legislature held a
special session and voted to amend LD 725 to, among other things,
exempt meat and poultry processing from the food sovereignty law
so that the state-inspected meat processing facilities would be able
to continue operating.45 The amendment was signed by the
governor on October 31, 2017.46
Each of these skirmishes: the local ordinances, Brown’s
legal fight, and the Maine Food Sovereignty Act, generated increased
awareness around issues of food independence and brought new
41

S.P. 242, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017).
Suzanne Dunham, New Local Food Ordinances Important for Maine Farmers,
SUN J. (Aug. 20, 2017),
https://www.sunjournal.com/2017/08/20/new-local-food-ordinances-important-formaine-farmers/.
43 Letter from Alfred V. Almanza, Acting Deputy Under Sec’y, Off. of Food
Safety, to Walter Whitcomb, Maine Dept. of Agric. Comm’r (July 6, 2017),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3PYp5sROj_1NkxMa3BRMHNVOXdkTDVwaj
NZN245VDA0Vzdj/view?usp%3Dsharing
44 Legislative Alert, ME. FARMERS MARKETS,
http://www.mainefarmersmarkets.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/LegislativeUpdate-re-Food-Sovereignty-Law.pdf. (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
45 Letter from Governor Paul R. LePage to the Legislature (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3PYp5sROj_1QTEzTWZaZWtBV05NUFhnVm
ZudGItYlp3aFJJ/view?usp%3Dsharing.
46 SP 242, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017).
42
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allies into the push for a state constitutional RtF. In January 2021,
Representative Billy Bob Faulkingham introduced H.P. 61 (L.D. 95)
in the Maine House of Representatives, again seeking to add a RtF
amendment to the Maine Constitution.47
In order to move forward, both the House and the Senate had
to approve the amendment by a two-thirds majority. The proposal
first went before the Committee on Agriculture, Conservation and,
Forestry, which considered testimony and input and, in April 2021,
gave the resolution a unanimous ought-to-pass report.48 On May 18,
2021, the Maine House of Representatives voted 104 to 41 in favor
of passage, exceeding the two-thirds threshold.49 The resolution then
went to the Senate, and on June 14, 2021, was placed on the Special
appropriations table pending final passage before the session
adjourned.50 On July 2, 2021 the proposal passed the Maine Senate
with a bipartisan two-thirds majority of 23-10.51 The amendment was
placed on the statewide ballot in November of 2021 and passed with
over 60% of the popular vote, making the RtF an official part of the
Maine constitution.52 The state of Maine now has the only
constitutionally enshrined RtF in the country.53
III. Analyzing Maine’s Work
While advocates recognize that the interests of those
working for independence, food security, and farmers are
47

The only other state to introduce legislation seeking to establish a constitutional
RtF is West Virginia. On March 15, 2021, Delegate Danielle Walker introduced
House Joint Resolution 30, the “Right to food, food sovereignty and freedom from
hunger,” a proposed addition to article three, section twenty-three of the West
Virginia Constitution. H.R.J. Res. 30, 85th Leg., 2021 Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2021).
The state of Washington has also begun the process, inaugurating an advisory
council in 2021 with the intention of introducing RtF legislation by 2023.
48 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right to
Food, H.R. Res. 61, 130th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. 2021),
https://legislature.maine.gov/legis/bills/display_ps.asp?LD=95&snum=13.
49 Maine LD95, TRACK BILL, https://trackbill.com/bill/maine-legislative-document95-resolution-proposing-an-amendment-to-the-constitution-of-maine-to-establisha-right-to-food/1975008/.
50 Id. Note that this year Maine also considered a piece of concept draft legislation
that sought to end hunger by 2030, in line with the SDG recommendations. See
H.P. 127, 130th Leg, 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. 2021).
51 See LD 95, FASTDEMOCRACY, https://fastdemocracy.com/billsearch/me/130/bills/MEB00008554/#votes (last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
52
Patrick Whittle, Maine Voters Pass the Nation’s First ‘Right to Food’
Amendment, PRESS HERALD,

https://www.pressherald.com/2021/11/02/supporters-of-right-to-foodamendment-lead-in-early-returns/ (Nov. 3, 2021).
53

Id.
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interconnected, in my view, Maine’s RtF work is grounded in a
farmer/producer, independent locality, and libertarian perspective.54
Specifically in Maine, most of the work in the food sovereignty arena
was initiated by towns seeking autonomy.55 This work garnered
support across the political spectrum. Maine’s experience, viewed
with an understanding of the unique characteristics of the state and
the origination perspective of its RtF work, can inform other
localities seeking to incorporate a RtF in their state constitutions that
encompasses the 4As.
The proposed amendment that passed both houses of the
Maine legislature this summer reads as follows:
All individuals have a natural, inherent and
unalienable right to food, including the right to
save and exchange seeds and the right to grow,
raise, harvest, produce and consume the food of
their own choosing for their own nourishment,
sustenance, bodily health and well-being, as long
as an individual does not commit trespassing, theft,
poaching or other abuses of private property rights,
public lands or natural resources in the harvesting,
production or acquisition of food.56
It is enlightening to contrast this language with that of the first RtF
constitutional amendment drafted in Maine. As further explained
below, the differences between the two proposals are, first and
In my view, West Virginia’s decision to seek a constitutional amendment on the
RtF originated with advocates working on anti-hunger and anti-poverty projects,
and the decision to forward the proposed amendment came from a legislator with a
personal history of food insecurity. This differing origination point may influence
allies, approaches, and the language used as the work proceeds.
55 Joao Fonseca, Empowering the People to Nourish: Right to Food in the State of
Maine, WHYHUNGER, (June 17, 2019),
https://whyhunger.org/category/blog/empowering-the-people-to-nourish-right-tofood-in-the-state-of-maine/. While Maine’s largest food bank has most recently
hesitated in supporting the RtF, see they testified in support of a previous iteration
of the bill. Austin Bryniarski, How Food Banks Are Advancing the Right to Food
Movement, FOOD BANK NEWS (Jan. 27, 2021), https://foodbanknews.org/howfood-banks-are-advancing-the-right-to-food/.
56 H.P. 61, 130th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Me. 2021). When the proposed amendment
went to the voters, it read: "Do you favor amending the Constitution of Maine to
declare that all individuals have a natural, inherent and unalienable right to grow,
raise, harvest, produce and consume the food of their own choosing for their own
nourishment, sustenance, bodily health, and well-being?" Maine Question 3, Right
to Produce, Harvest, and Consume Food Amendment (2021), BALLOTPPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Maine_Question_3,_Right_to_Produce,_Harvest,_and_Con
sume_Food_Amendment_(2021)(last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
54
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foremost, the result of the fact that Maine has been honing their
proposal through multiple legislative sessions, gathering input, and
engaging in compromise. Deletions made were in response to
concerns about the language as written, as opponents assumed that
the foundational principle contained in the proposal would mandate
specific future actions they would take issue with. While proposal
advocates were committed to retaining language they deemed
essential, they were willing to compromise.57 The original resolution,
as amended by the House and forwarded to the Senate, read as
follows:
All individuals have a natural, inherent and unalienable
right to food, including the right to acquire, produce,
process, prepare, preserve and consume the food of their
own choosing by hunting, gathering, foraging, farming,
fishing, gardening and saving and exchanging seeds or by
barter, trade or purchase from sources of their own
choosing for their nourishment, sustenance, bodily health
and well-being, as long as an individual does not commit
trespassing, theft, poaching or other abuses of private
property rights, public lands or natural resources in the
acquisition of food; furthermore, all people have a
fundamental right to be free from hunger, malnutrition,
starvation and the endangerment of life from the scarcity
of or lack of access to nourishing food. Every individual is
fully responsible for the exercise of these rights, which
may not be infringed.58
Most striking in the 2021 version of the proposal is the omission of
the final sentence, “all people have a fundamental right to be free
from hunger, malnutrition, starvation and the endangerment of life
from the scarcity of or lack of access to nourishing food.” Contextual
setting pronouncements such as this one are often used to guide
future implementation and interpretation by making the purpose of
the proposal clear.59 In this case, the sentence was amended out of
BULTRINI, supra note 3, at 6 (noting no model can account for each state’s
context, history or systems, but discussing key elements).
58 H.P. 583, 129th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Me. 2019). Note that when first submitted,
the proposal read as follows: “Every individual has a natural and unalienable right
to food and to acquire food for that individual's own nourishment and sustenance
by hunting, gathering, foraging, farming, fishing or gardening, or by barter. trade
or purchase from sources of that individual's own choosing, and every individual is
fully responsible for the exercise of this right, which may not be infringed.” H.P.
532, 127th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2015).
59 See generally, ANN SEIDMAN ET AL., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC
SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS (1st ed. 2000); OPEN SOC’Y JUST.
57
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the bill on the floor of the House, when legislators expressed concern
that this language would require the Maine government to literally
provide food to each Maine resident.
There is also the elimination of the phrase “purchase from
sources of their own choosing.” Opposition to this phrase was
epitomized the second time this proposed amendment was
introduced. While the Maine Department of Agriculture supported
the RtF ‘in concept’ this round, they expressed concern over the
intent of the language and its possible conflict with existing law.60
Also eliminated are the words “hunting, gathering, foraging,
farming, fishing, gardening.” These were struck when the Maine
Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife and the Department of
Agriculture expressed apprehension that these words would be
interpreted as meaning that people would not have to adhere to
existing regulations.61 Interestingly, the last sentence of the version
that passed this summer does include the words “harvesting,
production or acquisition of food” while the original language spoke
only of the “acquisition of food.” While implementation is yet to
come, it stands to reason that these words may in fact cover much of
the activity originally sought to be contained when the proposal was
first drafted. Finally, the language of the passed proposal enumerates
specific examples of the rights it is bestowing, using words most
associated with farming, such as ‘grow,’ ‘raise,’ and ‘harvest,’ as
opposed to ‘acquire,’ ‘process,’ ‘prepare,’ and ‘preserve.’62
INITIATIVE, LEGAL WRITING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS PRACTICE NOTES 3 (2018);
LEGIS. COUNCIL, ME. STATE LEGIS., MAINE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL (6th
rev. 2016), available at https://legislature.maine.gov/doc/1353.
60 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right to
Food: Hearing on L.D. 795 before the J. Comm. on Agric., Conservation &
Forestry, 129th Leg. (2019) (statement of Emily Horton, Director of Policy and
Community Engagement for the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and
Forestry).
61 Id.
62 Each of the changes detailed above were made in an effort to strike a
compromise that would mollify detractors while also preserving a RtF. For future
drafters seeking to fully incorporate the 4As ‘food’ could be replaced with
‘adequate, available, accessible, and adequate food’ to more perfectly incorporate
human rights language. Similarly, ‘right’ can be replaced with ‘human right’ to
make that intention clearer. These words hold import, as they reinforce underlying
human rights principles. ‘Adequacy’ in this context means individuals are now
getting, and will continue to get, enough calories and nutrients to lead healthy and
safe lives. ‘Available’ references an intent to ensure all people have the capacity to
buy or produce what they need. ‘Accessible’ interlocks this right with others, not
just by ensuring that people have the physical means to reach food but also that
they have the means to purchase whatever food is not otherwise secured.
‘Appropriate’ ties in environmental sustainability concerns and ensures that the
RtF is delivered in a respectful manner. Additionally, from a human rights
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In addition to disagreements over specific language, the RtF
also encountered opposition from parties asserting that the
amendment was unnecessary and simultaneously expressing
concerns about the effects it might have. While opponents were
ultimately unsuccessful in preventing the proposal from effectively
passing both chambers, the issues raised throughout the process are
instructive for both Maine’s future debate around public approval of
the amendment and for RtF advocates in other jurisdictions. For the
most part, these concerns focused on the lack of a need for the
amendment, on seeds, animal welfare, excessive litigation, zoning,
and general unintended consequences.
The supposed superfluousness of the proposal had been
raised since its initial introduction. Even opponents contesting
specific aspects of the legislation usually began their testimony by
averring that it was unnecessary, as the right already existed both
practically and in varying fragments of existing Maine law.63 This
difficulty in conceptualizing the need for a RtF is a common one, as
many people believe that the right is both abstract and a natural one,
belonging to everyone by virtue of their being human. Proponents
were able to successfully explain that passing a RtF ensures that this
right has a responsibility attached to it, and that responsibility
includes respecting the rights of individuals to feed themselves,
protecting that right against those whose actions would encroach
upon it, and helping to facilitate realization of that right through
connected concerns.
Other objections were more specific than a general worry
about natural law. The Maine Veterinary Association feared a right
to access food might lead to individuals raising food animals in
unhealthy conditions, such as a cow in an apartment or hens in a
perspective, including limiting language such as “commit trespassing, theft,
poaching or other abuses of private property rights, public lands or natural
resources” shifts the perspective from the traditional goal of respecting, protecting,
and fulfilling a right to one of constraint. This language of limitation was added at
the very start of Maine’s fight for a constitutional amendment, when in initial
discussions legislators raised concerns that not having such limitations would be a
green light for stealing and other crimes, despite the fact that even though those
crimes would still be valid. In states where it is feasible to do so, another way to
approach the goal of ensuring respect for all rights while embracing a human rights
point of view could be: No limitation to the exercise of the right to food is
permitted unless it is compatible with the right to food and is required by law.
63 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right to
Food: Hearing on L.D. 783 before the J. Comm. on Agric., Conservation &
Forestry, 127th Leg. (2015) (statement of Ellis Addition, Director of the Bureau of
Agriculture, Food and Rural Resources).
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basement.64 Animal Rights Maine testified about concerns over the
effect the amendment might have on the ability to enact animal
management and gun safety laws.65 Other parties testified about
future unintended consequences in general,66 with some labeling
these “severe” for “agriculture and food safety” across the state.67
The Maine Municipal Association, while agreeing “that the right to
food is inherent,” testified against the bill because they also believed
it might create problematic case law in the future.68 One legislator
testifying in opposition to the proposed amendment asserted that she
and the Municipal Association had concerns about having to litigate
ordinances already in place in areas such as Lewiston, Auburn, and
Portland, congested areas where raising farm life would be
problematic.69 There was also deliberation over whether the language
pertaining to seeds posed any conflict with Maine’s certified
seed/seed potato program.70 At an Agriculture, Conservation and

64

Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right to
Food: Hearing on L.D. 95 before the J. Comm. on Agric, Conservation &
Forestry, 130th Leg. (2021) (statement of Janelle D. Tirrell, Legislative
Committee Chair, Maine Veterinary Medical Association); see also Id. (statement
of Katie Hansberry, Maine State Director, Humane Society).
65 Id. (statement of Melissa Gates, Founding Director, Animal Rights Maine).
66 Id. (statement of Susanna Richer); Id. (statement of Emily Horton, Director of
Policy and Community Engagement, Maine Department of Agriculture,
Conservation & Forestry).
67 Action Alert: Contact Your Legislators Today to OPPOSE LD 795!, ME. FARM
BUREAU (June 18, 2019), https://www.mainefarmbureau.us/action-alert-contactyour-legislators-today-to-oppose-ld-795/.
68 See Hearing on L.D. 95, supra note 65 (statement of Janelle D. Tirrell,
Legislative Committee Chair, Maine Veterinary Medical Association); see also Id.
(statement of Rebecca Graham, Legislative Advocate, Maine Municipal
Association).
69 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right to
Food: Hearing on L.D. 95 before the House of Representatives, 130th Leg. (2021)
(statement of Kathleen Dillingham). Note that Lewiston, Auburn and Portland are
the immigrant centers of Maine, and Lewiston has one of the highest per capita
Muslim populations in the United States. Kathryn Skelton, Stronger Than
Barriers: Lewiston-Auburn’s Immigrant Community Hustles, Thrives with the Help
of Local Groups, SUN J. (Apr. 26, 2021),
https://www.sunjournal.com/2021/04/25/new-mainers-new-jobs/ (Apr. 26, 2021).
Maine also has the highest per capita number of anti-Muslim incidents per person.
See Anti-Muslim Activities in the United States 2012-2018, NEW AM. MUSLIM
DIASPORA INITIATIVE, https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/anti-muslim-activity/
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
70 Although for most of human history, seeds were sold or exchanged freely, a rash
of laws in the 1980s transformed the seed market, exponentially increasing the
number of plant patents from less than 120 in 1990 to over 12,000 today. Four
companies currently own over 60% of the world’s seeds, contributing to a
constriction of biodiversity and an increase in biopiracy. See Dan Barber, Save our
Food. Free the Seed, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019),
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Forestry committee work session, the committee’s legislative analyst
reported on two opinions advising that the language revealed an
intent to limit the application to individuals, who could save and
reuse seeds for their own use but could not sell them commercially,
and a distinction between certified seed potatoes and seeds.71 In the
end, the language on seeds was accepted as written, but the dispute
highlights the need for utilization of a common human rights
language, as struggles over seeds have been a consistent factor in RtF
work across the globe.72
For each of the concerns raised above, advocates of the bill
engaged in discussions, with those raising objections and sought to
clarify both their intent and the purpose of the bill. In response to
these explanations and the compromise language laid out above,
some opponents changed their positions. For example, the Maine
Department of Agriculture stated that they were neither for nor
against the bill, based on conversations with Sen. Hickman and his
openness to their concerns.73 This years’ long dialogue relied on the
relationships between legislators and neighbors and the willingness
of those forwarding the amendment to explain themselves and to
compromise.
Advocates of the proposed amendment also relied on themes
that resonated in the state to bring people on board. Those included
an argument that the RtF is the ‘second amendment for food’ and
distinguishing between protecting and providing, a distinction Rep.
Hickman had been asserting since he began submitting these
proposals and one that continued through the current submission.74
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/07/opinion/sunday/dan-barber-seedcompanies.html.
71 Note that the opinions of the state assistant attorney general and the University
of Miami law clinic related only to what the plain language suggests at this
juncture and did not purport to predict future judicial interpretations. See Maine
Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry Committee, ACF Work Session 4/15/2021,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 15, 2021), https://youtu.be/PdyY8LU20EA?t=5443.
72 Controversies over seeds often ignore the contributions of farmers and
indigenous communities. Recognition of this omission gave rise to a 2001 treaty
that, inter alia, seeks to protect farmers’ rights to participate in decision making
and benefits. See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture art. 9, Mar.11, 2001, Exec. Rep. 111-7, 2400 U.N.T.C. I-43345.
73 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right to
Food: Hearing on L.D. 95 Before the J. Comm. on Agric., Conservation &
Forestry, 130th Leg. (2021) (statement of Emily Horton, Director of Policy and
Community Engagement, Maine Department of Agriculture, Conservation and
Forestry).
74 See Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right
to Food: Hearing on L.D. 795 Before the J. Comm. on Agric., Conservation &
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Proponents repeatedly explained the difference between a
constitutional statement and the fulfillment of that right, making it
clear through the years that a RtF does not automatically obligate the
government to provide food.75 Finally, they addressed the concern
that the amendment was not needed. In the words of Rep.
Faulkingham, “if we needed this Amendment now, then it would
already be too late. Rarely are amendments adopted when they are
needed. They are adopted many years before, by legislators who had
the foresight to pass them for the benefit of future generations.”76
Despite the objections raised by detractors, backers of
Maine’s RtF amendment were able to successfully explain the
proposal to the people, and again give Maine the distinction of being
first in the nation in an area of food advocacy.

IV. Conclusion
As we can see, individuals with negative experiences around
the food system started the push for a constitutional right to food in
Maine. That experience primarily came from local farmers facing
restrictions on their ability to sell their products and was forwarded
for six years before passing. As the nation becomes increasingly
aware of the prevalence of food insecurity, the push for a right to
food will only increase. Maine’s experience will continue to provide
guidance for activists across the country.

Forestry, 129th Leg. (2019) (statement of Rep. Craig Hickman); Proposing an
Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right to Food: Hearing on
L.D. 95 Before the J. Comm. on Agric., Conservation & Forestry, 130th Leg.
(2021) (statement of Rep. Billy Bob Faulkingham).
75 See Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right
to Food: Hearing on L.D. 795 Before the J. Comm. on Agric., Conservation &
Forestry, 129th Leg. (2019) (statement of Rep. Craig Hickman).
76 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of Maine to Establish a Right to
Food: Hearing on L.D. 95 Before the J. Comm. on Agric., Conservation &
Forestry, 130th Leg. (2021) (statement of Rep. Billy Bob Faulkingham).

China’s Food Pagodas: Looking Forward by Looking Back?
Yifei Li and Dale Jamieson*
Abstract
In this Article we provide a close analysis of the Chinese
Dietary Guidelines – the Food Pagoda. Our focus on the dietary
guidelines is motivated by two main considerations. First, the
guidelines represent the most comprehensive, nationwide, statesponsored effort to educate the people of China about food. Like
citizens in most countries, Chinese people are presented with
numerous, often competing, messages from scientists, food gurus
and online influencers. The dietary guidelines are different in that
they are backed by an entire suite of governmental resources for
nationwide dissemination through hospitals, schools, public
billboards, TV and radio ads, among others. Among all the food
advices and recommendations in China, it is the official dietary
guidelines that have the greatest potential for changing dietary
preferences. Second, understanding the Chinese dietary guidelines
provides a useful basis for international comparison, since more than
100 countries around the world have dietary guidelines. Whether in
the form of a pyramid or a plate, visualizations of the “ideal” national
diet have become a common vector for official food advice.
Examining the dietary guidelines therefore helps situate China in the
broader context of government-proffered food advice. In this
Article, we examine the historical evolution of China’s Dietary
Guidelines and their implications for environment, health, and
animal welfare. Comparing the guidelines to longitudinal survey
data about actual consumption provides a unique window on these
issues, and in this Article we discuss what this glimpse may suggest
for climate, health, and animal welfare going forward.
I. Introduction
At the height of COVID-19’s initial outbreak in China,
alongside lockdowns, contact tracing, and medical resource
mobilization, an integral part of China’s national pandemic response
*
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strategy was the Dietary Guidelines for the Prevention and Treatment
of COVID-19. 1 Consistent with health practices since Chinese
antiquity,2 the Guidelines stress the importance of a balanced diet in
fending off diseases.3 The ancient Chinese adage that “food is the
absolute to the people,” or “min yi shi wei tian,” still rings true.
Despite the centrality of food in Chinese culture and the
weight of the nation’s food economy, it is glaringly absent when it
comes to broader conversations about China’s environmental
protection and responses to climate change. China’s national food
policies have largely been driven by nutritional and health
considerations, to the neglect of the myriad connections of the food
economy to wider issues of climate resilience, ecological
sustainability, and animal welfare.
China is not alone in this respect. In April, 2021, in response
to a claim circulating in right-wing media outlets, the U.S. Secretary
of Agriculture declared that “there is no effort designed to limit
people’s intake of beef coming out of President Biden’s White House
or USDA.” 4 The sheer political power of animal agriculture is
enough to ensure that in most countries, taking beef off the table, is
not on the table for discussion.5
It was thus both surprising and striking when a widely
circulated news story in The Guardian praised China for displaying
“massive leadership” in planning to “cut meat consumption in half,”

1

See Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Fangzhi Yingyang Shanshi
Zhidao (新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防治营养膳食指导) [Nutritional Dietary
Guidance for the Prevention and Treatment of Pneumonia Caused by New
Coronavirus Infection], GUOJIA WEISHENG JIANKANG WEIYUANHUI (国家卫生健康
委员会) [NATIONAL HEALTH COMMISSION] (Feb. 8, 2020),
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/sps/s7886/202002/a69fd36d54514c5a9a3f456188cbc428.s
html.
2See RUTH ROGASKI, HYGIENIC MODERNITY: MEANINGS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE IN
TREATY-PORT CHINA 23-25 (2014).
3 Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Fangzhi Yingyang Shanshi
Zhidao (新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防治营养膳食指导) [Nutritional Dietary
Guidance for the Prevention and Treatment of Pneumonia Caused by New
Coronavirus Infection], supra note 1.
4 Ryan McCrimmon, Biden Isn’t Banning Meat, USDA Chief Says, POLITICO (Apr.
26, 2021), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/26/biden-not-banning-meatusda-484609.
5 See Oliver Lazarus et al., The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Meat and
Dairy Producers, 165 CLIMATIC CHANGE 1, 2, 10, 15, 17-18 (2021),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10584-021-03047-7.pdf.
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a policy move that was said to be “cheered by climate campaigners.”6
The main reference of the Guardian story was the 2016 update to
China’s national dietary guidelines, also known as the “Food
Pagoda,” which recommended daily consumption of forty to
seventy-five grams of meat for the average Chinese adult. 7 The
prospect of China’s diet going green brings excitement and hope to
a country that is troubled by environmental crises from
“airpocalypse” to “aporcalypse,” and to a world that is deep in
planetary climate catastrophe.
There are many reasons for environmental and animal
welfare groups to be concerned about China’s food trajectory.
Globally, food system-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions – at
18 Gt CO2 equivalent in 2015 – amount to more than a third of the
world’s total emissions.8 The most substantial share of food-related
GHG is generated by animal-sourced food production.9 According to
OECD data, China accounted for 26.3 percent of the world’s total
meat consumption in 2018, up from 14.6 percent in 1990.10 In per
capita terms, the average Chinese person consumed 49.3 kilograms
of meat in 2018, more than tripling the 1990 figure of 15.6
kilograms. 11 In 2018, the per capita consumption level in China
exceeded the global average of 34.8 kilograms by 41.7 percent,
quickly approaching the OECD average of 69.5 kilograms. 12 In
2016 alone, China slaughtered more than 14 billion terrestrial
animals for food, or about 448 animals per second.13
The rapid transformation of China’s food economy is a clear
testament to the success with which the most populous country on
the planet has managed to alleviate poverty, but it is also a source of
Oliver Milman & Stuart Leavenworth, China’s Plan to Cut Meat Consumption by
50% Cheered by Climate Campaigners, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/20/chinas-meat-consumptionclimate-change.
7 Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南) [Dietary Guidelines for the
6

General Population], ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE
NUTRITION SOCIETY], http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/2016b.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2021).
8 M. Crippa, et al., Food Systems Are Responsible for a Third of Global
Anthropogenic GHG Emissions, 2 NATURE FOOD, 198, 198–209 (2021).
9 Matthew N. Hayek et al., The Carbon Opportunity Cost of Animal-Sourced Food
Production on Land, 4 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 21, 21 (2021).
10 Meat Consumption, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV,
https://data.oecd.org/agroutput/meat-consumption.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Animal Slaughter and Meat Production – China, TERRASTENDO (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://terrastendo.net/infographics/animal-slaughter-and-meat-production-china/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
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growing concern for Chinese policymakers. With obesity – and
especially child obesity – on the rise, and a host of diet-related
diseases becoming more prevalent than ever, the public health
implications of high-energy and protein-rich food consumption are
becoming harder to overlook.14 At the same time, rapid urbanization
puts unprecedented strains on rural agricultural productivity in a
country where per capita arable land is a less than half of the global
average, thus posing a serious challenge to self-sufficiency. 15
Improving access to food has morphed from an overwhelming social,
political, and economic success, to a salient health, and even security
risk for China.
It is in this context that the environmental implications of the
Chinese food economy have gained renewed importance. From
phosphorus, nitrogen, and GHG emissions to water and land uses,
China’s diet has an outsized impact on all aspects of global
sustainability, health, and wellbeing. 16 The need to address the
climate-agriculture nexus is further accentuated by the Chinese
leadership’s ambitious goal to peak carbon emissions before 2030
and to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. 17 A greener diet has the
potential to help achieve environmental goals, and also contribute to
population health, enhance food security, and improve animal
welfare.18 Greening China’s diet is therefore a truly monumental
task for China and the world.
In this spirit, we provide a close analysis of the Chinese
Dietary Guidelines – the Food Pagoda. Our focus on the dietary
guidelines is motivated by two main considerations. First, the
guidelines represent the most comprehensive, nationwide, state14

See H. Charles Godfray et al., Meat Consumption, Health, and the Environment,
361 SCIENCE 1, 2-3 (2018),
http://yacoby.physics.harvard.edu/Publications/eaam5324.full.pdf. See also Y. Li
et al., Determinants of Childhood Overweight and Obesity in China, 97 BRIT. J.
NUTRITION 210, 211-12 (2007); Jiguo Zhang et al., Dietary Patterns and Their
Associations with Childhood Obesity in China, 113 BRIT. J. NUTRITION 1978, 1978
(2015).
15 Chunyang He et al., Urban Expansion Brought Stress to Food Security in China:
Evidence from Decreased Cropland Net Primary Productivity, 576 SCI. TOTAL
ENV’T 660, 661 (2016).
16 See Yuanchao Hu et al., Food Production in China Requires Intensified
Measures to Be Consistent with National and Provincial Environmental
Boundaries, 1 NATURE FOOD 572, 572 (2020).
17 Steven Lee Myers, China’s Pledge to Be Carbon Neutral by 2060: What It
Means, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/world/asia/china-climate-change.html.
18 See ACAD. OF GLOB. FOOD ECONS. & POL’Y, CHINA AGRIC. UNIV. [AGFEP] ET
AL., 2021 CHINA AND GLOBAL FOOD POLICY REPORT: RETHINKING AGRIFOOD
SYSTEMS FOR THE POST-COVID WORLD 41-42 (2021).

134

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 17

sponsored effort to educate the people of China about food. Like
citizens in most countries, Chinese people are presented with
numerous, often competing, messages from scientists, food gurus
and online influencers. The dietary guidelines are different in that
they are backed by an entire suite of governmental resources for
nationwide dissemination through hospitals, schools, public
billboards, TV and radio ads, among others. Among all the food
advices and recommendations in China, it is the official dietary
guidelines that in China have the greatest potential for changing
dietary preferences. Second, understanding the Chinese dietary
guidelines provides a useful basis for international comparison, since
more than 100 countries around the world have dietary guidelines.19
Whether in the form of a pyramid or a plate, visualizations of the
“ideal” national diet have become a common vector for official food
advice. 20 Examining the dietary guidelines therefore helps situate
China in the broader context of government-proffered food advice.
In this Article, we examine the historical evolution of China’s
Dietary Guidelines and their implications for environment, health,
and animal welfare. Comparing the guidelines to longitudinal
survey data about actual consumption provides a unique window on
these issues, and in this Article we discuss what this glimpse may
suggest for climate, health, and animal welfare going forward.
We want to emphasize at the outset the tentative nature of
our conclusions. In principle, a more sophisticated modeling
approach could provide stronger evidence for our claims, but the
sporadic and potentially unreliable nature of the data, and the way
that it is aggregated, make it difficult to implement such an approach
with any confidence. In any case, we believe that the methods that
we employ in this paper provide new insights and suggest productive
lines of further research.21
II. China’s Dietary Guidelines
From the early nineteenth century until the end of the Great
Leap Forward in 1961, famines were an every-generational

19

FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS [FAO], FOOD-BASED DIETARY
GUIDELINES, http://www.fao.org/nutrition/nutrition-education/food-dietaryguidelines/en/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
20 Xinxing Guanzhuang Bingdu Ganran de Feiyan Fangzhi Yingyang Shanshi
Zhidao (新型冠状病毒感染的肺炎防治营养膳食指导) [Nutritional Dietary
Guidance for the Prevention and Treatment of Pneumonia Caused by New
Coronavirus Infection], supra note 1.
21 Similar points about methodology are made by Hu. See Hu, infra note 83.
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occurrence in China.22 When the People’s Republic of China was
declared in 1949, life expectancy at birth was 35 years.23 It increased
gradually over the next decade, but not dramatically until after the
Great Leap Forward. 24 Since then, there has been an astounding
improvement in food accessibility with dramatic results. For
example, 9-year old boys in China in 2019 were 8 cm taller than in
1985, the largest increase of any country in the world over that period
of time. 25
China’s first national dietary guidelines were produced in
1989 when the memory of famine was still fresh and about 200
million people remained undernourished.26 The guidelines took the
form of eight qualitative recommendations: (1) Eat a variety of
foods; (2) Do not be hungry, and do not eat until too full; (3) Eat
moderate amounts of oils and fats; (4) Balance coarse and refined
grains; (5) Use a limited amount of salt; (6) Eat fewer sweets; (7)
Moderate alcoholic drinks; and (8) Balance the three daily meals
(Standing Board of Chinese Nutrition Society 1990).27 In its original
publication, each entry was followed by a paragraph of brief
explanation. 28 A set of eight posters were designed and widely
distributed, each corresponding to one of the recommendations.29
In 1997, the guidelines were revised by a broad group of
nutritionists, and for the first time took the visual form of the pagoda
and provided specific quantitative recommendations for daily food
consumption (Figure 1).30
22

See S.F. Du et al., China in the Period of Transition from Scarcity and Extensive
Undernutrition to Emerging Nutrition-Related Non-Communicable Diseases,
1949–1992, 15 OBESITY REVS. 8, 8(2013).
23 Id at 13-14.
24 Id.
25 Andrea Rodriguez-Martinez et al., Height and Body-Mass Index Trajectories of
School-Aged Children and Adolescents from 1985 to 2019 in 200 Countries and
Territories: A Pooled Analysis of 2181 Population-Based Studies with 65 Million
Participants, 396 LANCET 1511, 1515 (2020).
26 FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS [FAO], THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2006: ERADICATING WORLD HUNGER (2006).
27 Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1989 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南》
1989 年版本) [“Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1989 Edition],
ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY],
http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/1989b.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
28 Keyou Ge, The Transition of Chinese Dietary Guidelines and the Food Guide
Pagoda, 20 ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 439, 439-40 (2011),
https://www.airitilibrary.com/Publication/alDetailedMesh?DocID=09647058201109-201306100025-201306100025-439-446.
29 Id.
30 “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1997 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南
》1997 年版本) ["Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1997 Edition],
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Figure 1. The Food Pagoda (1997)
In 2007, the guidelines were revised by the Chinese
Nutrition Society and endorsed by the Chinese Ministry of Health
(Figure 2).31

ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY],
http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/1997b.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
31 “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 2007 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南
》2007 年版本) ["Chinese Resident Dietary Guidelines” 2007 Edition],
ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY],
http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/2007b.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
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Figure 2. The Food Pagoda (2007)
In 2016 the pagoda was revised again (Figure 3) on orders
from the National Health Commission of China (what had previously
been the Ministry of Health).32

32

Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南) [Dietary Guidelines for the
General Population], supra note 7.
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Figure 3. The Food Pagoda (2016)
The primary function of the guidelines is public education.
Through information campaigns, propaganda posters, dedicated
media programming, school curricula, and other means, health
authorities all over China regularly sponsor events that prominently
feature the food pagoda.33 The express purposes of these events are
to call attention to the most pressing diet-related health concerns of
the nation and to encourage citizens to follow the latest consensus
among Chinese nutritionists. 34 Since the guidelines’ most recent
update in 2016, provincial and local governments across the country
have rallied up comprehensive support mechanisms to raise public
awareness of the guidelines, in compliance with top-level mandates

33

Ge, supra note 28, at 439-40.
See YueXin Yang et al., New Chinese Dietary Guidelines: Healthy Eating
Patterns and Food-Based Dietary Recommendations, ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 908, 908-13 (2018),
https://apjcn.nhri.org.tw/server/APJCN/27/4/908.pdf.
34
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from Beijing.35 For example, the hallways of hospitals are decorated
with propaganda posters that feature the food pagoda, reminding
pregnant women to have plenty of dairy and meat.36 These efforts
have paid off. Survey data show that incrementally larger shares of
the Chinese population – from 7.5 percent in 2004 to 21.1 in 2015 –
have been made aware of the guidelines.37
Each iteration of the guidelines has been issued in a country
that has undergone serious change since the previous guidelines. In
1989 per capita income was $311 per year and three-quarters of the
population was rural. 38 In 2016 per capita income was more than
$8,000 per year and only 43% of the population was rural.39 Today,
with 11% of the population malnourished and 25% overweight,
China’s nutritional profile resembles that of a western nation.40 The
authors of the guidelines emphasize that, in addition to being based
on the evolving science of nutrition, they are responsive to changing
Chinese dietary habits.41 According to China’s top nutritionist Keyou

35

See Xiaoyuan Xing et al., Analysis on the Publicity and Education Effect of
Urban Community Middle-Aged and Elderly People Nutrition and Dietary, 101
ADVANCES SOC. SCI., EDUC. & HUMS. RSCH. 467, 467-472 (2017),
https://www.atlantis-press.com/article/25874418.pdf.
36 See id. at 470.
37 Xiaofang Jia (贾小芳) et al., 2004—2015 Nian Zhongguo Chengnian Jumin
Shanshi Yingyang Zhishi Zhixiao Lu de Bianhua Qushi (2004—2015 年中国成年

居民膳食营养知识知晓率的变化趋势) [Changes in the Awareness Rate of
Dietary Nutrition Knowledge Among Chinese Adult Residents from 2004-2015],
49 WEI SHENG YAN JIU (卫生研究) [J. HYGIENE RSCH.] 345, 345–56 (2020).
38 GDP Per Capita (Current US$) —China, THE WORLD BANK (2021),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CN (last
visited Oct. 16, 2021); Rural Population (% of Total Population) —China, THE
WORLD BANK (2021),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=CN (last visited
Oct. 16, 2021).
39 GDP Per Capita (Current US$) —China, supra note 38; RURAL POPULATION (%
OF TOTAL POPULATION) Rural Population (% of Total Population) —China, supra
note 38.
40 See China, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, https://www.wfp.org/countries/china
(last visited Oct. 20, 2021). By way of comparison, more than 10% of US
households are considered food insecure while more than 70% of Americans are
overweight or obese. See Security Status of U.S. Households in 2020, U.S. DEP’T
OF AGRIC., ECON. RSCH. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutritionassistance/food-security-in-the-us/key-statistics-graphics.aspx (Sept. 8, 2021);
Overweight & Obesity Statistics, NAT’L INST. OF DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY
DISEASES, https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/healthstatistics/overweight-obesity (Aug. 2017).
41 See Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan de Fa Zhan Zhuangkuang (中国居民膳食

指南的发展状况) [The Development Status of Chinese Residents’ Dietary
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Ge, each iteration of the food pagoda was formulated after extensive
deliberation among the nation’s nutritionists on the basis of empirical
evidence from the once-every-decade national nutrition surveys.42 In
1959, the Chinese government conducted a nutritional survey, and
since 1982 it has conducted a nutritional survey every ten years.43 By
closely examining the relationship between the recommendations
and the survey data, we can reconstruct some underlying patterns in
China’s food policies.44
III. The Humble Pagoda
When comparing the recommendations to actual behavior,
the most striking feature is the gap between the two.
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Figure 4. China's Diet, Surveyed Trends (1982, 1992, 2002, 2012)
and Pagoda Goals (1997, 2007, 2016) (grams/day)45
Guidelines], ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会) [CHINESE NUTRITION
SOCIETY], http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/lsqy.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
42 See Ge, supra note 28, at 439.
43 Yuna He et al., Data Resource Profile: China National Nutrition Surveys, 48
INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 368, 368-368f (2019).
44 There are no computer files for the 1959 survey so, like most scholars, we begin
our investigation with the 1982 survey.
45 See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], GUOJIA WEISHENG JIANKANG
WEIYUANHUI (国家卫生健康委员会) [NATIONAL HEALTH COMMISSION],
http://www.nhc.gov.cn/htmlfiles/zwgkzt/ptjnj/year2006/index.html (last visited
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In every case the recommendations call for significantly
greater food consumption by weight than is actually consumed. 46
Even more striking is the fact that actual consumption has been
declining since the first survey in 1982, and the gap between actual
consumption and the recommendations has been growing.47 Food
consumption by weight does not convert easily into calories,
especially when multiple food groups are involved.48 However, all
the dietary recommendations are based on an intake of 2,400 calories
per day, and the text that accompanies them indicates that anything
between 1,600 and 2,400 calories per day is acceptable, depending
on individual health conditions. 49 Roughly speaking, the actual
Chinese diet is moving towards calorically dense food consumed in
low quantities, while the recommendations would move the diet
towards less calorically dense foods consumed in greater quantities.50
The feature of the 2016 food pagoda that caught the attention
of the world was its ambition for drastically reducing China’s meat
consumption.51

Nov. 28, 2021); China Statistical Yearbook 2019, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
STATISTICS OF CHINA, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2019/indexeh.htm (last
visited Nov. 29, 2021).
46 See “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1989 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指
南》1989 年版本) [“Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1989 Edition],
supra note 27; Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1997 Nian Banben (《中国居民
膳食指南》1997 年版本) ["Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1997
Edition], supra note 30; “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 2007 Nian Banben (
《中国居民膳食指南》2007 年版本) ["Chinese Resident Dietary Guidelines”
2007 Edition], supra note 31; Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南)
[Dietary Guidelines for the General Population], supra note 7.
47 Ge, supra note 28.
48 Id.
49 He et al., supra note 43.
50 Id.
51 Milman & Leavenworth, supra note 6.
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Figure 5. Meat in China's Diet, Observed Trends and Pagoda Goals
(grams/day)52
What was less noticed is that the 2007 food pagoda had
called for an even larger reduction in meat consumption from actual
consumption levels. 53 In the face of the steady growth in meat
consumption since 1982 (Figure 5), the 2016 recommendations
doubled down and recommended even further reductions.54
It appears that in its 2016 recommendations, Chinese state
nutritionists were acting against the rising tide, advocating for
omnivorous moderation even when the country of 1.4 billion was
exhibiting a growing appetite for meat.55 However, in many areas,
the pagoda recommendations reinforce, rather than challenge,
existing dietary trends. As Figure 4 shows, this is most evidently the
case for staples, 56 the observed consumption level of which has
declined steadily at the rate of at least 15 percent per decennial
interval. 57 The 2007 pagoda has followed suit in shedding its

See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], supra note 45; China Statistical
52

Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Our tabulation for the category of staples includes rice, flour, cereals, tubers, and
their products, in keeping with the convention in Chinese nutrition surveys.
57 Ge, supra note 28 at 443.
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recommended level of staples. 58 A similar pattern applies to
vegetables.59 Conversely, in the case of oil, observed consumption
has gone up, and the pagoda recommendation has risen in
synchrony.60 Perhaps more salient are the cases of fruits and aquatic
food, where the growth of consumption in early decades was
followed by a moderate decline in recent periods in urban areas.61 As
if on cue, the pagoda recommendations initially went up before
slipping downward. 62 In general, the food pagoda serves to
reproduce existing trajectories, rather than contradicting them. Meat
is an exception, rather than the norm, in the food pagoda.
The food pagodas’ tendency to follow consumption is most
evident in how the pagoda changes over time. In other words, the
evolution of the food pagoda mimics the changing trajectory of food
consumption in China. Steady growth in consumption predicts a
continuous increase in the recommendation, whereas u-shaped
consumption corresponds to u-shaped recommendation changes.
Even though the absolute values of food recommendations are by no
means close to the empirical trends, the decade-to-decade changes
most certainly are.
This humble quality of the pagoda is consistent with the fact
that the Chinese authorities do not appear to endorse the
interpretation of the food pagoda as either a sign of, or vehicle for,
Chinese environmental leadership. Indeed, the Chinese media
routinely dismiss discussions about the global environmental
implications of China’s meat consumption. For example, a Time
magazine cover story entitled “How China Could Change the World
by Taking Meat Off the Menu” received a withering response in the
official propaganda tabloid, Global Times. 63 According to the
author,
“Chinese netizens slammed Western media as being
hypocritical after an article boasted the popularity of
meat substitutes in China while accusing China of
overconsumption of meat which harms the
58

Id.
See id.at 440-41.
60 See id. at 442-44.
61 Id. at 440.
62 Id. at 442-43. Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南) [Dietary
Guidelines for the General Population], supra note 7.
63 See Lu Yuanzhi, West Should Cut Its Own Meat Consumption if It’s Serious
About the Climate, GLOB. TIMES (Jan.24, 2021),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213792.shtml; Charlie Campbell, How
China Could Change the World by Taking Meat off the Menu, TIME (Jan. 22,
2021), https://time.com/5930095/china-plant-based-meat/.
59
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environment, which, Chinese readers said not only
looks like it is hinting that Chinese people are eating
more meat substitutes as they feel guilty for eating
too much meat and hurting the environment, but,
more importantly, glossed over much higher levels
of Western meat consumption.”64
Seen from the perspective of the humble pagoda, China’s “massive
leadership” is more imagined than real.

IV. The Aspirational Pagoda
In the previous section, we suggested that the food pagoda is
humbler than it might seem—that it tends to follow consumption
trends rather than guide them. Even so, as Figure 6 makes clear the
pagoda’s recommendations for fruits, aquatic foods, eggs seem
perplexingly high (most puzzling of all is dairy which will be
discussed in Section 5).

64

Xu Keyue, Western Media Double Standard in Accusing China of Meat
Overconsumption: Expert, GLOB. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2021),
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213791.shtml.
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Figure 6. Pagoda Recommendations as Percentages
Corresponding Consumption Levels in the Prior Survey65

of

However, these recommendations take on a different
meaning in the context of urban-rural disparity in China. In Figure 7
below, the horizontal axis shows the ratio of urban to rural
consumption of foods. For example, urban dairy consumption is, on
average, 5.12 times the rural figure, whereas urban staple
consumption is only 0.77 of the rural statistic. The vertical axis, on
the other hand, tracks the pagodas’ recommended change from
surveyed consumption levels. For example, the pagodas recommend
taking, on average, 9.06 times more dairy than what Chinese
residents consume in reality. The recommendation for staples, on the
other hand, is to consume 0.21 times less than the status quo. After
tabulating the correlation between these two statistics, we derive an
R2 of 0.853, suggesting that 85.3% of the variation in the pagodas’
recommended changes is explained by urban-rural differences in
China.

See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], supra note 45; China Statistical
65

Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
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This strong correlation suggests that a specter is haunting the
food pagoda – the specter of the city. In other words, the food pagoda
tends to liberally recommend foods that are favored by urbanites,
while at the same time discouraging foods that rural residents
disproportionately consume. As a result, what appear as
quintessentially Chinese urban foods such as dairy, fruits, and
aquatic foods, are further valorized by the pagoda, whereas foods that
are characteristically rural, e.g. staples, are presented as undesirable
in the pagoda. As such, the food pagoda signals the people of rural
China to look up to their urban counterparts for the ideal diet and
encourages the people of urban China to continue in their current
dietary trajectory. Perhaps inadvertently, the food pagoda may leave
rural residents of China in a constant struggle to catch up with their
urban counterparts, while neglecting—if not annihilating—the
cultures and contexts of rural livelihoods, whatever the consequences
See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], supra note 45; China Statistical
66

Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
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for environment, health, and animal welfare. The health implications
are especially significant, since the diet-related problems of urban
China are precisely those due to the overconsumption of high-calorie
fruits, high-protein aquatic foods, and high-fat dairy products.67
Our findings both confirm and challenge previous work on
the subject. Past research has suggested that Chinese urbanites tend
to better adhere to food pagoda recommendations than their rural
counterparts. 68 Our results show similar correlational strength
between urban status and the food pagoda’s recommended dietary
structure. However, our analysis leads us to consider the possibility
that if there are causal relationships here of any sort, they may go
both ways. In other words, in addition to urbanites adhering to the
food pagoda more closely, the Chinese nutritionists who construct
the food pagoda (themselves urbanites) may have encoded Chinese
urban dweller preferences in the recommendations.
Yet, even when Chinese urban meat consumption is 162
percent of the rural amount, state nutritionists have prescribed
reductions.69 The fact that it is an exception to the general pattern of
the food pagodas endorsing urban dietary trends is important. The
public health implications of China’s growing appetite for meat have
become hard to ignore, especially in cities. 70
By 2007 the
epidemiological evidence had convinced China’s top nutritionists of
the need to reverse course and limit meat intake.71 Yet, as recently
as 1997, the pagoda was telling people to consume more meat – 27.3
percent more to be exact—even though much of the increase in
overweight began between 1989 and 1991 or even before.72 It is
easy for people to become confused when there are such rapid
changes in recommendations, especially when they are made against
the background of a food pagoda that overall still asks people to eat
more of nearly everything.
V. The Strange Case of Dairy
The most glaring feature of the food pagodas is their
unrealistically high recommendations for the consumption of dairy
products. The 1997 pagoda recommendation of 100 grams/day was
67

See Li et al., supra note 14, at 212-13.
Xiaoyue Xu et al., Do Older Chinese People’s Diets Meet the Chinese Food
Pagoda Guidelines? Results from the China Health and Nutrition Survey 2009, 18
PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION, 3020, 3025-26 (2015).
69 Id.
70 Zhang et al., supra note 14, at 1983.
71 Id.
72 Id. The broader context of this meat anomaly warrants further discussion that we
hope to pursue elsewhere.
68
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nearly seven times the actual consumption level of 14.9 in 1992.73
When the 2002 consumption figure went up to 26.5, Chinese
nutritionists doubled down on their dairy recommendation,
increasing the prescribed level to 300 grams/day.74 Then, even after
actual consumption declined to 24.7 in 2012, state nutritionists
remain adamant in recommending 300 grams/day, or more than 12
times the average amount consumed (Figure 4).75
The food pagoda’s fixation with dairy could seem
improbable, especially since, historically, dairy has never been an
integral part of the Chinese diet, with the exception of a small
contingent of ethnic minority populations. 76 “Barbarian” nomadic
groups such as Mongols and Tibetans are known to have depended
on certain cattle breeds for meat and milk, giving substance to the
general cultural association of dairy products with the “lack of
civilization,” as seen from the perspective of the Chinese Han ethnic
majority.77 But even for nomads, dairy consumption was commonly
reserved for the brisk winters.78 This historical experience with dairy,
or lack thereof, is closely related to the common association between
East Asia and the idea of “lactose intolerance.” Medical scientists
have been debating for decades the questions of whether “lactose
intolerance” is biologically determined or culturally constructed, and
of whether “lactose intolerance” is a misnomer to begin with. 79
“Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 1997 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南
》1997 年版本) ["Dietary Guidelines for Chinese Residents” 1997 Edition],
73

supra note 30.
74 “Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi Zhinan” 2007 Nian Banben (《中国居民膳食指南
》2007 年版本) ["Chinese Resident Dietary Guidelines” 2007 Edition], supra
note 31.
75 Yiban Renqun Shanshi Zhinan (一般人群膳食指南) [Dietary Guidelines for the
General Population], supra note 7.
76 Mark Elvin, The Technology of Farming in Late-Traditional China, in THE
CHINESE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY 13-35 (R. Barker et al. eds., 1982); Jia-Chen
Fu, Confronting the Cow: Soybean Milk and the Fashioning of a Chinese Dairy
Alternative, in MORAL FOODS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF NUTRITION AND HEALTH IN
MODERN ASIA 47, 47-65 (Angela Ki Che Leung et al. eds., 2019); Susan Glosser,
Milk for Health, Milk for Profit: Shanghai’s Chinese Dairy Industry Under
Japanese Occupation, in INVENTING NANJING ROAD: COMMERCIAL CULTURE IN
SHANGHAI, 1900-1945, 207-36 (S. Cochran ed., 1999).
77 See Megan Tracy, Pasteurizing China’s Grasslands and Sealing in Terroir, 115
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 437, 442 (2013).
78 See Elvin, supra note 76.
79 See Frederick J. Simoons, Primary Adult Lactose Intolerance and the Milking
Habit: A Problem in Biologic and Cultural Interrelations, 15 AM. J. DIGESTIVE
DISEASES 695, 695–710 (1970); Claude Fischler, Food Habits, Social Change and
the Nature/Culture Dilemma, 19 SOC. SCI. INFO. 937, 937 (1980); Widjaja Lukito
et al., From ‘Lactose Intolerance’ to ‘Lactose Nutrition,’ 24 ASIA PAC. J. CLINICAL
NUTRITION 1, 1–8 (2015).
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While the identification of lactose intolerance as a “medical
deficiency” should be avoided, an estimated 95 percent of ethnic
Han Chinese people are not genetically predisposed to digest milk.80
Dairy marketing and recommendation in China, therefore, are up
against the entire cultural and biophysical histories of the Middle
Kingdom.
However, the peculiarity of the dairy recommendation
begins to make sense, when it is situated in the context of China’s
experience with European modernity. The en masse arrival of
European settlers and missionaries in the late 1800s and early 1900s
gave dairy an unprecedented boost in China. 81 They brought with
them, among other things, an entire suite of dairy technologies,
regulations, and cultural values. As early as 1911, Chinese Customs
official were predicting “enormous sale” of imported condensed milk
to customers in China.82 Dairy consumables took on fresh political
and even ideological meanings in China, especially as their arrival
coincided with the nation’s search for its place in the colonial world
order. 83 Frustrated by military defeats, territorial concessions, and
declining cultural prominence, Chinese intellectuals debated
heatedly about the underlying reasons for apparent Western
superiority.84 Shepherded by the commercial interests of the traders
and compradors, who wielded enormous political influence, the
intellectual crisis morphed into a wholesale obsession with Western
science, commodities, health, and nutrition.85 In this context, the line
was blurred between national strength and personal health. A foreign,
but nevertheless enviable, symbol of the Western diet, milk came to
be seen as an essential ingredient in China’s belated entry into
modernity. 86 This led to the creation of a small Chinese dairy
80

Nissim Silanikove et al., The Interrelationships Between Lactose Intolerance
and the Modern Dairy Industry: Global Perspectives in Evolutional and Historical
Backgrounds, 7 NUTRIENTS 7312, 73161 (2015).
81 See Thomas David DuBois, Branding and Retail Strategy in the Condensed Milk
Trade: Borden and Nestlé in East Asia, 1870-1929, BUSINESS HISTORY (2019),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00076791.2019.1688302.
82 See Thomas David DuBois, China’s Dairy Century: Making, Drinking and
Dreaming of Milk, in ANIMALS AND HUMAN SOCIETY IN ASIA: HISTORICAL,
CULTURAL AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES, 179, 179–211 (Rotem. Kowner et al. eds.,
2019).
83 See LO SHUK YING (盧淑櫻), Muru Yu Niunai: Jindai Zhongguo Muqin Jusese
de Chong Su, 1895-1937 (母乳與牛奶: 近代中國母親角色的重塑, 1895-1937)
[MOTHER’S MILK AND COW’S MILK: REINVENTION OF MOTHERHOOD IN MODERN
CHINA, 1895-1937] (2018).
84 See ROGASKI, supra note 4
85 See Fu, supra note 76, at 47.
86 See Xiaoqian Hu, “A Glass of Milk Strengthens a Nation.” Law Development,
and China’s Dairy Tale, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 78, 78 (2020).
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industry, centered in the coastal cities and, more importantly, in the
Northeast, an area greatly influenced by Russian refugees, first from
the Great War, and then from the Bolshevik Revolution, who in some
cases brought entire dairy herds with them.87 Since then, China has
continued to integrate dairy into its diet, gradually internalizing a
form of “animal colonialism”88 into the culinary map of the nation.
The political turmoil of the twentieth century
notwithstanding, there was remarkable continuity in the promotion
of dairy in China. In Republican and Communist periods alike,
despite radically shifting winds in almost all other aspects of social
life, dairy production and consumption were consistently celebrated
as evidence of progress and prosperity. 89 Even under Japanese
occupation in the 1930s and 40s, Chinese dairy entrepreneurs
managed to enlist the support of authorities in expanding their
businesses, owing to the successful framing of milk-drinking “as the
key to China’s success in the evolutionary struggle to survive.” 90
The immediate post World War II period brought a flood of cheap
milk powder from the United States, and dairy modernization was
part of the first Five Year Plan after the birth of the “new China” in
1949.91 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the status of dairy remained
high, though supply was limited.92 Milk was classified as a “special
commodity” and allocated primarily to soldiers, cadres, and to the
young and old in urban areas.93
As the Chinese economy began to liberalize in the 1980s, the
dairy industry received yet another boost with its association with
western modernity, which has continued unabated. 94 A sign of
milk’s current status can be seen in this advertisement from early
2020 which appeared on Shanghai television, featuring Princess
Anne's son, Peter Phillips, advertising milk from Jersey cows.95

See The Dairy Market in China Will Be the World’s Largest by 2022, DAXUE
CONSULTING (June 1, 2020), https://daxueconsulting.com/china-dairy-market/.
88 See Mathilde Cohen, Animal Colonialism: The Case of Milk, 111 AM. J. INT’L
L. UNBOUND 267, 267–71 (2017).
89 See Silankiove et al., supra note 80, at 7313-15.
90 Glosser, supra note 76, at 209.
91 See A Look Through Time: Transformation of China’s Dairy Sector, DAIRY
GLOB. (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.dairyglobal.net/Markettrends/Articles/2021/4/A-look-through-time-Transformation-of-Chinas-dairysector-739294E/.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 See id.
95 Rebecca Taylor, Queen’s Grandson Peter Phillips Flogs Royal Connections in
Chinese Milk Ad, SKY NEWS (Jan. 21, 2020), https://news.sky.com/story/queensgrandson-peter-phillips-flogs-royal-connections-in-chinese-milk-ad-11913938.
87
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Figure 8. Chinese milk advertisement featuring Peter Phillips96
Nestle, which arrived in Shanghai in 1907, built its first
factory in Shuangcheng in 1987, which opened in 1990.97 The Swiss
dairy giant has not only brought wholesale transformations to the
local economy wherever it went, but also made rapid gains in market
share. Advertisements for Nestle’s infant formula was common in
Chinese hospitals from the late 1990s into the first decade of this
century.98 By 1999, Nestle’s total revenue of 13.3 billion US dollars
was 74 times that of Shanghai Bright, one of the largest Chinese dairy

Geroge Bowden, Does a Milk Advert Show Harry and Meghan’s Future?, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51188894.
97 See NESTLÉ, NESTLÉ IN CHINA CREATING SHARED VALUE 4 (2012), available at
https://www.nestle.com/sites/default/files/assetlibrary/documents/library/document
s/corporate_social_responsibility/nestle_china_csv_report_2012_english%20versi
on.pdf.
98 Personal communication from Chun-mei Li to authors (March 2021). The
government now encourages breast feeding but the law is relatively permissive
with respect to advertising substitutes for breast milk. See Fang Jin, Marketing of
Infant Formula Must be Regulated, CHINA DAILY,
http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201905/09/WS5cd35d4fa3104842260ba9a5.html
(May 9, 2019).
96
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firms.99 Nestle is now the largest food and beverage company in the
Chinese market.100
While firms like Nestlé are at the forefront of Chinese dairy
development, their success would not have been possible without the
systematic backing of the Chinese state at all levels. The most
significant piece of China’s governmental push for dairy is the school
milk program. It began piloting in five of China’s most populated
cities in 1999, promoting the centralized sales and distribution of
ultra-pasteurized liquid milk to schoolchildren at the prescribed daily
consumption level of 200 ml.101 By 2020, the program covered a total
of 26 million schoolchildren in more than 63 thousand schools all
over the country, becoming a stable sales channel for 123 dairy firms
that are enrolled as program suppliers.102
In numerous public reports and policy documents, the
Chinese Dairy Association identifies rural China’s low consumption
of liquid cow milk as a sure sign of backwardness, hence targeted
marketing in rural areas. 103 In school milk promotional materials,
liquid cow milk is commonly depicted as a desirable way of life, an
essential ingredient for student health, and a symbol of the modern
economy. 104 The program is promoted through officially-endorsed
press conferences, required health courses, student quizzes, radio
programs, parent meetings, and even an annual School Milk Day.105

99

Huijun Zhang (张辉军), Xibu Nai Ye Mianlin de Tiaozhan He Zhanlue Xuanze
Challenges and Strategic Choices Faced by Western Dairy Industry (西部奶业面
临的挑战和战略选择) [Challenges and Strategic Choices Faced by Western
Dairy Industry], GANSU NONGYE (1 甘肃农业) [GANU AGRICULTURE], no. 1 2001
at 59, 59-63.
100 NESTLÉ, supra note 97, at 2.
101 See School Milk Programme Under Way, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 21, 2001),
http://www.china.org.cn/english/SO-e/22455.htm.
102 Guoija “Xuesheng Yinyong Nai Jihua” Shishi 20 Nian Ji Xiandai Nai Ye
Pingjia Tixi Jianshe Tuijin Hui Zai Beijing Longzhong Zhaokai (国家“学生饮用

奶计划”实施 20 年暨现代奶业评价体系建设推进会在北京隆重召开) [The
20th Year of the Implementation of the National “Student Milk Drinking Plan”
and the Promotion Meeting for the Construction of a Modern Dairy Evaluation
System Were Held in Beijing], ZHONGGUO NAI YE XIEHUI (中国奶业协会) [DAIRY
ASS’N OF CHINA (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.dac.org.cn/read/newgndt21011414300550910155.jhtm.
103 See School Milk Programme Under Way, supra note 101.
104 Michaela Böhme, ‘Milk from the Purest Place on Earth’: Examining Chinese
Investments in the Australian Dairy Sector, 38 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES, 327, 330
(2020).
105 See School Milk Programme Under Way, supra note 101.
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In its push for uniformity and safety, the program only
allows for packaged, ultra-pasteurized liquid cow milk with long
shelf lives. 106 The government’s promotion of this single product
type has raised many controversies, especially in western regions
where ethnic minority children are accustomed to drinking fresh
dairy milk from local – if not their own – cattle farms.107 Despite such
pushback, the school milk program’s nationwide endorsement has
successfully enabled ultra-pasteurized milk to grow from obscurity
to monopoly in China – commanding 77.3 percent of the market,
according to a randomized household survey in 2014.108 This figure
can be corroborated by dairy firm earnings data, where sales of ultrapasteurized milk contributed 64.2 billion RMB (approximately 10
billion USD) or 71 percent of the total revenue for Yili, the largest
dairy conglomerate in China. 109 In the span of only two decades,
China moved from localized, smallholder dairy operations to
concentrated, industrial production of dairy by a handful of
conglomerates.110 When the industrialized model so easily takes over
and becomes the norm of dairy-making, the entire dairy economy is
built around the self-fulling prophecy of scale, quantity, and
efficiency, leaving aside questions of animal welfare, sustainability,
and well-being.111
The stunning growth of China’s domestic dairy economy has
provided the impetus and capital for global expansion. In recent
years, as the Chinese economy grows beyond China, the dairy sector
is at the forefront of global China’s expansive reach. Under the rubric
of the “Dairy Belt and Road,” for example, Chinese state capital has
been aggressively mobilizing domestic demand in order for statebacked dairy conglomerates to establish a truly global supply chain
106

Id.
See Qiaoqiao Guan (关俏俏) & Jie Liu (刘杰), Xinjiang Xuesheng Nai Jihua
Tuixing Shu Nian Zaoyu Ganga (疆‘学生奶’计划推行数年遭遇尴尬) [School
Milk Programs Go Awry in Xinjiang] (新疆‘学生奶’计划推行数年遭遇尴尬),
107

XXINHUA DIAO (新华调) INHUA (July 19, 2011),
https://news.qq.com/a/20110719/000959.htm.
108 Zhai Shixian (翟世贤) et al., Shouru Zengzhang He Chengshi Hua Dui Yetai
Nai XiaofeinJiegou de Yingxiang (收入增长和城市化对液态奶消费结构的影响)
[The Impact of Income Growth and Urbanization on Liquid Milk Consumption
Structure], 8 ZHONGGUO NONGCUN JINGJI (中国农村经济) [CHINESE RURAL
ECON.] 45, 50 (2017).
109 See Dairy Global, The Dairy Market in China Will Be the World’s Largest by
2022, supra note 83.
110 See id.
111 CHRISTOPHER SCHLOTTMANN & JEFF SEBO, FOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: AN ETHICAL APPROACH (2018).
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from New Zealand to the Netherlands. 112 Today the largest dairy
farm in the world is the Mudanjiang City Mega Farm, located on the
China-Russia border, which mainly supplies the Russian market.113
It is an almost total confinement system in which its 100,000 dairy
cows almost never see grass or experience daylight. 114 Outside
China, in Chinese conglomerate Mengniu’s “flagship” plant in New
Zealand’s Pōkeno Village, which has a population of approximately
400, the idyllic landscape has been forever transformed. 115 The
plant’s Chinese manager boasted that “when we came here in 2013,
it was all pasture here. Within just six years, the population of
Pōkeno has doubled, and the employment and infrastructure
construction in town have also improved a lot".116
And yet, things are not so simple. According to China’s
official statistical yearbooks, since China’s opening in the 1980s,
meat and dairy production have increased enormously, still dairy
follows its own distinctive course.117 In the early 2000s, Chinese
dairy output grew at a pace that exceeded that of all other animal
protein sources. Yet, circa 2006, dairy output reached an inflection
point and has since remained stable.118

See Yifei Li & Judith Shapiro, Rethinking Extractivism on China’s Belt and
Road: Food, Tourism, and Talent, in OUR EXTRACTIVE AGE: EXPRESSIONS OF
VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE 135, 138-42 (Judith Shapiro & John-Andrew McNeish
eds., 2021).
113 Amber Pariona, Biggest Farms in the World, WORLD ATLAS (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/biggest-farms-in-the-world.html.
114 Qingcai Liu (刘清才) & Xin Qi (齐欣), “Yidai Yilu” Kuangjia Xia Zhongguo
112

Dongbei Diqu Yu Eluosi Yuandong Diqu Fazhan Zhanlue Duijie Yu Hezuo (‘一带

一路’框架下中国东北地区与俄罗斯远东地区发展战略对接与合作)
[Development Strategy Docking and Cooperation Between Northeast China and
Russia’s Far East Within the Framework of the Belt and Road Initiative], 27 DONG
BEI YA LUN TAN (东北亚论坛) [NE. ASIA F.], no. 2 (2018).
115 See Jamie Gray, Chinese Dairy Giant Mengniu Eyes Formula Expansion at
Pokeno, N.Z. HERALD (July 7, 2018),
https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/chinese-dairy-giant-mengniu-eyes-formulaexpansion-at-pokeno/Q6NFFTDCDF4OBMZGW6RCH7HJ2Y/.
116 Yashili Factory Helps Reshaping Pokeno, a Small Town of New Zealand,
XINHUA (Oct. 14, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201910/14/c_138470996.htm.
117 See The Dairy Market in China Will Be the World’s Largest by 2022, supra
note 87.
118 See PWC, THE ONGOING MODERNISATION OF CHINA’S DAIRY SECTOR 4, 4
(2019), https://www.pwccn.com/en/food-supply/publications/modernization-ofchina-dairy-industry.pdf.
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Figure 9. China’s Meat and Dairy Output (1980-2018)119
Part of the explanation for this apparent anomaly is the dairy
scandals of the first decade of this century and the resulting growth
of dairy imports. The best known of these scandals came to light in
2008, and concerns the Sanlu Group, a state-owned Chinese dairy
products company that produced one of the oldest and most popular
brands of infant formula in China.120 The company adulterated milk
and infant formula with melamine in order to increase the nitrogen
content of diluted milk, thus giving it the appearance of higher
protein content, allowing it to pass quality control tests. 121 This

119

China Statistical Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
See Echo Huang, Ten Years After China’s Infant Milk Tragedy, Parents Still
Won’t Trust Their Babies to Local Formula, QUARTZ (July 16, 2018),
https://qz.com/1323471/ten-years-after-chinas-melamine-laced-infant-milktragedy-deep-distrust-remains/.
121 See id.
120
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resulted in 300,000 illnesses, 54,000 hospitalizations, and 6
deaths.122
A consequence of these scandals was a massive increase in
dairy imports, as Chinese consumer confidence in domestic products
tanked.123

Figure 10. China’s dairy imports (1995-2013)124
New Zealand has been the major beneficiary of this market
shift, yet, ironically, a New Zealand company, Fonterra, owned 43%
of Sanlu at the time of the scandal.125 Fonterra’s CEO was criticized
both in the business press and by New Zealand’s prime minister for
his ethical failings, yet he went on to continue to have a distinguished

122

See Xuli Wu et al., Challenges to Improve the Safety of Dairy Products in
China, 76 TRENDS FOOD SCI. & TECH. 6, 8 (2018).
123 See Yuting Wang et al., Dynamic Analysis of China’s Imported Raw Milk
Powder Consumption, 12 SUSTAINABILITY 1542, 1543-44 (2020).
124 Aussie FTA and Chinese Dairy Imports, DIM SUMS BLOG (Dec. 26, 2014),
http://dimsums.blogspot.com/2014/12/aussie-fta-and-chinese-dairy-imports.html
(analyzing China customs data).
125 See Edward Wong, Company at Core of China’s Milk Scandal Is Declared
Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/25/world/asia/25milk.html.
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career.126 Sanlu executives were not so fortunate: two were executed
and four others were imprisoned.127
Despite the long history of promoting dairy both by foreign
companies and the Chinese state, the overall result is surprising.
Dairy consumption has increased, but there has been nothing like the
spike that has occurred with respect to meat. Moreover, in relative
terms, China’s per capita dairy consumption remains a fraction of
that in industrialized economies. As the following figure shows,
Chinese per capita consumption in whole milk equivalent is about
1/10 of that of the United States.

Figure 11. Per capita consumption across selected countries in Milk
Equivalent (ME)

126

See Van der Heyden to Step Down as Fonterra Chair, Norris Tapped, N. Z.
HERALD (Nov. 16, 2011), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/van-der-heyden-tostep-down-as-fonterra-chair-norristapped/IMO64UD6BDVNCG3IFVTQ634WDA/.
127 See Tania Branigan, China Executes Two for Tainted Milk Scandal, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/24/china-executes-milk-scandalpair.
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NOTE: Per capita consumptions of each country are obtained
dividing total consumption (Source FAS-USDA) by the population
(Source FAO, Eurostat).128
This makes it all the more puzzling why the food pagodas
recommend such unrealistically high levels of dairy consumption,
especially since, as we have suggested, they largely follow
consumption rather than leading it. This becomes easier to
understand when we see that the food pagodas are just one element
of what we might call the “Chinese food/nutrition policy complex,”
which consists of overlapping layers of authority that represent the
internal checks and balances of the Chinese policymaking process.
The food pagodas overlap with several other guidance
documents and policy instruments, including most notably the
National Outline for Food and Nutritional Development (2014 to
2020) 129 , the National Nutritional Plan (2017 to 2030, with
qualitative goals only; not included in Figure 12)130, and the Healthy
China Action Plan (2019 to 2030, reiterating the goals in the national
outline), as well as countless provincial and local mandates and
directives on the same subjects.131 Unlike the food pagoda, which is
a public-facing document, these other elements in the policy128

Per Capita Consumption,
CLAL, https://www.clal.it/en/index.php?section=tabs_consumi_procapite (Sept.
11, 2021).
129 See generally Guowuyuan Bangong Ting (国务院办公厅) [Office of the State
Council], Zhong Guo Shi Wu Yu Yingyang Fazhan Gangyao (2014-2020 Nian) (中

国食物与营养发展纲要（2014—2020 年)) [China Food and Nutrition
Development Program (2014-2020)], ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG
RENMIN ZHENGFU (中華人民共和國中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2014-02/10/content_2581766.htm.
130 See generally Guowuyuan Bangong Ting (国务院办公厅) [Office of the State
Council], Guomin Yingyang Jihua (2017-2030 Nian) (国民营养计划（2017—
2030 年) de Tongzhi [National Nutrition Plan (2017-2030)], ZHONGUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU (中華人民共和國中央人民政府)
[THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (July 13, 2017),
http://ww.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/13/content_5210134.htm.
131 See Jiankang Zhongguo Xingdong Tuijin Weiyuanhui (健康中国行动推进委
员会 ) [Health China Action Promotion Committee], Jiankang Zhongguo
Xingdong (2019-2030 Nian) (健康中国行动（2019—2030 年)) [Healthy China
Action (2019-2030)], ZHONGUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN
ZHENGFU (中華人民共和國中央人民政府) [THE CENT. PEOPLE’S GOV’T OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (July 15, 2019), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/201907/15/content_5409694.htm.
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complex serve as the media by which government agencies
communicate with each other internally.132
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Figure 12. Pagoda Recommendations, National Outlines, and Actual
Consumption Levels of Foods in China (grams/day)133
The national outline goals (Figure 12) are closer to actual
consumption levels than those of the pagoda. In the case of dairy, for
example, in contrast to the public-facing pagoda recommendation of
300 grams a day, the internal government target was only 98.6 grams
for the years 2014 to 2020.134 The pattern holds for other categories
as well.
Unlike public-facing goals in the pagoda, which are
intended to be educational and aspirational, internal goals in the
national outline are meant to be practical and actionable. 135 They
represent an internal consensus across multiple government agencies
from local to central levels. Moreover, unlike the food pagoda, the
outline targets are binding, in the sense that officials are evaluated
based on how their jurisdiction satisfies them.136

132

See Guowuyuan Bangong Ting (国务院办公厅) [Office of the State Council],

supra note 129; Guowuyuan Bangong Ting (国务院办公厅) [Office of the State
Council], supra note 130; Jiankang Zhongguo Xingdong Tuijin Weiyuanhui (健康
中国行动推进委员会) [Health China Action Promotion Committee], supra note
131.
133 China Statistical Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
134 CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY, CHINESE DIETARY GUIDELINES 20 (2016).
135 Pierre F. Landry et al., Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political
Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder, 51 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 1074,
1075 (2017), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414017730078.
136 See id.
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The discrepancy between these inward and outward-facing
documents is an indication of the complex policy process at work in
today’s China, in which policy advisors strategically put forward an
intentionally unrealistic “ask” in anticipation of an inevitable
compromise down the road. 137 From this perspective, the dairy
recommendations in the Food Pagoda can be seen as the nutritionists’
“ask” in a complex policy-making environment. While nutritionists
play an important role in advising policymakers, they do not
themselves make policies. As such, their advice is juxtaposed and
compared with advice from medical doctors, agriculturalists,
statisticians, economic development specialists, and even trade
advocates. This fragmented structure helps the Chinese state collect
a wide range of inputs, but also means that the resulting policy is the
product of compromises and trade-offs among different groups. In
this context, advancing an unrealistically big “ask” in the publicfacing food pagoda gives state nutritionists much-needed bargaining
power in the policy process. Moreover, Chinese top nutrition
scholars, like other policy actors, are influenced by their own values
and interests, and the changing landscape of research funding,
especially as dairy firms such as Danone and Nestlé fulfill their
corporate social responsibility goals through dedicated streams of
research spending. 138
The industrial advocacy group, Dairy
Association of China, is housed in an office just one floor under the
nation's top dairy research unit in the prestigious Chinese Academy
of Agricultural Science in building #3 of the complex on 2 Yuan
Ming Yuan West Road in Beijing.139
The apparent disconnect of the food pagoda is thus a
consequence of the layering of different interest groups and
bureaucratic actors in Chinese politics. In other words, what is often
dubbed the “policy implementation gap” is an inherent feature of the
137

See Xufeng Zhu, Strategy of Chinese Policy Entrepreneurs in the Third Sector:
Challenges of “Technical Infeasibility”, 41 POL’Y SCI. 315, 319 (2008),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11077-008-9070-2.
138 Yang et al., supra note 34, at 909.
139 See Nai Chanpin Zhi Liang Yu Pinggu Keji Chuangxin Tuandui (奶产品质量

与风险评估科技创新团队) [Dairy Product Quality and Risk Assessment
Technology Innovation Team], ZHONGGUO KEXUEYUAN DONGWU KEXUE YANJIU
SUO (中国科学院动物科学研究所) [INSTITUTE OF ANIMAL SCIENCES OF CAAS],
http://wztest0821.caas.cn/rctd/kytd/217524.htm (last visited Oct. 16,
2021); Zhongguo Nai Ye Xiehui Jiben Gaikuang (中国奶业协会基本概况) [Basic
Overview of Dairy Association of China], ZHONGGUO NAI YE XIEHUI (中国奶业协
会) [DAIRY ASSOCIATION OF CHINA], https://www.dac.org.cn/normal/newxhjj.jhtm
(last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
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central government’s policy process, where the public-facing
pledges and commitments run parallel to the government’s internal
action plans and strategies.140 Outward-facing policies, such as the
Food Pagoda, sketch out an aspirational image of the nation, whereas
inward-facing documents define the day-to-day governance of
China. The food pagoda, and its unrealistically high dairy
recommendation is intended not as a set of rules for citizens to abide
by on a daily basis, but as an aspirational statement that paints the
picture of the ideal national diet in the eyes of China’s
modernization-driven policymakers. While the discrepancy in policy
targets reflects the internal complexity of China’s sprawling
governing apparatus, they are in many ways disconnected from the
social experience of food in China. This disconnect is most striking
in the fact that, when it comes to actual dairy consumption, the
Chinese people have thus far, largely ignored the efforts of both
international marketers and the domestic food/nutrition policy
complex.
VI. Climate, Health and Animal Welfare
Thus far, we have shown that the goals, roles, and
consequences of the Chinese dietary recommendations are more
complex than might have been imagined. As we noted in Section III,
what caught the world’s attention in the 2016 food pagoda was its
meat reduction recommendation and its potential impact on climate
change. However, when the pagoda’s recommendations are taken as
a whole, their impact on climate change is much less positive than
might have been thought.
The per capita emission reduction potential (0.386 kg
CO2e/day) of China’s proposed cut in meat consumption in 2016, for
example, is more than wiped out by the additional emission (0.465
kg CO2e/day) of the proposed dairy increase alone. As Figure 13
shows, the CO2 emissions of the food pagoda’s recommended diet
totals at 2.895 kg CO2e/day, reflecting a 31.3 percent increase from
the observed emissions level of 2.204 kg CO2e/day in 2012. Taken
together, the CO2 implication of the food pagoda is net-positive: it
increases emissions from the current dietary baseline. However, on
a more optimistic note, compliance with the 2016 pagoda would
decrease emissions relative to the 2007 pagoda.141
140

R. Ran, Perverse Incentive Structure and Policy Implementation Gap in
China’s Local Environmental Politics, 15 J. ENV’T POL’Y & PLAN. 17, 17 (2013),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1523908X.2012.752186.
141 The GHG implications for different food categories are interpolated on the
basis of prior research, which accounts for emissions associated with production,
consumption, and waste of the average U.S. diet (Heller and Keoleian 2015), and
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CO2e/day)142
As the actual Chinese diet has become lighter by weight
(Figure 4), its CO2 emissions have increased (Figure 13), due in large
part to the shift toward carbon-intensive foods such as meats, aquatic
foods, and eggs. Still, the actual consumption behavior of the
Chinese people is more climate-friendly than what is recommended
by the state.
adapted to the Chinese context in accordance with the Chinese Nutrition Society’s
(2021) recommendations. Martin C. Heller & Gregory A. Keoleian, Greenhouse
Gas Emission Estimates of U.S. Dietary Choices and Food Loss, 19 J. INDUS.
ECOLOGY 391, 391–401 (2014),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jiec.12174; Zhongguo Jumin Shanshi
Zhinan 2021 Ban (中国居民膳食指南 2021 版) [Chinese Residents’ Dietary
Guidelines 2021 Edition], ZHONGGUO YINGYANG XUEHUI (中国营养学会)
[CHINESE NUTRITION SOCIETY], http://dg.cnsoc.org/article/2021b.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2021). The GHG coefficients and their derivative functions are recorded
in Appendix A.
142See “2006 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian” (《2006 中国卫生统计年鉴
》) [“2006 China Health Statistics Yearbook”], supra note 45; China Statistical
Yearbook 2019, supra note 45.
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While climate concerns do not figure into the construction of
the pagodas, health is an important consideration. Exactly what
conformity to the pagoda would mean in this regard is too
complicated for us to address here. However, in a society with a
growing obesity rate, 143 radically increasing dairy consumption
while decreasing the consumption of staples would appear to be
moving in the wrong direction. In addition to such direct health
effects, animal agriculture produces indirect health effects that are
often unnoticed. A paper currently under review shows that by
driving increases in PPM2.5 pollution, there were about 66,000
premature deaths in 2010 alone as a result of the intensification of
animal agriculture from 1990-2010.144
It is even more difficult to assess the full impact on animal
welfare of the dietary recommendations, especially since
consumption can drive production offshore as well as in country.
Since becoming Brazil’s largest trade partner in 2009, a position that
had been long held by the United States, China has become the
destination for increasing volumes of Brazilian shipments of soy and
beef products, thus driving Amazonian deforestation in Brazil. 145
Current estimates suggest that the size of China’s dairy herd will
continue to decrease over the next few years but, due to imports, the
impact on dairy cows globally may increase.146 Even if the pagoda’s
recommended decreases in beef consumption were achieved, in
terms of the total number of animals killed for food, it would be more
than offset by increases in the consumption of aquatic animals. What
is more likely to happen, in any case, is that the consumption of
aquatic animals will increase and be added to further increases in
meat consumption.147 Already, as of 2018 China slaughtered more
pigs, chickens, sheep, and fish than any other country, and was
poised to surpass the United States with respect to cows. 148 In
See Sintia Radu, China’s Obesity Rate Triples in 10 Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/201910-28/obesity-rates-in-china-have-tripled-over-the-past-10-years.
144 See Xueying Liu et al., Dietary Shifts Can Reduce Premature Deaths Related to
Particulate Matter Pollution in China, 2 NATURE FOOD 997 (2021),
https://doi.org/10.1038/s43016-021-00430-6.
145 Philip M. Fearnside, Amazonian Forest Loss and the Long Reach of China’s
Influence, 15 ENV’T, DEV. & SUSTAINABILITY 325, 325 (2012),
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10668-012-9412-2.
146 See Heller & Keoleian, supra note 141.
147 Richard York, Poultry and Fish and Aquatic Invertebrates Have Not Displaced
Other Meat Sources, 4 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 766, 766-68 (2021),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-021-00714-6.
148 Bas Sanders, Global Animal Slaughter Statistics & Charts: 2020 Update,
FAUNALYTICS (July 29, 2020), https://faunalytics.org/global-animal-slaughterstatistics-and-charts-2020-update/.
143
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addition to concerns about the number of animals killed, Chinese law
provides virtually no legal protection for animals used in
agriculture.149
VII. Concluding Remarks
In the opening chapter of his three-volume treatise entitled
General Plan for Nation Building, the founding president of the
Republic of China, Sun Yat-Sun, proudly proclaimed:
“All of China is culturally accustomed to
vegetarianism. … By contrast, Europeans
and Americans are in the fashion of
carnivorism and alcoholism, in spite of
scientific advocacy on the one hand and
regulatory prohibition on the other. . . .
Chinese cultural customs of eating and
drinking are assuredly superior to that of all
other nations.”150
Sun arrived at this sweeping conclusion of national
gastronomical superiority based on one single foodstuff—tofu.
“Tofu is a must for the Chinese vegetarian diet; it is the plant-based
equivalent of meat. It has all the benefits of meat, but none of its
toxins,” Sun asserted.151 To the “founding father” of modern China,
tofu was the anchor of national identity.
China has no responsibility to “save the world,” but a nation
that resists dairy, finds tofu as an anchor of its national identity, and
whose dietary regulations call for a level of meat consumption that
is 1/5th of that of North America and Australia, and about 1/4th of that
of Europe, can provide important lessons to the world; and for China,
this can be an important source of “soft power.” For this to occur,
the food pagoda would have to become more coherent with respect
to its impacts on climate, health, and animal welfare and also more
efficacious with respect to behavior, at least with its recommendation
to reduce meat consumption.
Recommendations are not selfenforcing and it is the job of a government that organizes and
administers a complex set of policies and negotiates competing
interests to make recommendations real in everyday life. There is a
widely held assumption—sometimes even hope—that China’s topdown political system can compel citizens and firms to adopt
149

See DEBORAH CAO, ANIMALS IN CHINA: LAW AND SOCIETY (2015); PETER J. LI,
ANIMAL WELFARE IN CHINA 10-11 (2021).
150 SUN YAT-SEN, GENERAL PLAN FOR NATION BUILDING (建國方略) (1917).
151 Id.
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sweeping changes in the interest of the common good simply by
ordering them to do so. This is at best an illusion and at worst a
delusion in most areas of life. 152 In any case the pagoda, in its
political and bureaucratic contexts, turns out to be a remarkably soft
instrument of public policy, adapting to, as much as challenging, the
society’s changing dietary patterns. The image of the Chinese
government as a proactive, draconian climate defender does not hold
up, at least not now, in the case of the food pagoda.
What our investigation shows is that the Chinese
food/nutrition policy complex tends to frame rural China as a space
that lags behind and needs to catch up with urban modernity.153 But
perhaps it is not rural China that has lagged behind, but rather urbanoriented food policies that are leading towards a dystopian future.
With their dependence on plant-based food sources, preference for
local supplies, attention to seasonality and active involvement in
agricultural production, the rural people of China have wisdom,
experience, and culture to offer. We are keenly aware of the danger
in romanticizing rural ways of life, especially as growing numbers of
Chinese urbanites flock to rural areas to get a taste of romantic
rurality. 154 Much of this romanticizing reflects a jarring lack of
evidence-based understanding of China’s vast rural areas.
However, future research would do well to examine more closely
food, nutrition, sustainability and health in rural contexts.
Just as rural areas have much to offer to a rapidly urbanizing
China, the country’s own past also holds a rich repertoire of wisdom
for living through the Anthropocene. In a rare display of internal
dissent, Xianglin Xu, a seasoned economist at the Central Party
School, wrote in criticism of the 1996 food pagoda that:
“the nutritionists’ proposal is incompatible with
our national conditions. . . . Advocating for fully
Westernizing our diet, [the food pagoda] tries to
turn from plant-based food sources to animal ones,
just like post-war Japan did. The result in Japan is
that 60 percent of their caloric intake has become
152

See, e.g., Mark Beeson, Coming to Terms with the Authoritarian Alternative:
The Implications and Motivations of China’s Environmental Policies, 5 ASIA &
PAC. POL’Y STUD. 34, 38 (2017),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/app5.217.
153 See Afton Clarke-Sather, ‘But We Are the Most Backward’: Hierarchical
Categorization of Modernity in Contemporary Chinese National Identity, 83 POL.
GEOGRAPHY 1,8 (2020),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629820303231.
154 See Choong-Hwan Park, Nongjiale Tourism and Contested Space in Rural
China, 40 MODERN CHINA 519, 543 (2014).
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import-dependent by the 1990s. … It seems
impossible for China to afford the same.”155
Xu’s dissent has gone unnoticed in the last two decades and
a half. China’s policymakers are yet to fully appreciate the real costs
of abandoning plant-based food traditions in favor of animal-based
culinary modernity.
Still, there are hopeful signs from many different directions.
The China Vegan Society launched in May 2021 in Yunnan. 156
Buying discounted foods close to their “sell by” dates is becoming
common among young people.157 The COVID pandemic gave many
in China renewed impetus for moving toward a plant-based diet.158
Nestle plans to build a plant-based meat factory in Tianjin.159 As in
the rest of the world, capital is beginning to move towards plantbased protein.
In the final analysis, the problem is not that the Chinese state
has been slow to foster a healthy and sustainable diet for the nation
of 1.4 billion, but rather that the state has sometimes acted too much
and often incoherently.160 On the receiving end of mixed, frequently
changing signals, the people have not been presented with clear
messaging about food that actually engages with the realities of
everyday life. If the state can dial back its promotion of the modern,
urban diet, and foster the rediscovery of the many centuries of
culinary richness—let food be what it has always been in the Middle
Kingdom: culture, tradition, and identity—then Sun Yat-Sun’s hope
of becoming “assuredly superior to that of all other nations”161 might

155

Xianglin Xu (徐祥临), Dietary Guidelines Should Be Based on National

Conditions (制定膳食指南要符合国情), 18 理论前沿 (1996).
156 See Samantha J. Hind, China Vegan Society: An Alternative Vegan Activist
Approach, SURGE (July 28, 2021), https://www.surgeactivism.org/articles/chinavegan-society-an-alternative-vegan-activist-approach.
157 Phoebe Zhang, Near-Expired Food Bargain Sales the Latest Trend in China as
Beijing’s Anti-Waste Drive Picks up, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 24, 2021),
https://sg.news.yahoo.com/near-expired-food-bargain-sales-090157739.html.
158 Pamela Lin, Meatless Encounters, CHINA DAILY (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://epaper.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202009/18/WS5f63fbf1a31099a2343506f4.htm
l.
159 Wang Zhouquong, Nestle Launches New Line of Plant-Based Food, CHINA
DAILY (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202012/18/WS5fdc740aa31024ad0ba9cb86.htm.
160 China is not alone in this. See, e.g., Maneesha Deckha, Something to
Celebrate?: Demoting Dairy in Canada’s National Food Guide, 16 J. FOOD L. &
POL’Y 11, 11-47 (2020).
161SUN, supra note 150.
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just be within reach and, as a consequence, China may yet help to
save the world.

